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## THESIS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SYSTEMIC AND  
DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING NATO ENLARGEMENT  
TO CENTRAL EUROPE

by

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September 1996

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First, case studies provide a view of some of the systemic and state level shaping affecting the debate in Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the United States. Second, the study pits contending theories of these levels of analysis against each other to see if one does a better job of explaining/predicting state behavior. Finally, the study gives an overview of several policy implications of enlargement, including: how security guarantees will be extended to new members; possible Russian reactions to enlargement; and, strategies for enlargement to ameliorate the expected adverse reaction of the Russians. How NATO expands will directly influence how the Russians react.

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CENTRAL EUROPE**

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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

NATO enlargement is the most contentious issue affecting the European security environment. Given that it is likely to occur, it is the responsibility of policy analysts and leaders to consider both the expected benefits for and the possible consequences of enlargement upon the overall security environment. To do this, policy makers must have the tools to explore all aspects of the issue. This study attempts to provide three such tools.

First, case studies provide a view of some of the systemic and state level factors shaping the debate in Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the United States. Second, the study pits contending theories of these levels of analysis against each other to see if one does a better job of explaining/predicting state behavior. Finally, the study gives an overview of several policy implications of enlargement, including: how security guarantees will be extended to new members; possible Russian reactions to enlargement; and, strategies for enlargement to ameliorate the expected adverse reaction of the Russians. How NATO expands will directly influence how the Russians react.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

*The old order is dying, the new cannot yet be born. In the period between, morbid realities assert themselves.*

Antonio Gramsci

*The expansion of NATO is no longer a question of whether, but when and how.*

President Bill Clinton  
Warsaw, July 1994

*NATO is acting like a big drunken hooligan in a kindergarten who says he will hit anyone he likes.*

Aleksandr Lebed  
Secretary, National Security Council  
Russian Federation

### A. INTRODUCTION

There have been those who have described the area between Germany and Russia as a "security vacuum." According to Howard Frost, a Washington-based international security affairs analyst, "As applied to Eastern Europe, the concept of a security vacuum is intended to refer to the region's lack of international structure, uncertain democracies, weak economies, ethnic strife, and potentially troublesome neighbors to the east." (Frost, 1993, p. 37) Others have termed the area a "grey zone" between Russia and Western Europe, neither black nor white, but some mixture of the two. (Kaminski, 1994)

This terminology has two main problems. The first is that it is almost universally applied in a pejorative sense. The second is that it is applied monolithically. Security vacuum, grey zone, and even seemingly innocuous geographically-based terms such as Central and Eastern Europe all have connotations of uniformity. However, this is not the case within the area. While there are certain characteristics and concerns that all of the countries in the region share, they each also possess a unique set of circumstances and perspectives. This is also true of the countries outside of the region who are affected by the stability, or instability, of the region.

Regardless of the similarities and differences between the countries involved in the debate, they would all agree on one thing -- today, the most contentious issue in European security is the possible future enlargement<sup>1</sup> of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Central and Eastern

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<sup>1</sup>Throughout much of the literature and debate on this subject, the terms *enlargement* and *expansion* are used interchangeably. Whether by astute political foresight or inadvertent luck, NATO chose the term *enlargement* in its first study of the subject. The terminological problem is that the two terms have different connotations, one negative and one positive, when translated into Russian. In The Oxford Russian-English Dictionary, *expansion* (ЭКСПАНСИЯ) has a political connotation, and it is the root word for the noun *expansionism* (ЭКСПАНСИОНИЗМ) and the adjective *expansionist(ic)* (ЭКСПАНСИОНИСТСКИЙ). According to Oleg Ivanov, a Russian student at the Naval Postgraduate School, these translations of *expansion* are negative, due to the political connotation. *Enlargement* (РАСПИРЕНИЕ), on the other hand, does not have a political connotation or negative translation. It can also mean *broadening*, *widening*, or *extension*, which are more "politically correct." Therefore, this study will use *enlargement* to preclude any prior biases.

Europe. One would expect such a volatile subject to receive in-depth study and analysis. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of 1991, governments, their militaries, foreign policy experts, and academics, from Washington to Moscow, have been analyzing, discussing, and weighing options on the enlargement of NATO.

## **B. METHODOLOGY**

Each country involved has its own position, or set of positions, on the debate. For this study, there are a number of key questions. Why do nations align? What are the structural and domestic factors and conditions that affect a country's support or opposition to alliance formation, expansion, or continuation? Why do alliances continue to exist if the threat they were designed to oppose is gone? And, do structural or domestic political theories have greater explanatory power to predict or explain the actions of the individual states?

The task of this study is to seek answers to these questions by examining the positions on the NATO enlargement debate across six countries. Using International Relations (IR) theories, it will analyze the perspectives of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the Central European states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The study will examine these perspectives comparatively,

conducting qualitative case studies based on two competing levels of analysis: 1) the international system (systemic), and 2) the state system (domestic).

Hopefully, the comparative case studies will provide three things. First, they will provide a deeper understanding of the individual situations of the six countries; Second, they will provide a survey the relative explanatory powers of the competing theories and levels of analysis to determine if one does a more consistent job of predicting and explaining the states' actions. Finally, it will attempt to provide an overview of some pertinent implications of the enlargement process.

The systemic and domestic levels of analysis were chosen because there is a continuous and vibrant debate between supporters of the two over which does a better job explaining the causes of state behavior. At the systemic level, the belief is that states are unitary actors trying to survive in an anarchical system. Since there is no central authority, states seek to ensure their survival by maximizing their power relative to other states. At the level of the state, the belief is that internal workings and conditions of the state, such as type of regime and economic interdependence, can affect the behavior of the state.

The relative explanatory power of each level of analysis is tested by inferring hypotheses from each on the balancing behavior of states. The inferred hypotheses are then applied to the current alignment decisions of Russia, the United States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia to see which theories better explain their actions. Within the systemic level of analysis, this study infers hypotheses from balance of power and balance of threat theories. At the state level, the study infers hypotheses from theories on the political stability of the government, economic conditions, and the internal security threat to the country. Chapter II discusses this theoretical framework and underpinnings of the research.

Chapters III through VIII are the comparative case studies of the Russian, Central European (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), and U.S. perspectives, respectively. According to Barry R. Posen, professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "The comparative case method allows the scholar to sample a range of causes identified as important by each theory, and to see if variations in those causes do indeed produce variations in outcomes." (Posen, 1984, p. 8) Variation in the causes, or independent variables, was a key criterion in case selection. Other criteria included a requirement to examine both

countries who support and oppose NATO enlargement (variation in the dependent variable) and countries who cannot afford to ignore the issue of NATO enlargement. Based on these criteria, the previously mentioned cases were selected.

There is a wide variation in the independent variables of the six states. At the systemic level, there is a great disparity between the military power of the United States and all the other states. Large gradations in military power also exist both within the Central European states and between these states and Russia. Threat perceptions and geographical proximity to potential threats, two key factors in balance of threat theory, are also different among the six states. The United States has the benefit of the Atlantic Ocean between it and Europe, while Russia fears NATO's potential movement closer to its borders.

There are also wide variations in the state level independent variables. The United States has a stable political system, while those of Russia and Slovakia are questionable. The political stability of the others lies somewhere in between. Economic conditions also vary drastically among the six states. In addition, Russia and Slovakia face significant potential internal security threats, while the United States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland do not for various reasons.



When it comes to support for the enlargement of NATO, the variations among the states are less. Russia outright opposes NATO enlargement. It is the only one; all of the other states support it. However, there are differences in the degree of support for enlargement among these other states. The United States has agreed, in principle, that the Alliance should expand in the future. Currently, however, the U.S. leaders have not supported a definite time line for admission of new members. The other states would like to see NATO open its doors immediately to new members.

Finally, each of these states cannot afford to ignore the NATO enlargement issue. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter, "It is axiomatic that the security of America and Europe are linked." (Brzezinski, 1995, p. 26) Anthony Lake, the current Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has said, "History has taught us that when Europe is in turmoil, America suffers, and when Europe is peaceful and prosperous, America can thrive as well." (Lake, 1996)

While some of this is undoubtedly rhetoric, the economic importance of Europe to the United States cannot be discounted. More than 50 percent of U.S. investment abroad is in Europe. And, more than 60 percent of direct foreign investment in the United States comes from Europe. Finally,

Europe is the United States' second largest customer and second largest supplier, behind Asia. (Office of International Security Affairs [OISA], 1996)

Russia also cannot ignore the security situation in Central Europe or the possible enlargement of NATO. NATO is a military organization, a historical enemy of the former Soviet Union, that is potentially moving closer to the borders of the Russian Federation at a time when Russia is militarily weakened. Russia has to contemplate the possibilities. According to Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, deputy secretary general of the Russian Security Council, NATO's "expansion . . . means the creation of a new line that divides the continent and is on or close to Russia's state borders . . . . The decision on enlargement is a call from the past. Its implementation will force Russia to take adequate countermeasures." (Schmidt-Haeuer, 1995)

Finally, the states of Central Europe cannot ignore the issue of NATO enlargement, either. They all perceive a "security vacuum" left by the dissolution of the bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. They feel that they need to integrate into the structures of the West, primarily NATO and the European Union (EU). (Reisch, 1994)

Of course, the selected cases are not the universe of cases that could be included in this study. The case could be made that other NATO members should be included besides the United States. There are variations in the independent variables among the other members, each supports NATO enlargement to one degree or the other, and there are compelling reasons why some of them cannot ignore the potential consequences of enlargement. Particularly, Britain, Germany, and France, the major continental powers in NATO, and Norway, Greece, and Turkey, as the main "flank" members of NATO, cannot ignore the issue.

Unfortunately, the choice is one of resources. There is not enough time or resources available to do a systematic study of all cases. Therefore, the United States was selected as the representative member of NATO. This was done for the simple reason that America is the leader of the Alliance and has the greatest weight, both from a contribution point of view and a policy point of view. As a NATO diplomat put it, the "way things generally work in NATO . . . [is] America gets what it wants." (Dobbs, 5 July, 1995) Empirical evidence tends to bear this out. The case of Bosnia is a good example. Without U.S. involvement and sheparding of the Dayton Accords, it is doubtful that the European NATO members would have broken out of their parochial infighting to find a solution.

Therefore, this work will conduct comparative case studies on the positions of the United States, Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia with regards to NATO enlargement. The hope is that the final results of this study will provide policy analysts a heuristic tool for studying the problem and developing relevant policies. The final chapter, Chapter IX, seeks to draw out relevant policy implications from the focused comparisons. It will also seek to determine the relative explanatory power of the competing theories to explain and predict states' actions when it comes to alignment choices.

## II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

*Shall I join with other nations in alliance?  
If allies are weak, am I not best alone?  
If allies are strong with power to protect me,  
Might they not protect me out of all I own?*

*The King of Siam  
The King and I<sup>2</sup>*

*It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name (Liska, 1962, p. 3).*

### A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is broken down into three sections. The first section deals with alliances in the international relations arena. The second section discusses the use of multiple "images" to study the phenomenon of alliances.<sup>3</sup> These images correspond to the levels of analysis in the Chapter One. The section lays out theory relevant to the "third image," or the international system level, and the "second image," or the state level. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the chapter and reiterates key hypotheses inferred throughout.

<sup>2</sup>Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein, *The King and I*; cited by Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments," *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer '91, p. 375.

<sup>3</sup>The idea of images is from Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War*. In this work, Waltz identifies man as the first image, the state as the second image, and the international system as the third image.

## B. ALLIANCES

As the quotation from George Liska above indicates, alliances are a key phenomenon in international relations. No matter the explanations used to describe or predict why alliances formed, or will form, it is an incontrovertible fact that alliances have existed throughout history. It is also true that no alliance lasts forever. Yet, many students of international relations will admit that there is not a definitive theory on alliances. Glenn Snyder calls alliance theory "one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations." (Snyder, 1990, p. 103)

Lack of a theory makes it hard to examine the NATO enlargement issue. In order to answer the questions outlined above, this chapter must develop the theoretical framework for exploring the issue. The rest of this section will identify the definition of alliance that the study will use. The following section will attempt to infer hypotheses from the systemic and domestic levels of analysis.

What is an alliance? The one commonality among the literatures seems to be the lack of a consistent definition. Some are more similar than others. Arnold Wolfers defines an alliance as "a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states." (Wolfers, 1968, p. 268) Stephen Walt similarly defines an alliance as "a formal or

informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states." (Walt, 1987, p. 1) Michael Barnett and Jack Levy have a similar definition. They define an alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more states and involving mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future." (Barnett and Levy, 1991, p. 370) These are simple definitions that deal with the military aspect. They leave out any mention of political relationships or nonmilitary assistance between the sovereign states. This is problematic because "common usage" of the term encompasses all types of cooperation, including cooperation outside of the security venue, between entities.<sup>4</sup>

The *Oxford English Dictionary* has several definitions for alliance. Definitions that pertain to the field of IR are: 1) union by marriage, affinity; and, 2) combination for a common object, confederation, union, especially between sovereign states. Based on this definition and the everyday usage of the term, I define an alliance as: a relationship (formal or informal) between two or more states who agree to coordinate their efforts (military, political, economic, cultural, etc.) for the accomplishment of common objectives.

<sup>4</sup>The idea of sticking to common usage for terms in international relations is elucidated by Randall L. Schweller in his article "Bandwagoning for Profit" in *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, p. 81.

### C. MULTIPLE IMAGES

In his book, *Man, the State, and War*, Kenneth Waltz distinguishes between three images. The "first image" is the nature of man. The "second image" is the nature of the state and society. The "third image" is the nature of the international system. (Waltz, 1959) This study will use the "second" and "third" images to examine the NATO enlargement debate.

This research deals with many possible variables in a small number of cases. To deal with this problem, this study will focus on "key" variables of the levels of analysis, in order to maintain parsimony. Other scholars may argue with the selection of which variables are "key." It is then up to them to show, in future studies, why their selections would be more appropriate than those selected in this study. The remainder of this section will lay out the theoretical underpinnings of the two approaches.

#### 1. The Third Image

The Realist paradigm and its variant, structural Realism, are the major theories that have been used at the international system level to attempt to explain alliance dynamics. One of the main treatises on Realism is Kenneth Waltz's book, *Theory of International Politics*. Realism has two main assumptions about the international system -- the



system is anarchic, and it is populated by sovereign states. These states are unitary actors who wish to survive. The system is a self-help system, and states who either cannot help themselves or do it less efficiently than others will have to contend with dangers and suffering. According to Waltz, "fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power" (Waltz, 1979, p. 118).

**a. *Balance of Power***

A balance of power in the system is desired because it provides "safety for all states," with each one having the "ability to fend for itself." An imbalance of power, on the other hand, "by feeding the ambition of some states to extend their control, may tempt them to dangerously adventurous activity." (Waltz, 1979, p. 132) When confronted by a significant external threat to its survival, a state has one of two choices -- balancing or bandwagoning.

Balancing is, according to Waltz, "the behavior required of all parties in self-help systems." (Waltz, 1979, p. 163) The anarchic condition of the system means that the highest goal of the state is its security and survival. In order to survive, states can attempt to balance in one of two ways -- internally or externally. Internal balancing involves mobilization or creation of power from organic assets of the

state.<sup>5</sup> External balancing involves aligning with another state or coalition. If they are externally balancing, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions because the stronger side is threatening them and they will be more appreciated and safer on the weaker side. (Waltz, 1979) The two types of balancing lead to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** A state will attempt to balance internally before attempting to balance externally against a threat.

**Hypothesis 2:** A state will balance by joining the weaker of two coalitions to offset the threatening power of the stronger state or coalition.

The opposite of balancing is bandwagoning. If balancing is joining with the weaker side, then bandwagoning is joining the stronger state or coalition. (Waltz, 1979) There is a debate over the definition for bandwagoning. Stephen Walt, in his book, *The Origins of Alliances*, modifies Waltz's definition and says that "bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger." (Walt, 1987, p. 17) Walt claims that there are two basic reasons that a state will align with the source of danger -- appeasement and material gain. In either case, the perceived threat has to be present.

<sup>5</sup>Internal balancing, because of the so-called security dilemma, can have unintended negative effects. According to Waltz, the security dilemma "describe[s] the condition in which states, unsure of one another's intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion. Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone's security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by buying arms." (Waltz, 1979, p. 186)

Randall Schweller, in an answer to Walt's balance of threat theory, claims that there are a number of different types of bandwagoning. While acknowledging bandwagoning with the source of danger (both to survive and gain the spoils of victory), Schweller also points out that there are a number of types of bandwagoning for profit when there is no threat of danger. He labels these types: "jackal bandwagoning," an offensive maneuver designed to gain the bandwagoning state rewards from the rise of a "revisionist" state; "piling-on bandwagoning," when a bandwagoning state piles-on the bandwagon at the end of a conflict, again to share in the spoils; and, "wave of the future bandwagoning," where a bandwagoning state follows a state that it thinks represents the "wave of the future." (Schweller, 1994)

These various approaches to bandwagoning lead to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 3:** States may bandwagon with a stronger state if they fear the stronger state can destroy them and they feel they have no other recourse (capitulation).

**Hypothesis 4:** A state may bandwagon with a stronger state for the chance of receiving profit (jackal- or piling-on) or new technology (wave of the future).

#### ***b. Balance of Threat***

In *The Origins of Alliances*, Walt introduces balance of threat theory as a "refinement" to balance of power theory.

This theory says that a state will balance against the greatest threat, which is not necessarily the state with the most power. In addition to the distribution of power within the system, a state looks at three other variables in its calculation of the threat -- geographic proximity of the threat, offensive capabilities of the threat, and the aggressiveness of the threat. (Walt, 1987)

According to Walt, "whereas balance of power theory predicts that states will react to imbalances of power, balance of threat theory predicts that when there is an imbalance of threat . . . , states will form alliances or increase their internal efforts in order to reduce their vulnerability." He says this improves on balance of power theory by "providing greater explanatory power with equal parsimony." (Walt, 1987, p. 263) Of course, it also dips down into the level of the state, exhibited by the requirement of a state to make a judgment call of the aggressiveness of its opponent's intentions.

Whether the new theory actually explains more with equal parsimony is debatable. According to Harry Eckstein, the parsimony of theories is in proportion to:

(i) the variety and number of observations they order; (ii) the number of discrete theoretical constructs (i.e., constructs not...deducible from one another) used to order a constant volume...of observations; (iii) the number of other theoretical

constructs subsumed or derivable from them; and,  
(iv) the number and complexity of variables used in  
the statements (Eckstein, 1975, p. 89)

Based on this definition, balance of threat theory is not as parsimonious as balance of power. First, balance of threat does not order a greater variety and number of observations. The difficulty of gaging the nature of ostensibly offensive or defensive weapons, as well as the opponent's intentions, leads back to an overall emphasis on aggregate power. Second, the requirement for a threatened state to see that its opponent has both offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions is nothing more than the security dilemma found with balance of power theory. Walt merely adds another "discrete theoretical construct" that makes the theory more complex, not more parsimonious. The bottom line is that Walt increases the number and complexity of the variables used in the theory, without gaining any more explanatory power.

The variables of offensive capability and aggressiveness of intentions should be lumped into one variable, making the theory more parsimonious. This variable is nothing more than the "security dilemma" found in classical Realist thought. Since perception of a threat is in the eye of the threatened state, whether or not these variables play any role in the threatened state's decision to balance against the threat depends on their transparency. Therefore, this

study will consider offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions as one variable -- transparency of the threat.

If a state does not see that another state possesses weapons (whether originally offensive or defensive in nature) with offensive capabilities and a desire to use them *against* that state, why would it feel a need to balance against the "threatening" state? If, however, the state can see that the "threatening" state possesses both the offensive capabilities and the aggressive intentions to use those capabilities, then it will attempt to internally and/or externally balance against the threat.<sup>6</sup> Of course, the balancing actions of the "threatened" state may cause the "threatening" state to balance internally and/or externally, launching the action-reaction spiral predicted by the security dilemma. Given these considerations, the refined balance of threat theory leads to the following hypotheses on alliance dynamics:

**Hypothesis 5:** "States that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away."  
(Walt, 1987, p. 23)

**Hypothesis 6:** The transparency of the threat (aggressiveness of intentions and offensive capabilities) will affect whether a state perceives a threat or not.

<sup>6</sup>In this type of situation, suspicion that the "threatening" state possessed the offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions would be akin to seeing.

**Hypothesis 7:** A state will seek to balance against a threatening state that has greater aggregate power and is geographically proximate, if the threat is transparent (or at least not opaque).

## **2. The Second Image**

The "third image" dealt with the nature of the international system. The major theory used to explain the actions of states in the "third image" was Realism. However, a state's calculations of the balance of power alone cannot explain its actions. According to Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, the past shows a "number of occasions in which other than strictly 'realist' determinants appear to have influenced or even decided national policy." (Rosecrance and Stein, 1993, p. 12) For a full picture, we have to consider the possibility that internal considerations affect state behavior.

The "second image" deals with the nature of the state and domestic society. As such, the major areas to be covered will explain internal reasons for states aligning with one state or another. These main areas are domestic politics and internal security threats.

### ***a. Domestic Politics***

This study argues that it is imperative to include an examination of the domestic political system of a state, along with its position in the power distribution of the international system, in attempting to determine why it

chooses to align or not. The domestic political system of a state can and will affect its actions in the international system. The foreign policies of a state "are not simply the result of their positions in the international system as defined by power but also vary with respect to their leaders' willingness and political ability to respond to systemic imperatives." (Hagan, 1994, p. 183) Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein sum up well the importance of the second image:

A central conclusion...is that domestic constraints are sufficient to prevent or retard the policy response apparently dictated by international pressures. International stimuli generate a response when the domestic political and economic factors are conducive to it. Conversely, domestic imperatives can sometimes generate aggressive policies that should be precluded by the restraints of the external environment (Rosecrance and Stein, 1993, p. 17)

What are these domestic constraints? In the rest of this section, we will discuss key political and economic constraints that affect a state's decision to align. By political constraints, the focus is on constraints within the system of government. The next section lays out extra-governmental threats that can affect alignment or alliance decisions, such as ethnic disputes or organized crime.

No matter the source of constraint within the state, domestic constraints affect the state's choice of balancing method (internal or external). The constraints can affect



balancing in one of two ways. At times, internal constraints may limit a state's ability to mobilize internal resources, forcing the leaders to attempt to conduct external balancing. Conversely, at times, internal constraints may make external balancing unviable or undesirable, forcing the leaders to attempt to conduct internal balancing. (Barnett and Levy, 1991) This study focuses on three key domestic constraints that can affect the state's alignment or alliance decisions: 1) political stability; 2) economic constraints; and, 3) internal security threats.

#### ***b. Political Stability***

The first key political constraint that can affect a state's alignment choices is political stability. For purposes of this study, political stability is defined as the combination of the "maintenance of state structures and the maintenance of state managers' own positions of political power." (Barnett and Levy, 1991, p. 373) The primary measure of the viability of state structures is what Hagan calls "state power vis-a-vis societal actors." (Hagan, 1994, p. 193) The presence and strength of opposition groups to the ruling party, as well as divisions within the ruling party, are indicators of the viability of the leaders' political power.

The desire to maintain state structures and personal political power can affect leaders' alignment choices. If the state is strong and the leadership is confident of its political power, then the leadership has the freedom to extract resources from the state. Because of this, internal balancing will occur prior to external balancing. On the other hand, if the state is weak vis-a-vis societal actors and the leadership faces opposition or is not cohesive, then the state's first choice will be external balancing, as an attempt to extract internal resources for balancing may further reduce state strength or the political power of the leadership.

In addition, states which have to contend with weak structures and/or unsupported governments will seek external balancing before internal balancing in the hope of gaining external validation of the internal legitimacy of the regime. External validation is "attempts by state officials to utilize their status as authoritative international representatives of the nation-state to enhance their domestic political positions." (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989, p. 464) These dynamics of attempting to maintain state structures lead to the following hypothesis on a state's alignment policies:

**Hypothesis 8:** A state possessing leadership confident in its power, and either strong state power vis-a-vis societal actors or good state-society relations, will attempt to balance internally prior to balancing externally.

**Hypothesis 9:** A state possessing leadership that is not confident in its power, and either weak state power vis-a-vis societal actors or poor state-society relations, will attempt to balance externally prior to balancing internally.

**Hypothesis 10:** A state with a poorly supported leadership and/or unstable structures may seek to externally balance in order to receive external validation of the internal legitimacy of the government or leadership.

### ***c. Economic Constraints***

The other major type of domestic constraint that a government may encounter is economic constraint. The condition of the economy can force a government to adopt an external balancing scheme. This can happen in one of two ways. First, a state facing major domestic constraints may attempt to externally balance in order to secure resources (economic, military, technical, etc.) to improve the domestic economy. This is known as "external extraction." (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989) Second, if a state cannot internally mobilize the power necessary to confront a security challenge, then it is forced to balance externally in order to meet the threat. (Barnett and Levy, 1991) The effect of economic constraints leads to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 11:** A state may externally balance to gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic economy.

**Hypothesis 12:** If a state lacks the resources to internally balance against a threat, it will go for external balancing in order to meet the threat.

#### **d. Internal Security Threats**

The internal security situation of a state will also affect its alignment choices. Threats to the security of the state can come from a variety of sources -- ethnic groups, revolutionary movements, etc. When these threats threaten the existence of the state, the state will look to external sources, if it cannot mobilize sufficient resources internally. According to Barnett and Levy,

If internal threats to the government are more salient than external ones,...political leaders are often tempted to try to secure the material resources necessary to deal with those threats...through external alliance formation rather than through internal extraction from a society that is already economically stretched and politically alienated. (Barnett and Levy, 1991, p. 378)

The effect of the internal security threat on the alignment choices of a state leads to the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 13:** If a state perceives its internal security situation as more dangerous than external threats, and it cannot internally mobilize sufficient resources to deal with the threat, then it will externally balance to acquire the necessary resources.

#### **D. SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES**

##### **1. Third Image -- International System**

###### **a. Balance of Power**

**Hypothesis 1:** A state will attempt to balance internally before attempting to balance externally against a threat.

**Hypothesis 2:** A state will balance by joining the weaker of two coalitions to offset the threatening power of the stronger state or coalition.

**Hypothesis 3:** States may bandwagon with a stronger state if they fear the stronger state can destroy them and (capitulation).

**Hypothesis 4:** States may bandwagon with a stronger state for the chance of receiving profit (jackal- or piling-on) or new technology (wave of the future).

***b. Balance of Threat***

**Hypothesis 5:** "States that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away." (Walt, 1987, p. 23)

**Hypothesis 6:** The transparency of the threat (aggressiveness of intentions and offensive capabilities) will affect whether a state perceives a threat or not.

**Hypothesis 7:** A state will seek to balance against a threatening state that has greater aggregate power and is geographically proximate, if the threat is transparent (or at least not opaque).

**2. Second Image -- The State**

***a. Political Constraints***

**Hypothesis 8:** A state with a leadership confident in its power and either strong state power vis-a-vis societal actors or good state-society relations will attempt to balance internally prior to balancing externally.

**Hypothesis 9:** A state with leadership that is not confident in its power and either weak state power vis-a-vis societal actors or poor state-society relations will attempt to balance externally prior to balancing internally.

**Hypothesis 10:** A state with a poorly supported leadership and/or unstable structures may seek to balance externally in order to receive external validation of the internal legitimacy of the government or leadership.

***b. Economic Constraints***

**Hypothesis 11:** A state may externally balance to gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic economy.

**Hypothesis 12:** If a state lacks the resources to internally balance against a threat, it will go for external balancing in order to meet the threat.

***c. Internal Security Threat***

**Hypothesis 13:** If a state perceives its internal security situation as more dangerous than external threats, and it cannot internally mobilize sufficient resources to deal with the threat, then it will externally balance to acquire the necessary resources.

**E. CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, I have argued that a state's alignment and alliance choices can be influenced by both systemic conditions and domestic constraints within the state. By surveying the theoretical underpinnings of Realism and various theories of domestic politics, I have inferred hypotheses about what causes a state to implement balancing strategies, either internal or external, to reduce threats, again either internal or external, against the survival of the state.

Structurally, I have explored the balance of power within the system and the balance of threat to show why state's make certain alignment choices. Using balance of power theory, I inferred hypotheses on why a state balances against or bandwagons with a threat. Using balance of threat theory, I inferred hypotheses on what role the geographical proximity, transparency, and aggregate power of the threat play in the state's alignment decisions.

At the state level, I have examined how various constraints and internal threats to the state can also affect the state's alignment decisions. Political constraints include the orientation of the state leadership, and the need to maintain state structures, the leaders' political power, and the internal legitimacy of the state government. Economically, the state's ability to mobilize resources to meet either external or internal threats can influence the alignment choices of the state.

I will use these theories to explain the stances toward NATO and NATO enlargement of the United States, Russia, and the leading Central European candidates for admission into the Alliance (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). In the course of these comparisons, the inferred hypotheses will be confirmed, refuted or found to be in need of modification. The degree to which the hypotheses, as a whole

in each level of analysis, hold up to the examination of these focused comparisons will show the relative explanatory power of each of the theories.



### III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

*Rudyard Kipling, Alfred Milner, Alfred Thayer Mahan would say that this is a feeble, shiftless, demoralized, decadent, undisciplined people. In particular, they would say that the Russian ruling elites are utterly cynical and corrupt, that they are ruthlessly obsessed with short-sighted personal gain, and that their patriotic rhetoric masks a fundamental lack of all real patriotism, spirit of self-sacrifice, and capacity for fulfilling great imperial tasks.*

Anatol Lieven  
The National Interest  
January 1996

#### A. INTRODUCTION

Of all the European states considered in this study, the Russian Federation is the exception, the "odd man out." Russia is the only state that does not support NATO enlargement. It also seems to be one of the states having the hardest time with the transition from communism to democracy. The country is beset by a host of internal problems, political, economic, and social. Although the leaders of the Russian Federation are currently struggling with these internal problems, they cannot afford, and do not want, to ignore the outside world. Obviously, their main concerns in foreign policy issues are the security of the state and Russian influence in the world. This chapter explores the current Russian views on the security environment in Central

Europe and the issue of NATO enlargement.<sup>7</sup> The chapter will explore Russian views and actions using both systemic and domestic factors affecting the country's national security decisions. In addition to surveying Russian actions and attitudes using these theories, the chapter will also endeavor to compare the relative explanatory power of each theory.

## **B. THIRD IMAGE**

Prior to 1991, the Russian Federation was a republic within the Soviet Union. It did not have a need for a foreign policy and armed forces separate from those of the Soviet Union. Today, it is bordered by a number of new states, which it has never dealt with at the level of state-to-state relations. This forces Russia to examine the balance of power between itself and its likely adversaries.

### **1. Balance of Power**

Russia did not create armed forces immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It tried to maintain a common defense space with the other newly independent states. When this failed, Russia developed its own military formations. Figure 3.1 lists the current military balance for Russia and its possible opponents.

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<sup>7</sup>This study focuses on the western (European) axis of Russian security orientation. While it will bring out peripheral issues regarding the southern (Transcaucasus) and eastern (Asia) axis, it will only be in relation to influences, positive or negative, they can place on Russian actions in Europe.

Country	Personnel	Divisions	Sep Bde	Tanks	AIFV/ APCs	Arty	SSM	Aircraft		Atk Helo
								Cbt	Trans	
Russia	€1,714,000	69	19	19,500	35,000	21,300	Varies	215 0	650	1000
NATO	1,190,800	21	4	6840	18,630	5578	Varies	172 0	316	561
USA - Europe	159,600	2	0	1968	3160	1373	Varies	228	26	153
France	409,600	9	1	1067	4688	1546	113	477	126	237
Germany	367,300	8	1	2855	6606	2090	0	454	90	45
Britain	254,300	2	2	950	4176	569	64	561	74	126
Norway	33,500	0	5 bn	170	223	402	0	79	6	0
Middle Abroad										
Czech Rep	92,900	5	3	1433	1659	1418	14	240	14	36
Hungary	74,500	0	12	1191	1645	991	0	171	14	39
Poland	283,600	10	2	2110	2291	1880	40	438	34	70
Romania	230,500	7	11	2395	2450	3138	15	382	39	37
Slovakia	47,000	2	0	912	1043	808	9	146	16	19
Near Abroad										
Belarus	92,500	2	2	3108	3406	1584	96	354	44	78
Estonia	2500	0	4 bn	0	44	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	6850	0	2 bn	0	15	0	0	0	4	0
Lithuania	8900	0	1	0	15	0	0	0	30	0
Ukraine	517,000	14	3	5430	5216	3638	272	143 3	274	3
Nordic										
Finland	25,700	0	0 <sup>8</sup>	230	860	751	0	110	3	0

Figure 3.1 The Military Balance for Russia<sup>9</sup>

In Europe, seven states border Russia from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea. These states are Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, and Norway. Russia must also consider possible threats to its national security from both Central and Western Europe. The Central European states include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The Western states include the states of NATO, such as the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

<sup>8</sup>Finland possesses 9 brigades that have a primarily training role.

<sup>9</sup>See Appendix for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The Military Balance 1994-1995.

Realistically, NATO is the only state or organization that can seriously threaten Russia. Therefore, this study will concentrate on the balance of power between Russia and NATO. The rest of this section will explore the balance. Numbers, however, can be deceptive. In today's world of precision-guided munitions and stealth technology, quantity is not necessarily enough. Because of this, it is necessary first to explore the condition of the Russian armed forces.

**a. Russian Armed Forces**

By all accounts, the Russian armed forces are in a state of decline so steep and severe that "the Russian Army today is weaker in relative terms than it has been for almost four hundred years." (Lieven, *National Interest*, 1996, p. 24) The former Minister of Defense, General Grachev, has said the Russian military is "hungry, barefoot, and underfinanced." (Lambeth, 1995) General Lebed, the head of the National Security Council, describes morale in the armed forces in terms of "fatigue, apathy, and distrust." (FBIS, 9 July, 1996) The armed forces suffer problems in every area. This study focuses on six areas: 1) doctrine; 2) funding; 3) manning; 4) procurement; 5) reform, conditions, and morale; and, 6) capabilities and performance.

(1) Doctrine.<sup>10</sup> President Yeltsin signed the current Russian military doctrine, "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," in November of 1993. (Starr, *Orbis*, 1996) This was the document that laid out threats against the Russian state and the direction the armed forces would follow to combat those threats. While the document did not identify any state as an enemy, it listed the main external and internal sources of military danger to the Russian Federation. (Tishin, 1995) External sources included: territorial claims on Russia; local wars and conflicts; employment or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and, interferences in the internal affairs and situation of Russia. Internal sources included: ethnic conflicts; attempts to overthrow the government; and illegal armed formations. It also rejected the Soviet policy of "no first-use" of nuclear weapons. (Tishin, 1995)

The military doctrine was the basis of the plan for the reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces. Organizationally, a major priority was the development of

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<sup>10</sup>Additional readings on Russian and late-Soviet military doctrine include: V. Mironov, "Russia's National Security Military Doctrine and the Outlook for Russian-US Cooperation in the Modern World," *Comparative Strategy* 13/1 (1994); A.A. Danilovich, "On the New Military Doctrines of the CIS and Russia," M.A. Gareev, "On Military Doctrine and Military Reform in Russia," and Charles Dick, "Initial Thoughts on Russia's Draft Military Doctrine," all in *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 1992; Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," *Air Force Magazine*, September 1992; and, M. Gareyev, "Some Problems of the Russian Military Doctrine," *International Affairs*, August 1993.

mobile forces that could initially fight "local wars and armed conflicts . . . [which were recognized] as the main dangers to stability and peace." (Tishin, 1995, p. 120) These mobile forces' role in the local conflicts would be to rapidly deploy to "localize" and isolate the fighting, so that efforts could be made to find a peaceful solution. The need for creation of the mobile forces was an acceptance of the fact that the political situation no longer required large forces and the Russian economy could no longer support the financial burden. (Tishin, 1995)

Technologically, the doctrine supported a shift from production of quantity to quality. Priority of development was to go to design and production of systems for command and control, communication, electronic warfare, and weapons delivered by precision guidance systems. The goal of the military-technical support was "prompt provision of the Armed Forces with sufficient effective armaments and materiel to protect the vital interests of the nation." (Tishin, 1995)

(2) Funding. There is a chronic lack of funding today in the Russian Armed Forces. This shortage of funds affects training, operations, maintenance of equipment and personnel, procurement, and modernization. For 1996, the Russian Armed Forces received \$8.9 billion in the state budget. This was roughly half of what they had requested. It

represented 12 percent of Russia's 1996 budget. (Starr, 12 June, 1996) Fiscal limitations are causing many problems in the Armed Forces.

Operationally, the Russian Armed Forces have trouble operating and maintaining their equipment. Since 1992, Russian forces have suffered through a severe shortage of fuel. Because of this, Russian pilots have not been able to log adequate hours to remain proficient and safe, which has resulted in an increased aircraft accident rate. (Lambeth, 1995) Spare parts are in short supply, and equipment routinely fails. In fact, according to Anatol Lieven, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., the "greater part of Russian military equipment can only survive by cannibalizing other equipment." (Lieven, *National Interest*, 1996, p. 28)

Inoperable equipment and lack of money for training have combined to decimate the operational readiness of the Russian Armed forces. Effective training has become "all but impossible;" the Russian Armed Forces are not conducting any division-level or joint training exercises. (Parrish, 9 August, 1996) In fact, they have not conducted any exercises at division-level and above since 1992. (Lambeth, 1995) These problems of training and maintenance have led General Grachev to proclaim that only 50 percent of

the Army is adequately trained, and only 20 percent of the tanks are operational. (Kugler, 1996)

In the estimates of some Western military experts, during 1995, the "Russian Defense Ministry . . . had only seven divisions that it even pretended were 'battle-ready'." (Lieven, *National Interest*, 1996, p. 27) Richard Kugler, of the RAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute, is more generous, putting the figure at 10 divisions, or roughly 12 percent of the Russian forces. Whatever the figure, this dismal state of readiness makes it unlikely that the Russian Armed Forces could challenge NATO in any credible conventional manner.

(3) Manning. Budgetary constraints have also combined with management problems to affect the Armed Forces' ability to maintain and professionalize their forces. This is potentially the most serious long-term problem of the Russian Armed Forces. Equipment can be replaced, or high-quality personnel can be trained to effectively employ even older equipment. But, no amount of high-tech weaponry will win in combat if there are insufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate it. In 1992, Russian Armed Forces had a total of 2.8 million personnel. Today, that number is supposedly around 1.7 million. (FBIS, 10 April, 1996)



This number represents the authorized slots in the Armed Forces. It does not represent their actual strength. Today, estimates are that the actual strength may be as low as 1.2 million. (Parrish, 9 August, 1996) This current personnel shortage is exacerbated by a shrinking draft pool, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, the flight of qualified officers and volunteer soldiers from the Armed Forces, and the manning policies of the Armed Forces.

The draft pool is shrinking for two main reasons -- exemptions and draft dodging. According to Richard Starr, Russian legislation set the "percentage of those not exempt from the draft" at 23.8 percent of the eligible population. (Starr, 1996, p. 65, my emphasis) Since most of those with higher educations are exempt, it has resulted in a drop in the quality of recruits. There has been a 15 percent drop in the number of high school graduates entering the Armed Forces between 1988 and 1993. In addition to the large number of people exempt from the draft, there is also a significant problem with draft dodging. Official figures show that as many as 30,000 recruits have dodged the draft in every semiannual call-up since 1992. (Parrish, 9 August, 1996)

Since 1992, 150,000 officers have left the Armed Forces. Many of these officers were "younger and better qualified" than those who stayed in. (Parrish, 9 August,

1996) Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and contract soldiers have also been leaving in search of better-paying jobs. Because of budgetary constraints, the Armed Forces cannot afford to pay these soldiers adequately. More than 50,000 contracts for volunteers have been dissolved. General Grachev has said the Armed Forces "simply cannot afford" the expenditure of contract servicemen. (FBIS, 10 April, 1996) Current manning levels for NCOs are less than 50 percent of the authorized strength. (Lambeth, 1995)

(4) Procurement. There seems to be a significant contradiction in the procurement processes of the Russian Armed Forces. The contradiction is caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the lessons Russian planners appear to have taken from the Gulf War. During the Cold War, the majority of the best Soviet forces and equipment were stationed in what is now Central Europe and the "near abroad." After the split, "Russia inherited obsolescent equipment from the rear areas facing Western Europe, whereas the latest and more advanced weapons remained in East-Central Europe or in Belarus and Ukraine." (Starr, 1996, p. 60) During and after the Gulf War, Russian military planners were apparently "mesmerized" by the technological superiority of the U.S. forces. (Starr, 1996)

These disparate events have caused contradictions in Russian procurement and thinking. On the one hand, normal procurement and production to replace older systems has nearly stopped. For example, in the 1980s, Soviet tank production was around 2000 per year. In 1994, Russian tank production was only 40 tanks, representing a steep decline. (Parrish, 9 August, 1996) On the other hand, the state defense order, which is separate from the defense budget and will fund "accelerated R&D of a new generation of weapons for the Russian armed forces as well as for production of such advanced equipment," is 25 percent more than the entire Ministry of Defense's budget. (Starr, *Orbis*, 1996) Since there is bound to be a significant time lag between conceptualization of these weapons and their introduction into the force, Russian material capabilities can do little but decline in the interim.<sup>11</sup>

(5) Reform, Conditions, and Morale. As mentioned earlier, General Grachev has called the Russian Armed Forces "hungry, barefoot, and underfinanced," while General Lebed has described the morale of the soldiers in

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<sup>11</sup>In addition, it is interesting to note that the Russians may have missed an important lesson from the Gulf War. While it is hard to argue against the fact that high-tech weapons played a significant part in the destruction of the Iraqi Army, they would not have been nearly as effective if the United States had not had highly-qualified and highly-trained personnel operating the systems. The previously mentioned problems and defects in the personnel system of the Russian Armed Forces leads one to believe that they missed this crucial factor.

terms of "fatigue, apathy, and distrust." Many factors have contributed to these descriptions and the conditions of the Russian Armed Forces -- the performance in Chechnya, abominable living conditions, salaries that are pittance, widespread corruption, alcoholism, and a host of other problems. Anatol Lieven believes that "the reasons for its present collapse have above all to do with morale." (Lieven, *National Interest*, 1996, p. 24) In addition, he posits that the "demoralization of the army derives partly from the demoralization of the Russian society." (Lieven, *National Interest*, 1996, p. 25) Regardless, the collapse of morale is a reality, and it significantly reduces the élan of the Russian Armed Forces.

(6) Capabilities and Performance. All of the aforementioned major problems, as well as others, have had a cumulative, negative effect on the capabilities and performance of the Russian Armed Forces. Chechnya has shown the world this fact. The Chechens have been able to not only attack Russian forces inside Chechnya, they have also conducted operations inside Russia. Currently, the Russians have a hard time assembling even small forces for "peace keeping" operations. Their logistical system is "stretched to the breaking point" trying to sustain the forces in Chechnya. (Lambeth, 1995) They have suffered "repeated tactical

failures" that make one question the quality of the leadership and wonder if they have any means of incorporating lessons learned into new tactics, techniques, and procedures.

All of the mistakes and calamities point to the fact that "it is unlikely that Russia, with its decimated and poorly supported conventional forces, could mount a large-scale cross-border operation against a well-equipped enemy." (Lambeth, 1995, p. 90) At least, they could not mount these types of operations today. Assessments such as this must not be taken totally at face value, as a final and definitive appraisal of the Russian Armed Forces. History shows that the Russian Armed Forces have been extremely irrepressible in the past, regardless of the situation. For example, in 1939-40, after Stalin's purges of the military, the Finns were able to humiliate the Russian Armed Forces. Soon thereafter, the Red Army fought tenaciously against the German Wehrmacht, ultimately defeating probably the finest army in the world at the time.

***b. The Armed Forces of NATO***

Unfortunately for the Russian Federation, that well-equipped enemy could be the combined forces of NATO, at least in their minds. These forces are "more ready, better trained, and have better weapons" than Russian forces. (Kugler, 1996) And, the balance of power is continuing to shift in favor of

the NATO forces, both conventionally and in the nuclear arena, especially if Russia ratifies and abides by START II.

Figure 3.2 lists the balance of forces between the major NATO forces and the Russian Armed Forces. Figure 3.3 lists the change in the balance between the United States and Russia in nuclear weapons from 1991 to START II levels. These two figures show why Russia is nervous about NATO enlargement.

Country	Personnel	Divisions	Sep Bde	Tanks	AIFV/ APCs	Arty	SSM	Aircraft		Atk Helo
								Cbt	Trans	
Russia	1,714,000	69	19	19,500	35,000	21,300	Varies	2150	650	1000
NATO	1,190,800	21	4	6840	18,630	5578	Varies	1720	316	561
Visegrad	498,000	17	17	5646	6638	5097	63	995	78	164
NATO + Visegrad	1,688,000	38	21	12,486	25,268	10,675	Varies	2715	394	725

Figure 3.2 The Military Balance between Russia and NATO

Strategic Nuclear Forces (land, sea, and air)	1991		After START II	
	Russia	USA	Russia	USA
Nuclear Warheads	5,946	2,901	1,125	1,354
# of defended targets	2,238	2,596	660	2,078

Figure 3.3 Strategic Offensive Weapons of Russia and the USA<sup>12</sup>

On paper, Figure 3.2 shows that Russia has a numerical advantage over NATO forces. However, based on the preceding discussion on the conditions in the Russian Armed Forces, the implications to be drawn from just looking at the numbers are erroneous. The lowest current manpower estimate for Russian forces (1.2 million) would give them an equivalent

<sup>12</sup>Provided by Richard Starr. Original source: Sergei Grigor'ev, "Novyi Stregicheskii kurs Roskii na zapadnom napravlenii," Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, no. 1 (5), 13 January, 1996, p. 4.

number of men under arms, not an advantage in that category. Assuming General Grachev is right about the percentages of adequately trained personnel (50%) and operational equipment (20%), the number of Russian "trained" divisions and operational tanks would be 34 and 3900, respectively. While these are only rudimentary calculations, it is easy to see why the Russians are worried about the balance of power in Europe.

This increasing shift in conventional military power toward NATO is occurring at the same time that "the credibility of Russian deterrence has substantially diminished in both psychological and technical terms." (Bluth, 1995) This is due to the reductions of the Russian strategic offensive nuclear weapons under the INF, START I, and START II treaties. Figure 3.3 shows that, in 1991, Russia had a distinct quantitative advantage over the United States. In addition, it had almost three warheads for every U.S. target.

If START II is ratified by the Russians, the warheads will be greatly reduced. The United States will possess more total warheads than Russia. Russia would only have .5 warheads for each defended U.S. target. While the Russians will still maintain more warheads than Britain or France, Russia will not be able to coerce the European members of NATO because the U.S. umbrella will still protect them.

## **2. Balance of Threat**

### ***a. Aggregate Power***

The preceding discussion identified that NATO is the only state or organization that can match the aggregate power of the Russian Federation. The forces of NATO are better trained, better equipped, and better prepared than the Russian Armed Forces. Problems in doctrine development, funding, manning, procurement, morale, and performance have called into question the quantitative advantage that the Russian Armed Forces have. In addition, Russian military personnel believe that NATO has a quantitative advantage, even if the overall numbers do not show it. According to an unidentified Russian general, General "N," "Today, NATO surpasses Russia in the number of troops and conventional arms in Europe by a factor of two or three. After Poland, Hungary and ex-Czechoslovakia join the alliance, the gap would grow wider." (FBIS, 17 October, 1995)

### ***b. Geographical Proximity***

Enlargement of NATO into Central Europe would be problematic and troubling to the Russians for two reasons. The first reason, obviously, is that enlargement would bring an opposing alliance 500 miles closer to Russian borders, "leapfrogging" over the former East German. According to Russians, this would be in violation of the spirit of the 2+4



agreements, which prohibited NATO from stationing NATO troops in that area. As one Russian general puts it, NATO is "a powerful military grouping, which everyone in the Soviet Union young and old alike regarded as the likely enemy just a few years ago, [which] is moving close to Russia's bord (FBIS, 5 July, 1996) ers." If the alliance eventually moves into the Ukraine or the Baltics, it would put NATO troops "within striking distance of the Russian heartland." (Lieven, *Atlantic Monthly*, 1996)

The second reason is the geographical deployment of the Russian Armed Forces. They are "geographically out of balance" and not well-situated to confront NATO actions. During the Cold War, three quarters of Soviet troops were forward deployed in either Eastern and Central European countries or deployed in the western part of the Soviet Union. The other quarter was in Asia. Today, those percentages are almost reversed. According to Kugler, "owing to differential reduction patterns, only 33 percent of the existing posture is now deployed in western Russia." (Kugler, 1996) Lack of funds prohibits the Russians from addressing this imbalance of forces.

### ***c. Transparency of the Threat***

Given Russian concerns over NATO enlargement based on NATO's aggregate powers and potential geographic proximity

to the Russian Federation, does that make NATO a threat to Russia? As stated in the theory chapter, for purposes of this study, transparency of threat is determined by the ability of a state to see two things in potentially threatening states: 1) possession of offensive capabilities; and, 2) indicators of aggressiveness of intentions. Based on these requirements, NATO, in the eyes of the Russians, could be seen as a threat.

As the study has previously shown, NATO does possess large offensive capabilities. These capabilities include advanced weapons and technologies that "mesmerized" and obsessed the Russians after the weapons' demonstration and use during the Gulf War.<sup>13</sup> In addition, three members of NATO possess nuclear weapons capable of striking Russia.

While NATO professes not to have any aggressive intentions toward Russia, many people in Russia believe it does. They fear enlargement is "nothing but a geopolitical encirclement and attempted isolation of Russia." (Bluth, 1995, p. 395) This, according to Lieutenant General Ivashov,

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<sup>13</sup>For additional readings on Russian analyses of the lessons of the Persian Gulf War, see: Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Soviet Military Doctrine Implications of the Gulf War," *International Defense Review*, 1 August, 1991, and "Russia's New Military Doctrine," *Air Force Magazine*, September 1992; James J. Tritten, "The Changing Role of Naval Forces: The Russian View of the 1991 Persian Gulf War," *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 1992; Edwin T. Bacon, "The Former Soviet Union and Analysis of the 1991 Gulf War," *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1992; and, Stuart Kaufman, "Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War and Russian Military Doctrine," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, September 1993.

a Russian military professor and analyst, presents a "real threat to Russia, even though our NATO partners are seeking to convince us of the opposite." (*FBIS*, 5 July, 1996)

Others wonder why NATO wants to expand when it "won" the Cold War, and the Russians "lost." General Lebed has said that NATO is acting like a "big drunken hooligan in a kindergarten who says he will hit anyone he likes." He also said, "The Cold War is over. They won, and we all agreed to this. So why have you decided to re-open the competition?" (*Lieven, Atlantic Monthly*, 1996) Much of this line of reasoning and questioning can be linked to "lingering hostility from the Cold War." (*Kugler*, 1996, p. 21)

Still others use the words and actions of NATO members to support claims of NATO's aggressiveness. Lieutenant General Ivashov has pointed out that the U.S. national security strategy "unambiguously" proclaims that the United States is "the world's greatest power, with global interests and a global responsibility . . . [and the] U.S. Armed Forces must be able to counter the military strength of regional powers whose interests conflict with the interests of the United States and its allies." He also believes that NATO's training with Central European countries in exercises is a pretext for combat training. According to him, "Most often what these exercises rehearse are . . . plans for

operations in the initial stage of war and the conduct of large-scale combat actions using all troop categories and branches of the bloc's joint armed forces." (FBIS, 5 July, 1996)

### **3. Summary of Third Image Factors**

#### **a. Balance of Power**

With regard to the Russia case and balance of power theory, two of our inferred hypotheses were refuted, one was confirmed and one was neither confirmed nor refuted. The case refuted our hypothesis that a state would seek to balance internally prior to externally. Until Russia realized that the other newly independent states were not interested in maintaining unified security and military strategies, it sought to balance externally with the rest of the CIS against NATO. It was only after this realization that Russia attempted internal balancing actions, such as development of a national military strategy and a reform program for the armed forces.

The case refuted our hypothesis that a state would align with a stronger state or coalition for the chance to receive profit. Russian actions do confirm the traditional balancing hypothesis, which states that a state will balance with the weaker power or coalition against the stronger one; confirmation of this is evident in Russian effort to

reintegrate the military strategies of the CIS, as well as possible gestures toward China. Finally, the case neither confirmed nor refuted the hypothesis that a state would bandwagon with a stronger state to prevent its own destruction, as it is not currently under the threat of annihilation from any quarter.

***b. Balance of Threat***

The Russian case confirms all of the inferred hypotheses from balance of threat theory. The Russian Federation actively opposes NATO enlargement. Enlargement of NATO would bring a coalition with equal or greater aggregate power closer to the borders of Russia.

Russian statements and actions confirm that many members of the military and government see NATO as having both offensive capabilities and aggressiveness of intentions. In confirmation of our hypotheses, Russia therefore views NATO as a threat and is attempting to balance against it. Again, Russian military, political, and economical efforts both within the CIS and with China and other countries support this contention.

## C. SECOND IMAGE

### 1. Political Constraints

Today, the Russian political system revolves around President Boris Yeltsin. At times, he has been called "Czar Boris." This nickname may be appropriate, since, according to Stephen Blank, the "current structure or lack of a system is uncomfortably reminiscent of the late czarist system." Blank has called Russia today a "quasi-authoritarian system . . . where authority is nonrational, personalized, and organized in competing vertical patron-client chains dependent on the ruler's personal preference." (Blank, 1996, p. 15) President Yeltsin is able to rule in this "czarist" fashion for two reasons -- the strong presidential-style system adopted by the constitution of 1993 and his "divide and rule" leadership style.

The Russian constitution of 1993 gives the president broad powers over both the prime minister and parliament, which consists of a lower house, the Duma, and an upper house, the Federal Council. The Russian President is "dominant over the prime minister" and is generally free from potential "parliamentary interference." Because of this system, the president is free to establish foreign policy and the national security strategy. (Blank, 1996)

In the time of a crisis with the Duma, the president has the authority to dismiss the parliament by calling for new parliamentary elections. The Duma does not have a reciprocal measure to check the president's power. The closest it could come would be to pass a vote of no-confidence in the government. In the event of a no-confidence vote, the prime minister would have to resign, but not the president. (Blank, 1996) In addition to these advantages over the prime minister and parliament, the president also has the power to issue binding presidential decrees. These decrees<sup>14</sup> are "by nature executive acts and are mandatory for compliance on the entire territory of the Russian Federation." (Freedom House, 1995, p. 118)

President Yeltsin does not just rely on these constitutional measures to ensure the continuity of his "reign." He also uses a "divide and rule" style of leadership to pit his subordinates against one another constantly. This prevents any one of them from gaining too much power, especially relative to President Yeltsin. To do this, President Yeltsin uses a "well-established strategy of creating multiple overlapping . . . structures which compete with and balance one another." (Parrish, 29 July, 1996)

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<sup>14</sup>It should be noted that, although the president issues these decrees, they are not universally followed in Russia today.

Two examples that illustrate this tactic are Yeltsin's creation of multiple "armies" outside of the Armed Forces and the recent creation of the Defense Council. The "other Armed Forces," such as those in the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) and the Federal Security Service (FSB), serve as counterweights to the regular Russian Armed Forces. (Starr, 1996) The Defense Council, which has overlapping responsibilities and personnel with the Security Council, was "designed to clip [Security Council Secretary] Lebed's wings, and to ensure that he remains a faithful subordinate with little ability to make independent policy decisions." (Parrish, 29 July, 1996)

The combination of strong presidential powers, the ability to issue decrees outside of Duma legislation, and the successful tactic of "divide and rule" to limit any individual group's power potentially give President Yeltsin the ability to conduct broad actions to balance against internal and external threats. This situation, however, does not give him an unlimited ability to balance, especially internally. There are constraints in the system. One of the main political constraints is tensions over center-periphery relations.

In Russia today, a major issue is "the struggle by local authorities in the republics, oblasts, and krajs for greater autonomy and a more equitable . . . sharing of power with



Moscow." (Clark and Graham, 1995, p. 329) While Chechnya is an example of the fact that some of these struggles can be both violent and ethnically based, most of them are economically based. There are three areas of disagreement: control of resources; decisions over economic policies; and, payment of taxes. (Clark and Graham, 1995) Recent moves by Moscow, such as the signing of bilateral treaties with republics, have lessened this danger.

## **2. Economic Constraints**

Most of the current economic indicators of the Russian economy are negative and reflect an economy struggling to make the transition from central control and planning to a free market. While there is no doubt there are serious problems in the Russian economy, evidence points to the fact that Russia still has the economic capability to balance internally against threats. This section will explore some of the negative points and indicators of the Russian economy first. Then, it will attempt to show that not only does the Russian military-industrial complex (*voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks*, or VPK) have the potential to support internal balancing efforts of Russia, but also that it is engaged in this production at the present.

The major Russian economic constraint is a lack of money. The country is currently experiencing a severe budget crisis

caused by lower than expected revenues and a growing budget deficit. The budget deficit is currently around 6 percent of GDP. It is aggravated by an inefficient and easily evaded tax collection system that only collected 59 percent of the expected tax revenues in the first half of 1996. This unexpectedly low collection rate forced the government to increase foreign borrowing and cut spending in critical areas, including the army. (Gurushina, 1996)

The inefficient tax collection system is not the only source of declining revenue for the Russian Federation. Revenue is lost in three other areas. First, there has been an increase in the flight of capital out of the country. Second, there has been a large movement on the part of both individuals and business to not pay their taxes. According to Lev Makarevich, a finance expert for the Association of Russian Banks, "The fiscal burden is so high (80-120 percent) and there are so many taxes (more than 200) that absolutely all economic entities engage in evasion." (FBIS, 17 July, 1996) Finally, there is a growing "shadow economy" that "exists outside the scope of the law" and may be as large as 40-50 percent of the GDP. (FBIS, 16 July, 1996)

While the tone of the preceding discussion is undeniably negative, there are some Western experts that believe that the "uniformly pessimistic" view of the Russian economy is

incorrect. Charles Wolf, an analyst at the RAND Corporation, believes that the pessimists are looking at incorrect and misleading data. He argues that there are reasons for "limited optimism." These reasons include development of a private market, which is not adequately reflected in GDP statistics, the modest growth of professionalism in the government, and increasing Russian contacts with Western businessmen and business practices. (Wolf, 1995)

Whether the pessimistic or the optimistic view is taken, there is evidence that the VPK can still support Russian efforts at internal balancing. According to Richard Starr, "Russia retained 70 percent of the USSR's military-industrial complex . . . , with between 2,000 and 4,000 industrial plants that employ 5 to 8 million highly skilled workers." (Starr, 1996, p. 76) Diversity and possession of large amounts of natural resources mean that Russia can operate an "autonomous defense industry base" to support the Russian Armed Forces. (Starr, 1996) Today, although it has been downsized, the VPK is actively producing weapons systems for domestic and foreign use.

The VPK has "continued production of new Russian offensive weapons systems." The Topol M-2 modification of the SS-25 has been flight tested and enters serial production this year. The VPK has produced "miniature nuclear weapons" for

Russian ground forces. Seven new nuclear-powered, Severodvinsk-class submarines are currently in production. They will be outfitted with the new D-31 submarine-launched ballistic missile. (Starr, 12 June, 1996) And, the T-90 main battle tank (MBT) is currently in volume production (between 100-150 have been produced) and is replacing older T-72 MBTs in the Far Eastern Military District. (Foss, 1995) In addition to the new production going on within the VPK, the complex also recently received a significant increase in the resources available to it. This occurred because President Yeltsin issued a decree which reduced the "untouchable reserves" by 20 percent. Many of these resources will now go to the VPK. (Starr, 12 June, 1996)

These continuing efforts of the VPK show that Russia is actively pursuing its own revolution in military affairs (RMA) as a means of balancing internally. Attempting to harness the RMA is nothing new for the Russians. Beginning in the 1980s, Soviet military experts, such as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, believed that new technologies were generating an RMA. After the Persian Gulf War, Russian scientists believed that "Desert Storm confirmed these predictions and serves as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics." (Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 78)

### 3. Internal Security Threat

In a speech last year to the Duma, President Yeltsin said he "foresees more Chechnya-type situations in the future." He further indicated that Moscow would encounter "special danger from armed conflicts breaking out in Russia and on its borders, on the territory of the former Soviet Union, because of aggressive nationalism and religious extremism." (*OMRI Daily Digest*, 17 February, 1995) Conflicts of this type have already been seen in both Russia and the CIS.

Chechnya is the epitome of these conflicts. Within Russia, fighting has also occurred between North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Russian units have also been involved in other conflicts within the CIS, such as the Armenia-Azerbaijain conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the civil war in Tajikistan, and the fighting in the Georgian areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While it will be difficult for the Russians to predict where and when these conflicts will start, they do believe these conflicts are a possible internal security threat. The Geography Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences has identified roughly 180 potential "territorial-ethnic" conflicts in the former USSR, many of them within the borders of the Russian Federation. (Starr, 1996)

The Russians do not seem sure about whether they can prevent these conflicts. In his annual report to the Duma in

1995, President Yeltsin said that "the institutions of state power have yet to accumulate sufficient weight to ensure that force does not have to be applied to restore Russian sovereignty." (Blank, 1996, p. 11) The question is, if prevention fails and the Russians have to apply force in another Chechnya-type conflict, especially if Chechen operations are still going, will they have the resources to accomplish the mission? It seems doubtful, based on the previous discussion of the conditions of the Armed Forces.

#### **4. Summary of Second Image Factors**

The Russian government is plagued by instability. President Yeltsin, although he has broad powers as the current system, continually feels it necessary to pit his subordinates against each other to insure that no one gets too much power. This, coupled with the power ministries (defense, security, interior, and counter-intelligence) acting so independently that they at times look like feudal states, makes it difficult for Russia to balance against threats.

Based on our inferred hypotheses from domestic political theory, we predicted this unconfident leadership, with its weakened state mechanisms and poor state-society relations, would do two things. First, seek to balance externally against the prevalent threat before balancing internally. Second, seek external balancing to receive external validation

of the legitimacy of the regime. We do not see Russia doing either of these things, refuting our hypotheses.

In the case of the first hypothesis, Russia is actively seeking to balance internally, against both an internal threat (Chechnya) and a possible external threat (NATO enlargement). Although their efforts in Chechnya have been without much success, the Russians have made considerable efforts to destroy the internal security threat of the Chechen rebels. In terms of the external threat of NATO, Russia is releasing two critical resources of the state -- money and materiel -- to the VPK to provide the Armed Forces with the modern equipment that they think will help them deal with the threat.

In the case of the second hypothesis, we do not see the Russian leadership seeking to balance externally for external validation of their positions and legitimacy. Instead, they are relying on internal methods to maintain their position and legitimacy.

In terms of our hypotheses on economic constraints, the Russia case refutes the hypothesis on external extraction. This hypothesis said that a state may externally balance to gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic economy. This is not occurring with Russia. While it is true the leadership is looking for states to balance with, these states, primarily the other members of the CIS and China,

cannot provide the necessary resources to improve Russia's domestic economy.

Since Russia does possess significant internal resources, particularly natural resources, the case cannot confirm or refute the hypothesis that a state without internal resources to balance against a threat will seek to balance externally. For similar reasons, the case cannot confirm or refute our final hypothesis, which states that if a state perceives its internal security situation as more dangerous than external threats, and it cannot internally mobilize sufficient resources to deal with the threat, then it will externally balance to acquire the necessary resources. Russia has mobilized internal resources to combat the conflict in Chechnya.

An alternate explanation for Russian actions could be that the Russian government's opposition to NATO enlargement reflects worries about the mass public's response to seeing Russia humbled by the West. This is unlikely. Based on interviews conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School with Russian officers, only the educated public worries about enlargement. The average Russian does not know or care about the issue; they are too concerned with their own travails. Therefore, it is unlikely that the mass public would put any pressure on the government to counter NATO enlargement.



#### D. CONCLUSION

As pointed out in the introduction, of all the case studies in this work, Russia is the exception. This is the case, as well, with respect to the abilities of the theories we have looked at to explain and predict Russian attitudes and responses to today's security situation in Central Europe. In this case, the systemic level's relative explanatory power is significantly greater than domestic political theory. Its combination of balance of power and balance of threat theory do a good job of predicting Russian actions. In contrast, the case did not confirm any of our hypotheses inferred from domestic political theory.

Russian actions to attempt to reintegrate more closely the CIS and its endeavors toward China clearly demonstrate confirmation of our traditional balancing hypothesis. In addition, these actions also clearly confirm all of our balance of threat hypotheses. A coalition with equal or greater aggregate power is moving closer to the borders of Russia. It possesses large offensive capabilities and, at least in the eyes of the Russians, aggressiveness of intentions. The theory predicts this will cause Russia to balance against the stronger coalition, and that is what it is attempting to do.



#### **IV. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

##### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter sets out to elucidate Czech views on NATO enlargement and the security environment in the region today. It will examine both systemic and domestic factors affecting the country. Of the four Central European countries desiring entry into NATO, the Czech Republic was perhaps the "luckiest" geopolitically after the revolutions of 1989. It was the only state that had major, beneficial border adjustments. The adjustments made two potential adversaries with well-armed forces, Ukraine and Hungary, more distant. In addition, the partition of the former Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR) increased domestic stability by eliminating the only significant ethnic minority (Slovaks). The rest of this chapter will: 1) briefly detail the Czech position on NATO; 2) examine Czech positions and actions based on "third image" and "second image" factors; and, 3) summarize the relative explanatory powers of our theories and their inferred hypotheses to explain and predict Czech actions and positions.

##### **B. CZECH POSITION ON NATO**

According to Stephen Blank, the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the U.S. Army War College, "Today the fundamental question and first priority for Prague is obtaining membership in an enlarged NATO." (Blank, 1996) The

Czechs look at NATO membership as a means of being accepted as a Western, instead of a Central European, state. According to Josef Zieleniec, the Czech Foreign Minister,

It [is] very important for us to emphasize the Czech state's continuity in relation to the traditions of Czechoslovakia in the 1920's and 1930's and ... to follow up on the prestige that Czechoslovakia had in the world. In order for this to happen, we must...transform this state and we have to achieve what we set out to achieve in 1989: The Czech Republic must become a standard Western European state with an efficient Western European-type economy (*FBIS*, 19 May, 1994)

### **C. THIRD IMAGE**

As stated in the previous chapter, the "third image" deals with the nature of the international system. The realist paradigm can help explain a state's actions or behavior.<sup>15</sup> The critical areas this study will explore are the balance of power in the system and the balance of threat.

#### **1. Balance of Power**

Geographically and militarily, the Czech Republic's two largest neighbors are Germany and Poland. Each possesses large armed forces and equipment. Figure 4.1 lists the current military balance between the Czech Republic and its neighbors, as well as U.S. and Russian forces.

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<sup>15</sup>This view is not universally held among Realists. Kenneth Waltz believes Realism explains the workings of the system, but does not develop a theory of individual states' foreign policies. Others, such as Collin Elman, believe that Realism does explain why a state adopts certain actions and positions.

Country	Personnel	Divisions	Sep Bde	Tanks	AIFV/ APCs	Arty	SSMs	Aircraft		Atk Helo
								Cbt	Trans	
USA	159,600	2	0	1968	3160	1373	Varies	228	26	153
Russia	1,714,000	69	19	19,500	35,000	21,300	Varies	2150	650	1000
Czech Rep.	92,900	5	3	1433	1659	1418	14	240	14	36
Austria	51,250	0	5	169	447	230	0	54	31	0
Germany	367,300	8	1	2855	6606	2090	0	454	90	45
Poland	283,600	10	2	2110	2291	1880	40	438	34	70
Slovakia	47,000	2	0	912	1043	808	9	146	16	19

Figure 4.1 The Military Balance<sup>16</sup> for the Czech Republic

The figure shows that the German forces are significantly larger than those of the Czech Republic. The same holds true for the Polish forces. The numbers and the associated balance, of course, can be misleading. In order to assess accurately the balance of power in the region, one has to consider factors such as the relative conditions of the different armed forces and their military-industrial potential.

#### **a. Czech Armed Forces**

The Czech armed forces are obviously not what they were prior to the revolutions of 1989. Like all of the militaries in Central Europe since then, the Czech armed forces have experienced major disruptions. These disruptions have included reductions and reorganization of forces, reduced defense spending, halting modernization efforts, and erosion of their military-industrial support base.

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<sup>16</sup>See Appendix for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The Military Balance 1994-1995.

At the time of the partition of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics, the Czech Republic got the better end of the deal militarily. Because the split of armed forces was done in a ratio of 2:1 in favor of the Czech Republic and better quality troops were stationed in the western half of the CSFR, the Czech Republic's armed forces received an initial qualitative and quantitative advantage over those of Slovakia. (Sauerwein, 1994) These advantages did not, however, insulate the Czech armed forces from future manpower and fiscal cuts.

After the partition of the CSFR in 1993, the Czech armed forces numbered 106,000. In 1994, this total was down to 92,900. By the end of this year, the number will be down around 65,000. These reductions have led to a number of problems that affect the capabilities of the armed forces, including poor recruitment and retention of junior officers and generally low morale throughout. In addition to manpower reductions, there has been a 50 percent drop in defense spending since 1989. This has led to problems in training, readiness, and modernization. (USAREUR, 1995)

The Czech military-industrial base has also suffered since the partition, diminishing the ability of the Czechs to modernize their forces. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union, in order to try to take advantage of economies of scale, directed that Pact countries had to produce specific

types of military hardware. Because of this, the Joint Technical Committee of the Warsaw Pact assigned Czechoslovakia production of "a wide range of military equipment, from combat vehicles, military trucks, and explosives to small arms and trainer aircraft (USAREUR, 1995, p. 15) Unfortunately for the Czech Republic, 60 percent of this arms production capability, primarily the heavy-weapons industries, was located in what is now Slovakia. Many of the Czech plants that remained have been closed down or converted to civilian products. (Sauerwein, 1994)

***b. Polish and Slovak Armed Forces***

All of these disruptions to the Czech armed forces and the Czech military-industrial complex have affected the balance of power between the Czech Republic and its adjacent neighbors. Those neighbors that were also members of the Warsaw Pact -- Slovakia and Poland -- have suffered similar disruptions, to varying degrees. While each of these states still possesses large quantities of equipment, it is not enough. Effectively, the legion of problems in each of these armed forces, including budgetary, manning, training, and maintenance problems, significantly reduces their combat effectiveness. Because of this, the armed forces of each of these countries are at a level of "near impotence." (Sauerwein, 1994)

### **c. *Austrian and German Armed Forces***

Conversely, with respect to the other two neighbors of the Czech Republic, Austria and Germany, the qualitative degradations of the Czech armed forces increase German and Austrian power relative to that of the Czech Republic. This is because the German and Austrian armed forces are not suffering from these fiscal and readiness problems. Their armed forces have modern equipment, cohesion, established force structures, and stable military-industrial complexes.

## **2. Balance of Threat**

As described in the previous chapter, balance of threat theory looks at a combination of four characteristics of a potential threat -- aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressiveness of intentions -- to explain a state's actions in the face of that threat.

### **a. *Aggregate Power***

Figure 4.1 showed the military balance for the Czech Republic with respect to its neighbors. The figure represents the aggregate power of the different armed forces. For the Austrian and German armed forces, this power is actual power. In the event of a conflict, they could almost immediately bring this power to bear against the Czechs. For the Poles and the Slovaks, on the other hand, the aggregate power of their armed forces is primarily latent rather than real. It would take immense efforts on the part of either country to



translate this latent power into actual power. Regardless, the Czech Republic has to look long term for possible threats. Its assessment of these possible threats will affect their balancing choices.

***b. Geographic Proximity***

Geographic proximity necessitates that the Czechs look at these countries' long term threat potentials. Because they are geographically contiguous with the Czech Republic, each could directly influence Czech national security. This is not the case with other potentially unstable or aggressive states in Central and Eastern Europe today, particularly Serbia, Ukraine, and Russia. Slovakia separates the Czech Republic from the potential threat of these states. If things were to go bad, it provides a 200 mile buffer that helps to insulate the Czechs. The bottom line is that geography, especially after the partition, favors the Czech Republic.

***c. Transparency of the Threat***

Each of these countries is geographically proximate to the Czech Republic, but are they threats? In other words, what is the transparency of the threat? Official Czech government sources explicitly state that the Czech Republic does not consider any specific state as a threat. Instead, "threats to Czech security could arise through increased regional instability, especially to the East, or international crime, such as drug trafficking or attempts to smuggle nuclear

materials . . . through the country." (USAREUR, 1995, p. 13)

Of all of the Czech Republic's neighbors, two states -- Germany and Poland -- possess more aggregate power than the Czechs, and two states -- Austria and Slovakia -- possess less. For reasons developed below, it seems that only Slovakia could develop into a long term threat in the balance of threat sense.

The Austrian armed forces, in every quantitative category except transport aircraft, are smaller than the Czech armed forces. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, they have qualitative advantages in both personnel and equipment that give Austria the offensive capabilities to threaten the Czech Republic. However, Austria is not a threat because it does not possess aggressive intentions against the Czech Republic or any other state. Two pieces of evidence point to the validity of this assertion: 1) Since the negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria in 1955, Austria has remained neutral, which was a condition of the Soviet withdrawal; and, 2) Austria and the Czech Republic have a bilateral agreement for cooperation and military exchanges. (Frost, 1993)

Germany and Poland both possess greater aggregate power than the Czech Republic. Of the two, Germany definitely possesses the offensive capabilities necessary to be a threat. Poland's offensive capabilities are debatable, given the

previous discussion of the manpower, training, readiness, and modernization problems prevalent in the Central Eastern militaries over the last seven years. Poland does, however, possess the military-industrial capability to correct at least the material problems in the long term. The country has a "balanced defense sector" and ranks first in arms production among Central and East European countries. (Sauerwein, 1994)

Even though these two countries possess, or could possess, the offensive capabilities to threaten the Czech Republic in the long term, they are not threats either, at least in the military sense. This is because the Czechs do not perceive that they possess aggressive intentions toward the Czech Republic, and it is hard to envision development of these intentions in the future. According to the Polish Prime Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Poland is determined to contribute to collective efforts to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of [the family of democratic states]." (Cimoszewicz, 1996, p.3) Aggressive intentions would be incompatible with this stated goal and their desire to integrate into Euro-Atlantic economic and security structures.

Similarly, Germany, since unification with the former East Germany, has continued its traditional post-World War II foreign policy of "firm integration in a Euro-Atlantic framework (Meiers, 1995, p. 82)," a position also incompatible

with aggressive intentions. In addition, the German national conscience has undergone a profound change since World War II, as the constitutional debates about deployment of German forces out of German territory show. According to David Haglund, Director of the Centre for International Relations at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario,

Germans have grown used to the idea that their security was intimately bound up in the country's embrace of Western political, economic, and security institutions. Another *Sonderweg* would be simply impossible, because ruinous. The early battles over German rearmament demonstrated that, when it came to defending their own territory, the Germans could agree that the organized application of legitimate force could be an acceptable means of statecraft. But beyond the country's frontiers, or perhaps beyond NATO's, the German public has continued to see force as being of slight moral and practical utility. (Haglund, 1995, p. 34)

This metamorphosis of the German national conscience can also be seen in the Bundeswehr, the German Armed Forces. The transformation of the Bundeswehr into an institution totally subordinated to the civilian government, and therefore unlikely to pursue expansionist policies in the future, can be seen in the phrase and policy called *Bürger in Uniform*.<sup>17</sup> *Bürger in Uniform*, as mentioned earlier, represents both an idea and actual policy of the Bundeswehr. Esoterically, it represents the idea that the German military establishment is totally subordinate to the civilian government.

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<sup>17</sup>This discussion of *Bürger in Uniform* is based on interviews conducted with German military officers, from various services, at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Practically, it has a number of implications. First, it requires that the Minister of Defense must always be a civilian. Second, it regulates that military personnel cannot participate in political activities (demonstrations, debates, rallies, etc.) unless they are off-duty, and never in uniform. In addition, currently serving military personnel cannot hold elected positions in the German government. Finally, the German officers pointed out that *Bürger in Uniform* is one of the major reasons they prefer maintaining a conscript system in Germany, rather than a primarily volunteer system. *Bürger in Uniform* and the conscript system allow the education of German youth in the requirement to have a subordinated military establishment.

Of course, just because the Czech Republic does not perceive Poland and Germany to be threats does not mean there are no problems between the Czech Republic and these two countries. With the Poles, Czechoslovakia had a border dispute during the interwar years over the area of Teschen. In 1920, the Allied powers awarded the town to Poland, but the more prosperous surrounding countryside to Czechoslovakia. In 1938, Poland seized the area during the Munich Crisis. (Bell, 1986) Today, however, neither state professes any claims on the territory of the other. (CIA, 1995)

Problems with Germany also stem from World War II. They deal with the claims of restitution from Sudeten Germans

who were forcefully expelled from Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1947. The current issue is over the Extrajudicial Rehabilitation Law enacted by the then-Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia in 1991. The law allows people who had property confiscated by the Czechoslovak government to file for restitution of the property. (Bren, 1994)

The issue for the German government and the Sudeten Germans in Germany is that the measure sets the date of restitution as on or after 25 February, 1948, when the Communist government seized power. This date excludes Sudeten Germans from the right to seek restitution. German estimates of the value of the property confiscated from expelled Sudeten Germans are around DM 265 million. (Bren, 1994) However, although the issue has still not been resolved, it has not significantly affected Czech-German interstate relations. The issue did not prevent the two states from signing the Czechoslovak-German treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1992.

Unlike Austria, Germany and Poland, however, Slovakia does have some potential to be a long term threat to the Czech Republic. Materially, the aggregate power balance favors the Czechs. However, Slovak armed forces do possess weaponry and the military-industrial infrastructure and potential to possess offensive capabilities. Figure 4.1 shows Slovakia has mechanized forces, artillery, surface-to-surface

missiles, and sufficient quantities of advanced combat aircraft and attack helicopters to threaten the Czech Republic. In addition, Slovakia inherited the lion's share of the CSFR's weapons industry, and it is actively seeking the ability to technologically upgrade these defense industries from French, Belgian, and German firms. (Sauerwein, 1994)

In addition to the possession of offensive capabilities, a rise of nationalist feelings and political instability could give rise to the necessary aggressive intentions that could make Slovakia a threat to the Czechs. In Slovakia, "nationalist prejudices and ethnic tensions are never far below the surface." (Wallace, 1994) Other than as the immediate cause of the partition, these tendencies have had little disruption on the development of Slovak democracy. However, leaders such as the nationalistic Prime Minister Meciar could use them in the future to redirect the orientation in the direction of authoritarianism. Given Slovak relegation to a secondary status in the former CSFR and possible future jealousy over Czech integration efforts with the West, it is not difficult to see how Slovakia could develop aggressive intentions against its former partner.

In addition to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, like all other countries in Central Europe, must consider the potential threat of Russia, for both historical and practical purposes. Historically, the Czechs will not be able to forget

that the Soviet Union, backed by its Warsaw Pact "client-allies," invaded Czechoslovakia on 20 August, 1968, to quell the liberalization of the Czech Communist Party known as the "Prague Spring." (Rothschild, 1993, p. 172)

Practically, potential instability in Russia could affect the Czech Republic through such things as increased refugee flows and organized crime. In addition, if Slovakia did not get into NATO, it might attempt to balance with Russia against the West. This would further exacerbate relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Czech politicians do not seem too worried about the possibilities presently. According to Czech Prime Minister Klaus,

Let us in no way underestimate it [the Russian threat]. However, I would not separate this threat from the whole issue. The Russian threat is not a military one. It is the threat of mastering -- or of not mastering -- the early postcommunist phase. This threat has social, economic, political, and, only at a certain point, military dimensions. At the same time, I concede that the Czech Republic is a little further toward the West than, for instance, Poland. This issue is more sensitive for the Poles than it is for the Austrians, for example. In this sense, I would place us more alongside Austria than Poland. (FBIS, 11 January, 1994)

### **3. Summary of Third Image Factors**

#### **a. Balance of Power**

Realism predicts a state confronted by an unfavorable balance of power will attempt to correct the imbalance. It can do this by balancing or bandwagoning. If a state attempts to balance against the external threat, it



can choose to balance internally or externally. Our inferred hypotheses predicted: 1) states will attempt to balance internally before externally; 2) states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions to offset the threatening power of a stronger state or coalition; 3) weaker states may bandwagon with a stronger state if they fear they will be destroyed and they have no other recourse;<sup>18</sup> and, 4) weaker states may seek to bandwagon with a stronger state because of the chance of receiving profit or technology or to follow a new ideology.

The Czech case clearly confirms the first hypothesis. Although painful, the Czech Republic has gone through both internal military and economic transformations that have streamlined its military structures, military-industrial complex, and economic systems. In a sense that is counterintuitive to the quantitative mind set of the Cold War struggle, this seemingly detrimental internal balancing and adjustments will make the Czech Republic and its armed forces more powerful in the long term.

The second hypothesis is refuted by the Czech case. Looking at the balance of power for the Czech Republic, the largest "power" that could threaten the security of the state is the combination of the forces of Germany and the other NATO countries. Our second hypothesis would predict that the Czech

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<sup>18</sup>Of course, it must be emphasized that Great Powers never bandwagon.

Republic would be seeking to align and balance against this stronger coalition. Poland and Slovakia are two neighboring weaker states with which the Czech Republic could balance. Instead, it is trying to align with NATO.

This is not a case of the defensive, or capitulation, bandwagoning that our third hypothesis predicted. As stated earlier, the Czech Republic does not consider any specific state a direct threat. Instead, this phenomenon is confirmation of the fourth hypothesis -- integration into NATO and Western European economic, social, and political structures will "turn a profit" for the Czech Republic. In other words, the chance of future "profits" has enticed the Czech Republic into bandwagoning with the West.<sup>19</sup>

#### ***b. Balance of Threat***

Balance of threat theory can help explain Czech actions in today's Central European security environment. Although Figure 4.1 shows that Russia clearly has more power and residual and latent military potential, the Czech national security documents do not define Russia as a threat. Instead, regional instability is on the top of the list of potential threats. Of course, this is not to say that the Czech government does not consider Russia a threat.

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<sup>19</sup>In this sense, profits are not meant as a purely economic term; it is incontrovertible that the security guarantees provided by NATO, or the WEU, would be "profitable."

Balance of threat theory can explain this stance. The Russian Federation is not adjacent to the Czech Republic. It therefore cannot affect the national security of the Czech Republic as directly as the regional threats. Russian forces would have to transit Ukraine and Slovakia to attack the Czech Republic. While this is not outside the realm of possibility, especially given the instability in Ukraine and continuing Slovak relations with Moscow, there would be indicators of these movements that would serve to warn the Czechs.

In addition, Russian operations in Chechnya call into question the capabilities of the Russian armed forces. Without offensive capabilities to back up rhetoric, even a resurgence of imperialism and aggressive intentions in Moscow should not change the Czech stance. Regional instability would still pose a greater threat. However, this is not necessarily a static condition. Russian capabilities have been resilient in the past. From the start of World War II to the Red Army liberation of Berlin, the Soviet Armed Forces went from basically nothing to a world power.

Balance of threat theory can similarly explain Czech actions and attitudes toward their immediate neighbors. The German armed forces are both qualitatively better and quantitatively larger than the Czech armed forces. The Polish armed forces are quantitatively larger. Austrian forces, although smaller, have cohesion, modernization, training, and

readiness advantages that make them qualitatively better than the Czechs. Despite the fact that each of these armed forces possesses offensive capabilities that could threaten the Czech Republic, there is no move on the Czech side to balance against them. This is because none of these states has aggressive intentions against the Czech Republic.

#### **D. SECOND IMAGE**

The "second image" deals with the nature of the state and domestic society. This section will focus on domestic political constraints, economic constraints, and the internal security threat of the Czech Republic.

##### **1. Political Constraints**

The Czech government currently has few domestic political constraints that would keep it from balancing internally or externally. It is one of the most stable governments in Central Europe. The government is a parliamentary democracy with a two-house parliament that elects the president. The president appoints the prime minister. Four parties currently make up the coalition government. They share common views of market reform and a strong desire to integrate the Czech Republic into Western European institutions. (USAREUR, 1995)

The governing coalition controls 110 out of 200 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which is the lower house of Parliament. The coalition's control over Parliament is actually more pronounced than this figure would indicate,

because only one of the opposition parties has not splintered or lost deputies since the 1992 election. (USAREUR, 1995) According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the current coalition "represents a stable right-of-center majority that . . . shows no sign of losing popular support." (USDOC, 1994)

## **2. Economic Constraints**

Because of the stability of the Czech political system and the market reforms introduced by the pro-market coalition government, the Czech Republic has an advanced economy. There is a generally positive trend in the Czech economy. Of course, it has not accomplished this feat alone; numerous foreign firms have invested in the republic. These joint ventures include formation of consortiums to "resume arms production for the domestic market and export (Simon, 1994, p. 484)," which will improve Czech modernization efforts.

Positive characteristics of the Czech economy include "a stable currency with few current-account foreign-exchange controls, low unemployment, low national debt, strong foreign currency reserves, and a small, general government fiscal surplus." (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995) Since 1993, the country has experienced positive growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Inflation has been reduced from around 60 percent in 1991 to roughly 10 percent. Unemployment is a remarkably low 6 percent, lower than most Western European states. (USAREUR, 1995)

### **3. Internal Security Threat**

Prior to the partition of the CSFR, there were two primary internal security challenges, or threats -- the reemergence of Slovak nationalism and the ethnic Hungarian minority in the southern part of the Slovak Federal Republic. After the partition, these problems disappeared for the Czech Republic. Today, as a result of the partition, the Czech Republic does not have to deal with an internal security threat. It is primarily homogenous and does not have large ethnic minorities.<sup>20</sup> Ninety-four percent of the population is Czech. (*New Europe*, 1996)

### **4. Summary of Second Image Factors**

The Czech government has a leadership that is confident in its own political position and the maintenance of the state structure. It has good state-society relations, primarily due its market reforms and the corresponding improvements in the economy. The hypothesis inferred from domestic political theory predicted that a state with a leadership confident in its own power and good state-society relations will attempt to balance internally prior to externally balancing. This is the case in the Czech Republic today.

We also see the Czech Republic attempting to balance externally to gain resources for internal improvements of the

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<sup>20</sup>While most scholars consider the Czech Republic to be primarily homogenous, it is interesting to note that there is a distinct difference between Moravians and Bohemians.

domestic economy. As mentioned earlier, it is actively seeking joint ventures with foreign firms to acquire both foreign capital and technology. This phenomenon is not the external extraction of resources predicted by the hypothesis on the internal security threat, which stated that a state would try to balance externally to acquire resources unavailable indigenously for combating an internal threat. That hypothesis does not apply to this case, because there is no significant internal security threat to the Czech Republic.

#### **E. CONCLUSION**

Overall, both systemic and domestic political theories can help explain Czech actions in, and overall responses to, the current security situation in Central Europe. This is in line with the study's position that decision makers must use a combination of the theories in both levels of analysis to determine state strategies and actions. Although the inferred hypotheses from both levels of analysis can help predict and explain Czech positions and actions, especially internal actions, the advantage in explanatory power has to go to "third image," or systemic, theories.

Balance of power and balance of threat not only serve to predict and explain Czech actions, they also do a better job at predicting the direction of the balancing actions (i.e., toward Western Europe, instead of other Central European countries or Russia). A comparison of two hypotheses, one

from each image, will illustrate this point. One of the hypotheses we inferred from balance of power theory stated that the chance of profit or ideology or technology can entice a state to bandwagon with a stronger state. A similar, yet competing, hypothesis from the "second image" stated that a state may externally balance to gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic economy.

The "second image" hypothesis can only predict that the Czech Republic may externally balance to gain resources, such as energy sources or technology. It cannot predict whether that balancing will be with the West or Russia. Both have resources that could help the Czechs. Although it is not producing much, Russia still has huge deposits of natural resources.

The first hypothesis can predict both the external balancing of the Czech Republic and the direction. It predicts that the Czechs will be enticed by long term profit and the chance to obtain improved technologies. These opportunities can only be currently gained from the West. According to the Czech Prime Minister, "Our road to Europe goes through Germany." (Sauerwein, 1994) This hypothesis, therefore, does a better job of explaining why the Czechs are more willing to bandwagon with a stronger state than balance with the weaker against the stronger.



## V. THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUNGARY

### A. INTRODUCTION

If the Czech Republic was the "luckiest" state after the revolutions of 1989, then Hungary was probably the "unluckiest" state. The breakup of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia have significantly complicated Hungarian national security policies. Because of these breakups, Hungary now must deal with five new states on its borders -- Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. In addition, there are a large number of ethnic Magyars living in the states bordering Hungary, which also serves to complicate Hungarian foreign policy.

This chapter will follow the format set out in the preceding chapter on the Czech Republic. Its goal is to explore Hungarian views on NATO expansion and the security environment in Central Europe today. The chapter will use different theories of international relations to cover both "third image" (systemic) and "second image" (domestic) factors affecting the country's national security decisions. At the end of the chapter, it attempts to summarize the relative explanatory powers of each theory to explain or predict Hungarian positions and actions.

## B. HUNGARIAN POSITION ON NATO

According to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Kovacs, "Hungary wants full membership in NATO, not some partial solution." (Szilagyi, *OMRI Analytical Brief*, 22 March, 1996) Support for Hungary's admission to NATO is strong throughout the country. All of the major parties support Hungary's application for full membership. Hungary is actively working to improve its bilateral relations with Slovakia and Romania to meet the NATO criterion that states resolve border disputes and eliminate or reduce tensions caused by ethnic disputes. (Szilagyi, *OMRI Analytical Brief*, 22 March, 1996)

Hungary has also said that it would accept all responsibilities of NATO membership, to include the stationing of NATO troops and nuclear weapons on its territory. This view was stated by the Foreign Ministry Secretary, who said, "If a decision is made with the consent of Hungary, then it would be natural that in the implementation of that decision, Hungary will shoulder the obligations derived from that decision [NATO troops and nuclear weapons]." (Csongos, 20 March, 1996) Hungary is actively supporting NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. It has allowed NATO AWACs to fly from its territory, provided space for an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), and contributed a 400-man engineer unit to IFOR. (Szilagyi, *OMRI*, 22 March, 1996)

### C. THIRD IMAGE

#### 1. Balance of Power

Prior to 1989, Hungarian national security policy was fairly simple. Hungary was deeply embedded in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and, with the exception of neutral Austria, was surrounded by other members of the Warsaw Pact. Because it was not a "front-line" state, Hungary's military role was limited. It was a "glorified main supply route, support area and reserve base for the Soviet main axis across Germany, if and when that axis was to move West." (Gorka, 1995, p. 26) With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact's military structure on 1 April, 1991, Hungary had to begin looking at the balance of power between itself and its neighbors. Figure 5.1 lists the current military balance between Hungary and its neighbors.

Country	Personnel	Divisions	Sep Bde	Tanks	AIFV/ APCs	Arty	SSMs	Aircraft		Atk Helo
								Cbt	Trans	
USA - Europe	159,600	2	0	1968	3160	1373	Varies	228	26	153
Russia	1,714,000	69	19	19,500	35,000	21,300	Varies	2150	650	1000
Hungary	74,500	0	12	1191	1645	991	0	171	14	39
Austria	51,250	0	5	169	447	230	0	54	31	0
Croatia	105,000	0	5	178	92	900	0	20	9	2
Romania	230,500	7	11	2395	2450	3138	15	382	39	37
Serbia	126,500	0	19	639	629	1499	0	284	23	115
Slovakia	47,000	2	0	912	1043	808	9	146	16	19
Slovenia	8100	0	7 bn	57	45	45	0	0	0	1
Ukraine	517,000	14	3	5430	5216	3638	272	1433	274	307

Figure 5.1 The Military Balance for Hungary<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>See Appendix for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The Military Balance 1994-1995.

**a. Hungarian Armed Forces**

Since 1989, Hungarian armed forces have gone through a 50,000 reduction, to their present strength of 74,500. This reorganization has largely corrected some of the systemic problems inherited from the Warsaw Pact, namely oversized command structures, disproportionate sizes of combat units, and a large number of logistics and training units. (Sauerwein, 1994)

The reorganization could not correct, however, the material deficiencies of the Hungarian armed forces. Because of the presence of 65,000 Soviet troops in the country, manning and equipping the Hungarian forces were never high priorities. Consequently, most of the equipment in the armed forces today is obsolete Soviet equipment. In addition to lack of modern equipment, Hungarian forces lack money for training, maintenance, and modernization. (Sauerwein, 1994)

Even if the money were available for modernization, the military-industrial complex could not provide the necessary goods and services. During the days of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary only played a minor role in Pact defense production. In 1989, Hungary's defense industry was "among Eastern Europe's smallest and account[ed] for just 1 percent of Hungary's total industrial production." (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 October, 1989) For present day Hungary, the problem is not just a matter of scale. It is also a matter of

type. While it was a member of the Warsaw Pact, the Pact's Joint Technical Committee assigned Hungary production of military communication and electronic equipment. The only other equipment Hungary attempted to produce was small arms, scout cars, and a few armored personnel carriers. They produced no heavy weapon systems. (USAREUR, 1996)

Using this brief description of the conditions of the Hungarian armed forces and its military-industrial complex, it is possible to compare the relative power of Hungary with its neighbors. Of the states that border Hungary, four possess larger armed forces. These states are Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine. Of the four, Hungary does not have serious potential security problems with Croatia or Ukraine.

#### ***b. Romanian Armed Forces***

The Romanian armed forces are more than three times as large as the Hungarian armed forces. Along with the Romanian military-industrial complex, they have weathered the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the economic hardships of Central Europe well. Capability assessments of the armed forces indicate that they "would be able, with adequate warning, to counter successfully a determined attack on national territory." (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994) In addition, they are "probably also capable of undertaking successful large-scale incursions into the territory of Romania's

neighbors, if the political will to do so existed." (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994)

The Romanian government separated the military-industrial complex from the centralized planning apparatus of the Warsaw Pact after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Today, according to the minister of national defense production, the country possesses a "pretty effective defence industry," and they are attempting to improve it with the acquisition of Western technology. The military-industrial complex provides up to 85 percent of the state's defense needs. (Beaver, 1994)

### ***c. Ukrainian Armed Forces***

The Ukrainian armed forces dwarf the Hungarian armed forces. Ukraine, in its position as the most western republic of the former Soviet Union, had first rate units from all services of the Soviet armed forces. In total, Ukraine nationalized 30 percent of the equipment and 750,000 personnel of the former Soviet army that was west of the Urals. The equipment and personnel were first echelon forces, and they included tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. While Ukraine agreed to give all these weapons back to the Russian Federation for destruction, it still possesses large numbers of conventionally armed ballistic missiles capable of striking Hungary. (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994)

Although severely constrained by the current economic situation, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex has the infrastructure to modernize Ukrainian forces. The military-industrial complex is a large one, having been nationalized by the Ukrainian government also. A modest modernization plan is underway now to keep the military-industrial complex in operation. (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994) Even without it, the Ukrainian armed forces possess, and will continue to possess, significantly more equipment than Hungary, as well as the industrial and knowledge base required to modernize that equipment in the future.

#### ***d. Croatian Armed Forces***

Croatian forces are also larger than those of the Hungarian armed forces. As the figure shows, however, this advantage is significant only in the number of personnel. In terms of readiness and training, Croatian armed forces currently do not have the ability to conduct "large scale offensive operations against established neighbouring states." (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994) Of course, the performance of the Croatian Armed Forces in the Krajina prior to the signing of the Dayton Accords may indicate that this assessment needs updating. Even with these improvements, however, Croatia lacks a well-developed military-industrial complex. (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994) Because of this, Croatia does not have the ability to change internally the balance of power.

#### **e. Serbian Armed Forces**

Serbia is the last neighbor of Hungary that has significant military forces. The Serbian armed forces performed poorly in the initial stages of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. However, they have undergone a reorganization and downsizing since then. The net result is a more Serb-dominated and staffed structure. This should improve the capabilities of the armed forces. The armed forces are capable of defending Serbia. In terms of equipment, Serbia possesses sufficient material for defensive purposes, but will have serious problems replacing or modernizing the equipment, primarily due to the U.N. arms embargo during the Bosnian conflict and the loss of the infrastructure that was distributed throughout the former Yugoslavia. (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994)

### **2. Balance of Threat**

#### **a. Aggregate Power**

Numerically, the preceding discussion identified four states that had larger forces than Hungary. These states were Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine. Of these four states, Croatia and Serbia do not currently possess equipment, readiness, or the military-industrial capability to seriously threaten Hungary. In other words, Hungary has greater aggregate power than both of these states. This is not the case with Romania or Ukraine. Romania has large and well-



equipped armed forces, and a significant military-industrial complex that can provide for 85 percent of the country's defense needs. Ukraine's armed forces dwarf those of Hungary. In addition, Ukraine possesses large stockpiles of equipment and weapons systems. Even if its military-industrial complex cannot currently provide for modernization, because of fiscal constraints, Ukraine has a lot of spares. Based on this discussion, it is obvious that Romania and Ukraine have greater aggregate power than Hungary.

***b. Geographic Proximity***

Both Romania and Ukraine share common borders with Hungary. The border between Hungary and Romania is the longest -- approximately 450 kilometers in length. The border with Ukraine is much shorter -- approximately 100 kilometers. Because the Austro-Hungarian empire extended well-beyond the country's current day borders prior to World War I, both Romania and Ukraine have areas that belonged to Hungary. These areas have large Magyar populations. It is because of these ethnic Magyars that geographic proximity plays such an important role in defining the threats to Hungary.

***c. Transparency of the Threat***

The question is, given that Romania and Ukraine possess greater aggregate power, are there indicators that either of them could be a long term threat to Hungary? As stated in the theory chapter, for purposes of this study,

transparency of threat is determined by the ability of a state to see two things in potentially threatening states. The first is the possession of offensive capabilities. The second is indicators of aggressiveness of intentions. Today, both Romania and Ukraine possess the requisite capabilities. Neither one possesses aggressiveness of intentions. However, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where Romania could develop those intentions.

As stated earlier, both Romania and Ukraine possess equipment that gives them the capability to conduct offensive operations against Hungary. Ukraine possesses the most modern equipment that was in the Soviet armed forces at the time of the breakup. Romania has similar equipment and is actively seeking new technology that will give it the ability to improve these offensive capabilities.

Although Ukraine possesses the offensive capabilities, it does not evince aggressive intentions toward Hungary. By all indications, relations between Ukraine and Hungary are cordial and cooperative. The countries have signed a multitude of bilateral agreements since 1991, including a declaration that guarantees minority rights. This agreement allays fears of the Hungarian government over treatment of ethnic Magyars in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, a Ukrainian region once belonging to Hungary. The two states also have an agreement on military cooperation that calls for

regular consultations and visits. (Larrabee, 1993) Of course, all of this does not guarantee Ukrainian stability. Ukraine does have the potential to be a long term threat to Hungary if political conditions in Ukraine allow Moscow to reassert Russian influence.

Hungary's relations with Romania are not so cordial. There is a significant strain between the two countries over the roughly two million Magyars that live in Transylvania. Romanian politicians do not want to grant these minorities collective rights, because they fear it will threaten Romanian territorial integrity. For their part, Hungarian officials regard "the situation of the ethnic Hungarians living abroad as an essential component of relations with its neighbors." (Reisch, 1994, p. 46) These conditions are further exacerbated by the fact that the ultranationalist forces in Romania have significant power. (Reisch, 1994) These forces could inflame anti-Magyar feelings which could lead to official aggressiveness of intentions against Hungary.

In addition to Romania, Russia is also a provocative potential threat, even though it is not an adjacent neighbor. Russia is historically one of the most serious threats to the region. (Orme, 1991) Today's threat to Hungary from Russia is not necessarily a direct one. Instead, similarly to the case of the Czech Republic, instability in Russia threatens Hungary with cross border problems such as possible refugee flows and

organized crime. However, there is a possibility that Russia could directly impact Hungarian sovereignty. Either increased Russian nationalism and neoimperialistic policies or Russian reactions to NATO enlargement could lead Russia to increase pressures on Ukraine. If Russia were able to reexert influence in Ukraine as it has in Belarus, it could become the most dangerous threat to Hungary.

### **3. Summary of Third Image Factors**

#### ***a. Balance of Power***

Balance of power theory by itself does not necessarily do a good job of explaining or predicting Hungarian positions and actions in today's Central European security environment. Of our inferred hypotheses, two are confirmed, one is refuted, and one is neither confirmed nor refuted.

Although it has been painful, Hungary has attempted first to balance internally against outside threats. Since before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary has been reducing, streamlining, and reorganizing its forces. Today, although faced with severe fiscal constraints, Hungary is attempting to modernize its forces. It has had to prioritize its outlays. (USAREUR, 1996) All of these efforts are in line with the hypothesis that a state will attempt to balance internally before it balances externally.

The second hypothesis that is confirmed is the hypothesis on bandwagoning for profit. Hungary's stated goals are to be admitted into Western European structures. Yet, Hungarian officials are the first to admit that the country faces no direct and immediate threat. In contradiction to the third hypothesis, Hungary is not attempting to bandwagon with the stronger coalition because it fears that a stronger power will destroy it. Instead, it wants to bandwagon with the West because of the chance of receiving profit.

Finally, Hungary's efforts to join NATO refute the hypothesis that states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions to offset the threatening power of a stronger state or coalition. NATO is the preponderant power in the area. At the level of Central Europe overall, this hypothesis suggests that we should see Hungary attempting to balance with Russia, Ukraine, Romania, or some combination, to offset NATO's power. At the regional level, we could reasonably expect to see Hungary and Romania balancing against Ukraine, or Hungary and Croatia and Serbia balancing against Romania. That is not happening. Balance of threat theory can help explain why.

#### ***b. Balance of Threat***

Romania and Ukraine are the only geographically proximate states that have greater aggregate power than Hungary and possess offensive capabilities. Because they are nearby, these states pose a greater threat than others,

particularly Russia. While Hungary knows that each of these states possesses offensive capabilities, it does not think either one has aggressive intentions. However, the presence of anti-Magyar sentiments and ultranationalist forces in Romania could lead to aggressive intentions in the future. The appropriate reaction would be for Hungary to balance against that future threat. Admission to NATO would serve that purpose for the Hungarians. It would also serve as a hedge against any future threats caused by Russian influences in Ukraine.

### **C. SECOND IMAGE**

#### **1. Political Constraints**

Although there is little political instability in Hungary, it is not as stable as the Czech Republic. And, there are signs that problems could arise in the long term. The ruling coalition is led by the successor to the Communist Party -- the Hungarian Socialist Party. Along with its coalition partner, it controls 279 out of 386 seats in the National Assembly. This advantage gives the government the ability to pass whatever legislation it wants. The quantitative advantage may increase in the future, as opposition parties are financially strapped and the coalition is cutting state support for political parties. Since the ruling parties have considerable business interests, this could widen the gap in their favor (Freedom House, 1995)

The ruling coalition's large margin of victory in the elections of 1994 shows that the public supported the government. However, popularity and support have diminished because of economic hardships caused by the austerity program which the government instituted. This program has been very unpopular. (Szilagyi, *Transition*, 22 March, 1996) It has also shown divisions within the ruling coalition. If the economic situation gets worse, internal tensions within the ruling coalition could limit its ability to continue the reforms. (USAREUR, 1996)

## **2. Economic Constraints**

Hungary is currently suffering from a number of economic ailments. These include reduced government spending, high inflation, high unemployment, a large foreign debt, and budget and trade deficits. (USAREUR, 1996) These difficulties limit Hungary's ability to spend the money necessary to balance internally against any threats.

In addition to these problems, Hungary has the aforementioned problem of a small military-industrial complex that has no heavy weapon system production capabilities. This forces Hungary to remain dependent on external sources to equip and modernize its forces. Due to the fact of Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact, the majority of this equipment is Soviet. This means, lacking the capital to invest in Western systems, Hungary must rely on its former suppliers for

future modernization. These suppliers include Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland. While it is doubtful whether Slovakia or Romania would sell military hardware to Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and Poland probably would. This decreases Hungarian dependence on Russia, and it decreases the leverage Russia could exert on Hungary.

### **3. Internal Security Threat**

There is no significant internal security threat to Hungary. The population of Hungary is primarily homogenous. Ethnic Magyars represent approximately 96 percent of the population. Other ethnic groups represented include Romanies (Gypsies), Slovaks, Germans, and Romanians. (Freedom House, 1995)

### **4. Summary of Second Image Factors**

The Hungarian coalition government is currently in a position where it has a large majority in the National Assembly. Due to new legislation reducing state financial support for political parties, and the ruling coalition's large business interests, the coalition should be able to increase its share of seats in the National Assembly. Their actions, to date, in the national security realm have been consistent with our inferred hypothesis from domestic political theory that a leadership confident in its own power would attempt to balance internally prior to externally.



In a situation similar to the case of the Czech Republic, some of their internal balancing actions have been counterintuitive to conventional thinking on balancing, such as reorganization and reductions of the armed forces. These actions may not quantitatively help the state, but they qualitatively affect the balance. In addition, the Hungarian leadership has not had *carte blanche* to conduct internal balancing. For example, economic factors have inhibited full implementation of modernization, forcing the government to prioritize these efforts. (USAREUR, 1996)

Hungarian actions in the face of these constraints confirm the inferred hypotheses on economic constraints. These hypotheses stated: 1) a state may externally balance to gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic economy; and, 2) a state that lacks the resources to balance internally against a threat will attempt to balance externally to meet the threat. Both of these hypotheses predict and explain Hungarian efforts to join NATO. Admittance into Western European structures will provide needed capital for the Hungarian economy. In addition, Hungary can reasonably expect its military to benefit from the receipt of technology and excess NATO equipment, primarily U.S. equipment under the Foreign Military Sales or Excess Defense Articles programs, in the event of admission.

#### D. CONCLUSION

As in the case study of the Czech Republic, both systemic and domestic political theories can help explain and predict Hungarian overall responses to today's security situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Justification for Hungarian actions tends to confirm hypotheses from both levels of analysis. In the Hungarian case, however, there is not a disparity in the relative explanatory power of the theories.

Both theories do an equally good job of predicting and explaining Hungarian actions. The rise in the standing of domestic political theory can be attributed to the strength and validity of the hypotheses on economic constraints. The Hungarian economy is much worse shape than the Czech economy. This causes the Hungarians to seek external extraction of resources, which is predicted by the hypotheses.

## **VI. THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLAND**

*The geography has not changed -- the Germans are still on one side, Russia is on the other.*

Professor Bronislaw Geremek  
Chairman, Sejm Commission on Foreign Affairs  
(Gizinski, 1994)

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter explores Polish views on NATO enlargement and the current security environment in Central Europe. Prior to 1989, Poland's security environment was stable. It was bordered by other members of the Warsaw Pact on all sides -- East Germany on its western border, Czechoslovakia to the south, and the Soviet Union to the northeast and east. Today, Poland faces a different geopolitical situation -- to the west is a reunified Germany, to the south are the Czech and Slovak Republics, and to the east is a slew of newly independent states that includes the Russian Federation (the Kaliningrad Oblast borders Poland), Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine.

### **B. POLISH POSITION ON NATO**

According to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister of Poland, Poland considers admission to NATO as "one of the major objectives of Polish foreign policy." (Cimoszewicz, 1996, p. 3) Axel Krohn, a former researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, believes there are three reasons for Polish interest in joining NATO. The first,

as stated by the former Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski, is Poland's desire to gain the U.S. nuclear security guarantee to hedge against resurgence of an expansionist Russia. The second is the hope that admission to NATO will speed Poland's entrance into the European Union. The third is to preclude the development of a strong German sphere of influence in Central Europe. (Krohn, 1995, pp. 596-597)

### **C. THIRD IMAGE**

Poland today is completely surrounded by different states than it was prior to 1991. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact led to "new insecurities and deficiencies after the integrated military and command structures had fallen apart." Today, while the likelihood of a large-scale attack on Poland has decreased, the likelihood of local and regional conflicts throughout Europe, such as the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, has increased. (Sauerwein, 1994) The likelihood of conflicts forces Poland to look at the balance between itself and its neighbors and likely adversaries.

#### **1. Balance of Power**

Today, seven states border Poland. Figure 6.1 lists the current military balance between Poland and its neighbors.<sup>22</sup> The figure also lists the numbers of U.S. and Russian forces.

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<sup>22</sup>It is interesting to note that Poland is the only one of the Central European states in this study that has a navy. The balance of naval forces between Poland and Russia is discussed later.

Country	Personnel	Divisions	Sep Bde	Tanks	APFV/ APCs	Arty	SSMs	Aircraft		Atk Helo
								Cbt	Trans	
USA - Europe	159,600	2	0	1968	3160	1373	Varies	228	26	153
Russia	1,714,000	69	19	19,500	35,000	21,300	Varies	2150	650	1000
Poland	283,600	10	2	2110	2291	1880	40	438	34	70
Belarus	92,500	2	2	3108	3406	1584	96	354	44	78
Czech Rep.	92,900	5	3	1433	1659	1418	14	240	14	36
Germany	367,300	8	1	2855	6606	2090	0	454	90	45
Lithuania	8900	0	1	0	15	0	0	0	30	0
Russia (Kalin)	38,000	3	2	1100	1300	600	40	35	0	48
Slovakia	47,000	2	0	912	1043	808	9	146	16	19
Ukraine	517,000	14	3	5430	5216	3638	272	1433	274	307

Figure 6.1 The Military Balance<sup>23</sup> for Poland

Of the states that border Poland, it has potential problems with five -- Belarus, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. (Larrabee, 1993) Of the five, Lithuania, assuming it remains independent of Russia, can be discounted as a potential threat. Its armed forces are just too small. However, Poland cannot discount the others as it surveys the balance of power in the region. Prior to examining the relative balance of power between Poland and its neighbors, it is necessary to explore the conditions and status of the Polish armed forces and the indigenous military-industrial complex.<sup>24</sup>

#### **a. Polish Armed Forces**

Since 1988, Polish forces have undergone extreme changes in size, structure, and deployment. In 1988, there were 413,000 personnel in the armed forces. Today, that figure is 283,600, which is still above the 234,000 level

<sup>23</sup>See Appendix A for a tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The Military Balance 1994-1995.

<sup>24</sup>Both will contribute to the country's ability to balance internally against a threat.

mandated by the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Structurally, the army has gone from 13 divisions in 1988 to 10 divisions and two brigades today. This structure will be further reduced to a force of six mechanized infantry divisions, six mechanized infantry brigades, and seven cadre divisions. Finally, Polish armed forces have undergone a large redeployment from a primarily western-oriented defense pattern to a country-wide deployment. (Sauerwein, 1994)

The condition of the armed forces is dismal. The army lacks modern weapons, particularly antitank systems, modern main battle tanks, communication systems, combat helicopters, and radar systems. Current equipment is Soviet equipment that is two to three generations behind western equipment. (Jakucki, 1994) Half of the air force's combat aircraft (220/438) will reach the end of their effective service life in the next two to three years. There is hardly any money available for modernization. The defense budget has shrunk 60 percent in the last seven years (2.4 percent of GDP for 1996). (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, August 4, 1995)

Unlike the Czech Republic and Hungary, however, Poland does have the necessary military-industrial base infrastructure to correct most of these problems, if they can get the necessary foreign capital and technology. Poland's military-industrial role in the Warsaw Pact production scheme

gave it a "balanced defence sector that produces jet and turboprop trainers, transport aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armoured vehicles, rocket artillery, radars, small arms, frigates, landing craft, and minesweepers." (Sauerwein, 1994) The Polish defense industry, like all Central European arms manufacturers, has gone through reductions and conversions since 1989. Currently, Poland has a total of 28 defense enterprises and 11 repair facilities, giving it 19 percent of its 1988 production capacity. (Sauerwein, 1994)

Based on this brief discussion of the conditions of the Polish armed forces and its military-industrial complex, it is possible to survey the relative power of Poland's neighbors. Of the states that border Poland, three possess larger forces than Poland. These are Germany, Ukraine, and the combination of Belarus and Russia. Poland has potential security problems with all of them.

#### ***b. Belarus/Russian Armed Forces***

Since 1993, it has become increasingly clear that Russia does directly border on Poland through Belarus. Within the former Soviet Union, Belarus was the most Russified of the Soviet republics, outside of the Russian Federation. Today, the old Soviet-era flag is the national flag of Belarus. (Defense and Foreign Affairs, 1995). The economy of Belarus is inextricably linked to the Russian economy, particularly in the energy sector, where Belarus is heavily dependent on

Russian oil and gas supplies. There is a "virtual integration" of the two economies, the Belarusian Central Bank has been dissolved, and the Russian rouble is the official currency of Belarus. (*Jane's Sentinel*, 1994)

Russia and Belarus have continued to increase military and security cooperation. In December, 1995, the countries agreed to "strengthen ties between the military-industrial enterprises of the two states, to expand joint use of Belarusian military infrastructure, particularly in air defense, and to coordinate regional planning efforts." (Garnett, 1996, p. 70) Finally, Russian border guards and customs agents currently man the Poland-Belarus border. (Kuzio, 1995)

Therefore, the danger to Poland from Belarus does not come from the Belarusian armed forces by themselves. These forces are small and in a state of flux. The armed forces have a declared self-defense role. Currently, Belarus has five separate mechanized infantry brigades in its force structure. It possesses significantly more equipment than it can possibly man, including approximately one hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SS-1C Scud B and SS-21). (The Military Balance, 1994) The problem is the integrative trend seen between Belarus and Russia.

It is not infeasible that, under the auspices of integration of forces of the Commonwealth of Independent



States (CIS), Russia could station forces in Belarus, opposite Poland. In the two military districts closest to Belarus (Leningrad and Moscow), Russia has approximately 200,000 troops. These forces include three armies, with a combined total of six motorized rifle divisions (MRD), five tank divisions (TD), and three airborne divisions (ABD). The total numbers for major combat systems include 3,300 main battle tanks (MBT), 4,000 armored combat vehicles (ACV), 2,600 artillery pieces, 90 short range ballistic missiles, and hundreds of combat aircraft and helicopters. (The Military Balance, 1994)

In addition to these forces, Russia has the highly militarized Kaliningrad Oblast, which borders Poland on the north. This area has three divisions and two separate brigades stationed in it, with roughly 1,100 MBTs, 1,300 ACVs, 600 pieces of artillery, and 40 short-range ballistic missiles. (The Military Balance, 1994) While it is true that Kaliningrad is the home of the Russian Baltic Fleet, this force level seems excessive for defensive purposes only.

The Russian Baltic Fleet, of course, also poses a threat to Poland and Polish Armed Forces. According to Boris Makeev, a former Captain 1st Rank in the Soviet Navy and Leading Scientific Researcher of the Department of Disarmament Problems of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow, "The Northern and Baltic regions

are the most important from the point of view of Russia's national security and the threat from maritime axes since they are under the control of NATO." (Makeev, 1995, p. 88) Current Russian naval forces in the Baltic Fleet include the following: 10 diesel submarines, 32 major surface combatants (3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 26 Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships, 20 assault ships, 200 naval aircraft, 35 naval helicopters, a naval infantry brigade, and a coastal defense SSM regiment. (Makeev, 1995, p. 90, and The Military Balance, 1994, p. 116) These forces dwarf Poland's 3 submarines, 2 principal surface combatants, and 32 assorted patrol and coastal combatants. (The Military Balance, 1994, p. 97)

In summary, Belarus, by itself, does not possess more power than Poland. However, the combination of Belarus with Russia, leading to the basing of Russian forces in Belarus, and Russian forces stationed in Kaliningrad, far surpasses the capabilities of the Polish armed forces. While the war in Chechnya has called into doubt the capabilities of the Russian armed forces, that civil war should not be allowed to "put the nail in the coffin" of their capabilities. After all, the Red Army defeated Hitler's elite forces only a little while after the Russians had been embarrassed during the 1939-1940 Winter War with Finland.

It would be incorrect to assume that Russia's best fighting formations are operating in Chechnya; the area just

is not that important to Russia's overall national security. The best forces seem to be in and around Moscow. For example, there are three "elite" divisions in the Moscow area. (Shlapentokh, 1995) The bottom line is that, although the capabilities of the Russian armed forces may have seriously declined, they cannot be ignored, especially by Poland.

**c. German Armed Forces**

German armed forces possess both qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Polish armed forces. Qualitatively, Germany has more modern equipment, compared to the outdated Soviet equipment of the Polish armed forces. It is particularly effective in production of armored and tracked vehicles. The German main battle tank, the Leopard 2, is considered to be "Europe's de facto tank standard" and is used by five European countries. In addition to its own military-industrial complex, Germany could also call on those of the other major Western European countries, assuming that whatever operations it took were under the auspices of NATO. These countries have numerous joint projects, such as the EF2000 combat aircraft and the Eurocopter Tiger attack helicopter. (Jane's Defence Weekly, March 20, 1996)

Quantitatively, Figure 6.1 shows Germany's numerical superiority over Poland. The numbers are, of course, deceiving. Although Poland has large amounts of equipment, it has already been pointed out that this equipment is outdated,

and Poland has a hard time maintaining it and replacing it. Therefore, the military balance is even more in the Germans' favor than the figure indicates. The only area where Poland possesses an advantage over Germany is in the area of short-range ballistic missiles. This advantage, however, would be mitigated by three factors: 1) German possession of precision guided munitions; 2) NATO's nuclear and tactical ballistic missile umbrella; and, 3) Germany's possession of 154 U.S. multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which can accept the Advanced Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). (The Military Balance, 1994)

#### ***d. Ukrainian Armed Forces***

Ukrainian forces were discussed in depth in the last chapter on Hungary. Ukrainian forces are more than twice the size of Poland's armed forces. The Ukrainian armed forces possess the most modern equipment that the Soviet armed forces had at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, including a large number of short-range ballistic missiles and modern tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft. Although it is constrained by severe economic problems, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, which also "inherited" significant capabilities, has the potential to modernize the Ukrainian force. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, Ukraine will continue to possess larger forces, more modern equipment, and a greater industrial

capacity to modernize that equipment than Poland.

## **2. Balance of Threat**

### **a. Aggregate Power**

Numerically, the preceding discussion identified two main states that had larger forces than Poland. These states were Germany and Russia. Both of these states have greater aggregate power than Poland. Germany possesses technological and industrial capabilities that increase its power relative to that of Poland. Russia, on the other hand, has severe handicaps in all areas of its armed forces and economy that actually lessen the balance of power gap between itself and Poland. Nevertheless, both countries could threaten Polish national security, if the political will were present.

### **b. Geographic Proximity**

As the quotation at the beginning of the chapter points out, Poland, although surrounded by a number of new states, has returned to its traditional geographic situation. Germany is on one side, and Russia is on the other. Germany and Russia have roughly equivalent length borders with Poland.<sup>25</sup> Germany, of course, is the closer threat geographically. Germany could bring the bulk of its forces to bear much more rapidly than Russia. The closest Russian forces to Poland (38,000 troops) are in Kaliningrad. The rest

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<sup>25</sup> The border between Germany and Poland is approximately 460 kilometers, and the border between Kaliningrad and Poland is approximately 440 kilometers.

would have to move from Russia proper through Belarus. This would not be difficult, given the incredibly close relations between Belarus and Russia. Therefore, the Poles cannot afford to assume that the Russia threat is diminished just because the "technically" sovereign state of Belarus is in between Poland and Russia.

*c. Transparency of the Threat*

Germany, however, is not a threat to Poland, at least not militarily. While Germany does possess significant capabilities that could be used offensively against Poland, it does not possess aggressiveness of intentions toward Poland. As stated in the theory chapter, transparency of threat is determined by the ability of a state to see two things in potentially threatening states. These two items are: 1) possession of offensive capabilities; and, 2) indicators of aggressiveness of intentions.

Germany is not a threat to Poland because it does not possess aggressive intentions. The Czech case brought out the point that Germany is strongly integrated into the Euro-Atlantic framework and has incorporated the lessons of the past into its national conscience. In addition, Germany and Poland have undergone a post-Soviet rapprochement since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Germany is now one of Central Europe's strongest advocates, as well as Poland's leading trade partner. It has provided vast amounts of aid

to this area. (Pond, 1996) German intentions are to stabilize the region to the East. As German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said, ". . . the most effective way of serving stability . . . is to support the fledgling democracies of Central Eastern, and Southeastern Europe." (Kohl, 1994, pp. vi)

Russia, like Germany, possesses capabilities that it could use against Poland in an offensive manner. Unlike Germany, however, it is not as easy, in the eyes of the Poles, to posit that Russia has no aggressive intentions. Recent Russian attempts to reassert influence in the Near Abroad and to reintegrate the newly independent states into the CIS have been interpreted as a return of neoimperialism in Russia. (Milewski, 1994) This neoimperialist policy can be construed by Poles as aggressiveness of intentions on the part of Russia. According the Polish Secretary of National Defense,

No doubt the biggest visible danger is Russia's return to the imperial policy first pursued by the Czars and then by the Soviet Union. The idea of so-called nearest foreign territory that we hear from the lips of leading Russian politicians, references to alleged "historic Russian spheres of influence" which include Poland; the loud objections to the possibility of Poland joining NATO, and remarks about alleged duty to protect all Russian-speaking peoples in the countries of the former Soviet Union -- all this we consider an expression of imperial policy, contrary to the standards of CSCE and hostile to Poland. Right now, the greatest threat is that Russia might interpret an absence of reaction to such rhetoric as silent approval thereof, or even as an encouragement to proceed from words to deeds. (Milewski, 1994)

### **3. Summary of Third Image Factors**

#### **a. Balance of Power**

Balance of power theory can again help us explain or predict Poland's positions on NATO expansion. Our inferred hypotheses from balance of power theory hold up for the most part.

The first hypothesis says that a state will attempt to balance internally before externally. We saw that this was the case with Poland. The Poles have made major changes to the size, structure, and deployment of their armed forces. Instead of the majority of their forces facing toward the West, they now have them more evenly spread out around the country, in recognition of the threat from the East. In addition, they have downsized their military-industrial complex to make it more streamlined.

At the same time, Polish authorities and defense industries have sought out Western firms and governments in an attempt to gain technology and foreign investment in the Polish military-industrial complex. (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, November 11, 1995) This will give Poland the ability to modernize its forces, which will allow it to balance internally against threats. This behavior is in line with our inferred hypothesis that says a state will bandwagon with a stronger state, or coalition (NATO and the West, in this case), for the chance of profit or receiving new technology.



The case can neither confirm nor refute our hypothesis on traditional defensive bandwagoning. This hypothesis said that a state will bandwagon with a stronger state if it fears the stronger state can destroy it and there is no other recourse left but to bandwagon. Poland is in no immediate danger of destruction. It wants to bandwagon with the West for profit, not because of fear of its own destruction by the West.

Our hypothesis on traditional balancing is refuted by the case of Poland. The hypothesis says that a state will balance by joining the weaker of two coalitions to offset the power of a stronger state or coalition. Looking at the balance of power situation in Central Europe today, this hypothesis would predict that Poland would align with some of the newly independent states, primarily Russia, to balance against the overwhelming power of NATO. This is not the case, and balance of threat theory can help explain why.

***b. Balance of Threat***

Germany and Russia are the two geographically proximate states that have greater aggregate power than Poland and also possess the offensive capabilities to threaten Poland. Yet, Poland does not consider Germany a military threat, but it does think that Russia could be a threat. Our inferred hypothesis on transparency of the threat can explain this stance. This hypothesis said that a state had to see

both offensive capabilities and aggressiveness of intentions before it would perceive a threat. While Germany possesses the offensive capabilities, it is not aggressive toward Poland.

Russia, on the other hand, has the offensive capabilities and has conducted itself in such a manner that Poland perceives it to be possibly aggressive. Therefore, in line with our inferred hypothesis that said a state would balance against a threatening state that had greater power, was geographically proximate, and evinced a transparent threat, Poland is attempting to balance against the threat of Russia by integrating into Western security structures.

#### **D. SECOND IMAGE**

##### **1. Political Constraints**

Poland is a presidential-parliamentary democracy. A coalition made up of two parties descended from the Communist Party -- the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) -- currently controls the government. In coalition, these parties control 66 percent of the seats in Parliament, or Sejm, and 73 percent of the seats in the Senate. (Freedom House, 1995) This gives them sufficient control of the legislature to pass whatever legislation they desire.

It is likely that these parties will win again in 1997 for several reasons. First, although they only gained 36

percent of the popular vote in the 1993 elections (Freedom House, 1995), the large number of political parties present will make it difficult for challengers to gain more than the 5 percent of the national vote required to be represented in the Senate and the Sejm. Second, voter turnout has been decreasing, which favors the incumbents.

Finally, successful stabilization policies and market reforms have given Poland one of the "fastest growing economies in Europe." (U.S. Department of State, August 1994) Based on the ruling coalition's current position and the likelihood that it will continue governing Poland after the 1997 elections, it is safe to say that there are few political constraints limiting Poland's ability to balance against an enemy, either internally or externally. The major constraints that limit the government's ability are economic constraints.

## **2. Economic Constraints**

Although Poland does have one of the fastest growing economies in Europe, it has serious limitations that hamper the country's ability to conduct internal balancing efforts. These limitations include: problems in industrial privatization, lack of capital to finance reconstruction, insufficient funds for research, development, and modernization, and the lack of modern technology.

The majority of industries in the military-defense industrial complex are still state-owned. Of 28 enterprises

in the defense industry, ten are state-owned, and the state still controls majority holdings in the rest. (Sauerwein, 1994) State control limits the capital that the industry can attract, which decreases the research, development, and modernization the industry can do. Small defense budgets exacerbate this problem. Poland spends 11 percent of its defense budget on investment level expenses (R&D and procurement of new systems). The NATO average is 30 percent. The risk for the Polish armed forces in this situation is "technological decline and obsolescence." (Piatkowski, 1996)

### 3. Internal Security Threat

There is no significant internal security threat in Poland. It is a primarily homogeneous society. Ethnic minorities include Germans, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Figure 6.2 lists the major ethnic divisions of the country.




Figure 6.2 Ethnic Divisions of Poland

#### **4. Summary of Second Image Factors**

The Polish coalition government currently controls majorities in both the Senate and the Sejm, or Parliament. Due to several factors, it is likely that the coalition government will remain in power after the 1997 elections. This makes the government confident in its power and the maintenance of its position. Given this situation, the Polish government's actions in the realm of security have been consistent with our first inferred hypothesis from domestic political theory. The hypothesis said a leadership confident in its power would attempt to balance internally first.

The hypotheses on economic constraints are also borne out by the case of Poland. These hypotheses state: 1) a state may externally balance to gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic economy; and, 2) a state that lacks the resources to balance internally to meet a threat will attempt to balance externally. Both of these hypotheses predict Polish behavior toward NATO. Membership in NATO will provide Poland with access to capital and technology that will improve the Polish economy. These resources, such as the proposed sale of U.S. F-16 fighters to Poland, will help Poland balance against its primary external threat -- Russia.

#### **E. CONCLUSION**

In the case of Poland, both systemic and domestic political theories help explain the overall Polish responses

to the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe today. Both reasonably predict Polish behavior. As we have seen in each of the preceding two cases, inferred hypotheses from both levels of analysis are borne out.

In systemic terms, we see a similar pattern in Poland that we saw in Hungary. Balance of power theory correctly predicts that Poland will attempt to balance internally and it will want to bandwagon with the West for the chance to receive both profit and technology. However, the hypotheses on capitulation bandwagoning and traditional balancing do not accurately predict Polish behavior. Poland, although it is bandwagoning with the West for profit, is not bandwagoning in the traditional sense.

The hypotheses on domestic political theory are also borne out. These hypotheses accurately predict that the confident Polish leaders, with their wide majority in Parliament, will attempt to balance internally against external threats. At the same time, and not at odds with the internal balancing efforts, they attempt to balance externally for extraction of outside resources to help the domestic economy and the internal balancing efforts.

## VII. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

*There's something to be said for being No. 2. No false image of competence to maintain. No irrationally inflated ego to burst. No chance of slipping from the top. All these make Slovakia a worthwhile destination on a sojourn through Central Europe. Historically overshadowed by the Czech lands in general, and the Golden City of Prague in particular, Slovakia nonetheless maintains a distinct and fascinating culture to investigate. At first hard to figure out, but after some digging maybe a little more interesting too.*

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### A. INTRODUCTION

The Slovak Republic is undoubtedly the "younger brother" of the countries of Central Europe. It was the last state in the region to gain its independence, only becoming a sovereign state on 1 January, 1993, with the "Velvet Divorce" of Czechoslovakia. Slovakia has had less time to develop basically everything -- democratic institutions, a civil society, national security orientations, armed forces, etc. The short time-span, coupled with a lack of experience in governance and nationalistic sentiments, has caused problems. According to Andrew Cottey, "Since gaining independence, Slovakia has been plagued by political instability and doubts about its democratic credentials." (Cottey, 1995)

This chapter explores Slovak views on the security environment in Central Europe today and NATO enlargement. The chapter will use different theories of international relations to explore factors affecting the country's national security decisions. The end summarizes the relative explanatory powers of each theory to explain or predict Slovak positions.

#### **B. SLOVAK POSITION ON NATO**

The stated official Slovak position is that it wants to become a member of NATO. According to the Slovak Foreign Minister, Juraj Schenk, NATO is "the most effective existing security organization able to respond effectively to all potential security problems in Central and Eastern Europe." (Fisher, 1996) He further stressed that Slovakia cannot guarantee completely its security without NATO. Official government declarations proclaim integration with Europe as the republic's most important strategic goal. (Fisher, 1996)

#### **C. THIRD IMAGE**

Prior to 1993, Slovakia was not a state. it was a federal republic in Czechoslovakia, with no requirement for a separate foreign policy or armed forces. Today, the likelihood of a large-scale attack on Slovakia has decreased. None of its neighbors has territorial claims on Slovakia, and all of them are suffering numerous problems that would inhibit expansionistic moves. However, the likelihood that local and



regional conflicts could affect Slovakia has increased. The conflict in the former Republic of Yugoslavia is an example. Slovakia's neighbor, Hungary, is worried about the ethnic Hungarians in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. Tensions between Serbia and Hungary over Serbian treatment of this minority could lead to a conflict. In any such conflict, Slovakia might find it hard to remain uninvolved because of its own large ethnic Hungarian minority. Because of dynamics like these, Slovakia must look at the balance of power with its neighbors and likely adversaries.

#### **1. Balance of Power**

Prior to the partition of Czechoslovakia (CSFR) in 1993, the Slovak Republic, as an integral part of the CSFR, had no need for a national security strategy. After the "Velvet Divorce," or peaceful partition of the CSFR into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Slovakia had to develop both a national security strategy, a corresponding national military strategy, and the armed forces to support them.

In order to develop these strategies and forces, Slovakia had to consider the armed forces and capabilities of surrounding states and likely threats. The two are not synonymous. Surrounding states are not necessarily threats, and likely threats are not necessarily the surrounding states. Figure 7.1 lists the current military balance for Slovakia.

Country	Personnel	Divisions	Sep Bde	Tanks	AIFV/ APCs	Arty	SSMs	Aircraft		Atk Helo
								Cbt	Trans	
USA - Europe	159,600	2	0	1968	3160	1373	Varies	228	26	153
Russia	1,714,000	69	19	19,500	35,000	21,300	Varies	2150	650	1000
Slovakia	47,000	2	0	912	1043	808	9	146	16	19
Austria	51,250	0	5	169	447	230	0	54	31	0
Czech Rep.	92,900	5	3	1433	1659	1418	14	240	14	36
Hungary	74,500	0	12	1191	1645	991	0	171	14	39
Poland	283,600	10	2	2110	2291	1880	40	438	34	70
Ukraine	517,000	14	3	5430	5216	3638	272	1433	274	307

Figure 7.1 The Military Balance<sup>26</sup> for the Slovak Republic

Five states border the Slovak Republic. All of them have larger armed forces than Slovakia. Of the five, it has potential problems with three -- the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Ukraine. Prior to examining the relative balance of power between Slovakia and its neighbors, it is necessary to explore the conditions and status of the Slovak armed forces and the indigenous military-industrial complex.

#### **a. Slovak Armed Forces**

Of all the armed forces of the states in Central Europe, Slovakia's armed forces have had the greatest challenges since the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. There were no Slovak armed forces prior to the partition. Afterwards, the Slovaks inherited personnel, equipment, and bases, which they had to mesh into armed forces.

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<sup>26</sup>See Appendix A for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The Military Balance 1994-1995

Challenges included forming a Ministry of Defense, appointing senior officers, obtaining weapons and equipment from the Czechoslovak military, modifying training and educational facilities, and building and expanding bases and facilities. (Herspring, 1994, p. 680) According to the "Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine," the Slovak government based decisions on the force structure on two conditions. First, although the Slovak government says Slovakia has no immediate threats, it reserves the right to defend itself against all threats. Second, it bases its defense structure on "defensive sufficiency" and the need for a "rational deterrent." (FBIS, 18 March, 1994)

The partition agreement between the Czech and Slovak republics divided military forces, both personnel and equipment, on a 2:1 basis, in favor of the Czechs. Slovakia's share included roughly 55,000 personnel and hardly any infrastructure. Slovakia lacked an infrastructure because most of the forces of the former Czechoslovakia had been stationed in the western portion of the country. Only two low-readiness divisions (out of ten total) were stationed in the Slovak Republic. (Sauerwein, 1994)

This lack of an infrastructure has hampered the Slovaks' ability to redeploy forces to an all-around defensive orientation and has limited their ability to utilize fully

some of the equipment it received. For example, Slovakia received ten MiG-29s from the former CSFR air force. Since then, it has also received five more from Russia as payment against Russia's foreign debt to Slovakia. The Slovak Air Force cannot use these aircraft, however, because the country's airfields are "incapable of handling these and other combat aircraft." (Larrabee, 1993, p. 45)

Since 1993, Slovak armed forces have been reduced from 55,000 to the current total of 47,000. Conditions and morale are not good. Although defense spending is on the rise, it is down nearly 50 percent in real terms since 1989. The budget for 1995 allocated 3.2 percent of GDP toward defense spending, a nearly 20 percent rise over 1994 military spending. (USAREUR, 1995) According to the Slovak Minister of Defense, most of the money goes to pay for salaries, supplies, training, ammunition, international commitments, and resolving social issues, such as the lack of adequate housing for personnel. These requirements leave "nothing for developmental programs." (FBIS, 29 February, 1996) Because of this, the Slovak armed forces must continue to deal with their reliance on outdated Soviet equipment and a dependence on Russia or other countries for spare parts.

Poor economic conditions have similarly affected the military-industrial complex of Slovakia. During the Cold War,

it was home to large amounts of defense manufacturing facilities. Slovakia had 60 percent of the arms production capability of the former CSFR. The number of tanks produced in Slovakia was equivalent to the outputs of Germany and France. Times, naturally, have changed. According to the Slovak Minister of the Economy, arms production in 1993 was 3.8 percent of the 1989 level. (Sauerwein, 1994)

There are signs, however, that the situation of the military-industrial complex is improving. Economic indicators show Slovakia's economy improving in the military-industrial area. In 1995, there was a 7.4 percent growth in GDP in industrial production. (FBIS, 10 May 1996) The leading defense manufacturer, ZTS (Zavody Tazkeho Strojarsstva), has formed a consortium of defense manufacturers. These manufacturers are actively seeking Western partners and technology. An example is the T-72 M2 upgrade, which ZTS developed in cooperation with a French and a Belgian firm. (Sauerwein, 1994)

The West is not the only direction the Slovaks have turned for help and the hope of external extraction of resources. Recently, relations between Slovakia and NATO have been characterized as "schizophrenic." (Fisher, 21 March, 1996) While military relations are said to be good, "political relations have deteriorated, as Slovakia moves

further away from the democratic standards established by its Western partners." (Fisher, 21 March, 1996) In April, the U.S. House of Representatives passes a bill designed to facilitate the admission of Central European states to NATO. The bill included the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but omitted Slovakia. (Fisher, 23 April, 1996) According to the Benjamin Gilman, the Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, "there is a perception in the U.S. Congress...that the current government in [Slovakia] is more concerned about consolidating its power than it is committed to democratic reform." (Fisher, 23 April, 1996) Because of its domestic political situation and recent European and American statements, demarches, and actions, Slovakia perceives that it has less of a chance of being admitted to NATO than the other Central European states.

To "hedge its bet" against being isolated, it is also seeking improved relations with both Romania and Russia. (Larrabee, 1993) With the Russians, the Slovaks signed an agreement on military cooperation in 1993. The agreement provides for "close security ties and Russian military supplies to Slovakia." (Cottey, 1995, 87) When the Russians transferred the previously mentioned five MiG-29s, as well as spare parts and ammunition, to Slovakia, it was done under the auspices of this agreement.

### ***b. Ukrainian Armed Forces***

The status of the Ukrainian armed forces and military-industrial complex have been covered in previous chapters. Ukrainian forces dwarf Slovak forces by a factor of ten. The Ukrainian armed forces possess the most modern equipment that the Soviet armed forces had, including short-range ballistic missiles and modern tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft. Constrained by severe economic problems, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex still has the potential to modernize the Ukrainian force. Ukraine will continue to possess larger forces, more modern equipment, and a greater industrial capacity.

### ***c. Czech Armed Forces***

In terms of personnel and equipment, the Czech armed forces are roughly twice as large as those of Slovakia. From the beginning, Czech forces were of a higher quality than Slovak forces, due to the predominantly western orientation of the former Czechoslovak armed forces. In addition to advantages in ground forces, Czech aviation assets are better than Slovak assets because the Czechs have the infrastructure to support them. In terms of production capability, the Czech military-industrial complex is much smaller than the Slovak complex. The Czech Republic does not have the potential to modernize its forces that the Slovak Republic has.

#### **d. Hungarian Armed Forces**

The Hungarian armed forces are larger than the Slovak armed forces. The Hungarian armed forces are farther along in their reorganization, given that they have had more time. However, they suffer similar ailments. Most of the equipment is obsolete Soviet equipment. They also lack funding for adequate training, maintenance, and modernization. Hungary is worse off than Slovakia in the area of defense production. While Slovakia has a "gross overcapacity" for heavy weapon production (Sauerwein, 1994), Hungary produces only light weapons and communication equipment.

### **2. Balance of Threat**

#### **a. Aggregate Power**

Numerically, the preceding discussion identified that every state bordering Slovakia, including Austria, has more aggregate power than the Slovak Republic. Of the five adjacent states, Slovakia has potential problems with three of them. Ukraine is indisputably the most potentially powerful. It possesses large forces, more modern equipment, and a larger military-industrial complex than Slovakia. While aggregate power advantages also go to the Czech Republic and Hungary, Slovakia possesses a military-industrial complex that could negate these advantages, given political will, new technology and financing.



Slovakia must also consider the threat from Russia in its deliberations. The Russian threat is similar to those that the Czech Republic and Hungary face. As mentioned earlier, Russia is historically the most serious threat to the region. Today, since Russia does not directly border Slovakia, the danger is not immediate. Instead, the situation in Russia is most likely to affect Slovakia through Ukraine. If Russian-Ukrainian relations continue to deteriorate, Slovakia would be one of the first states to be affected by the instability, especially mass refugee flows to the West. Since 85 percent of Slovakia's fuel supplies come from Russia, via pipelines that run through Ukraine, and Russia is the second largest exporter into Slovakia (USAREUR, 1995), tensions between Russia and Ukraine could seriously affect the Slovak economy.

***b. Geographical Proximity***

Slovakia considers local threats to be the predominant threats in Europe today. According to the Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine,

It is apparent from the tenor of the international political situation that, first and foremost, the risks ensuing from the instability of the individual states and regions -- from which threats and risks to neighboring states and regions may also arise -- and not the risks stemming the end of the heterogeneous bipolar system of international relations are the predominant ones in Europe. (FBIS, 18 March 1994)

Of the five bordering states, Hungary has the longest shared border with Slovakia, representing almost 40 percent of Slovakia's total land boundaries. The Ukrainian border makes up only 6 percent of Slovakia's land boundaries. The boundary with the Czech Republic makes up approximately 16 percent. (New Europe, 1996)

### **c. Transparency of the Threat**

Given that the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Hungary possess greater aggregate power than the Slovak Republic, are there indicators that any of them could be a long term threat to Slovakia? As stated in the theory chapter, for purposes of this study, transparency of threat is determined by the ability of a state to see two things in potentially threatening states. The first is the possession of offensive capabilities. The second is indication of aggressiveness of intentions. Based on these two requirements, the Czech Republic and Ukraine cannot be considered threats to Slovakia, while Hungary has the potential to be a threat.

Of the three states, Ukraine definitely possesses offensive capabilities vice Slovakia. As stated earlier, its weapon systems are the most modern in the region. Even if these weapon systems are not as modern as those of NATO, they are at least a generation ahead of those of Slovakia. What Ukraine lacks is aggressiveness of intentions toward Slovakia.

By and large, relations between Slovakia and Ukraine are good. The bilateral cooperation treaty and military cooperation agreement signed by the two in 1993 provide evidence of this fact. There are some potential tensions between the two over minority rights and Transcarpathia. The Transcarpathian Oblast of western Ukraine belonged to Czechoslovakia during the interwar years, when it was called Ruthenia. However, since Slovakia has made no demands for the return of the former Ruthenia, there seems to be little likelihood of Ukraine having any aggressiveness toward Slovakia.

Slovakia also has possible conflicts with the Czech Republic, primarily based in the distribution of federal property and the dismantling of state structures. However, the Czech Republic cannot be considered a threat to the Slovak Republic. It lacks both credible offensive capabilities and aggressiveness of intentions. Its armed forces are in no condition to conduct major offensive operations against another state. In addition, the continuing survival of the Slovak state is a major benefit for the Czech Republic. Slovakia provides a 200-mile buffer between the Czech Republic and instability in the East. According to a Czech official, "in no case should we look with disrespect at Meciar's Slovakia -- the existence of a politically . . . stable

country between us and the former USSR is in the Czech Republic's vital interest." (FBIS, 25 January, 1995)

That leaves Hungary. It is the only state that can reasonably be identified as a threat to Slovakia in balance of threat theory terms. Today, Hungary lacks the necessary offensive capabilities to pose a threat to Slovakia, especially considering its current military problems and its requirement to deploy sufficient forces to protect its border with Romania. However, it is not inconceivable that, if Hungary were admitted to NATO ahead of Slovakia, it could acquire equipment, technology, and training that would provide it with these offensive capabilities.

In the minds of the Slovaks, the Hungarians already possess the requisite aggressiveness of intentions. Hungary is the "central security concern" of Slovakia. This is because of the large ethnic Hungarian population in the southern part of Slovakia. In some of these areas, up to 90 percent of the population is Hungarian. The Slovaks fear the "minority may secede or that Hungary will try to reclaim its lost territory."<sup>27</sup> (Cotter, 1995, p. 88) The current Hungarian government has tried to allay these fears, but it is hampered by the statements and policies of the previous governments.

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<sup>27</sup>In 1920, the Treaty of Trianon gave Czechoslovakia territory at the expense of Hungary.

Former Hungarian Prime Minister Antall proclaimed that he was the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians. (FBIS, 27 March, 1996) Considering that the official population is around 5.5 million people (New Europe, 1996), this caused problems with neighboring states, such as Slovakia and Romania, which have large ethnic Hungarian populations.

### **3. Summary of Third Image Factors**

#### **a. Balance of Power**

With regard to the Slovak case and balance of power theory, we again have mixed results in terms of how our inferred hypotheses held up. The pattern of the results, however, is slightly different from the previous cases. Each of the other Central European states exhibited a similar pattern for the testing of the hypotheses: 1) they confirmed the hypothesis that states would attempt to balance internally before externally; 2) they confirmed the hypothesis that states would align with a stronger power for the chance to receive profit or technology (bandwagoning for profit); 3) they refuted the hypothesis that a state would balance with the weaker of two powers or coalitions against the stronger; and, 4) they neither confirmed nor refuted the hypothesis that a state would bandwagon with a stronger state to prevent its own destruction, assuming the weaker state feels it has no other recourse for its survival.

The Slovak government follows the pattern through the hypotheses on internal balancing and bandwagoning for profit. Contrary to the other three Central European cases, the Slovak case can also support the traditional balancing hypothesis, if we open our range limits to allow a state to pursue multiple and contradictory policies at once. Slovakia's dealings with Russia give an example of a state that is balancing against stronger powers.

These actions do not necessarily indicate that Slovakia is balancing against NATO. In fact, it probably is not. Instead, Slovakia is balancing against its more powerful neighbors. Finally, the Slovak case returns to the familiar pattern with regard to the traditional bandwagoning hypothesis. The Slovak Republic's actions neither confirm nor refute the hypothesis, since it is not threatened with destruction by a stronger state without any other recourse.

#### ***b. Balance of Threat***

The Slovak case follows the pattern established in the other case studies for support of the inferred hypotheses from balance of threat theory. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Ukraine are the only geographically proximate states with which Slovakia has potential conflicts. Because they are nearby, these states are more of a possible immediate threat to Slovakia than other states, particularly Russia.

Of these three states, only Ukraine clearly possesses the offensive capabilities to threaten Slovakia. The fact that Slovakia does not consider the Ukrainians a threat confirms the hypothesis that a threat will not be perceived, and consequently balanced against, unless the threatened state can see that the threatening state possesses both offensive capabilities and aggressiveness of intentions. Hungary, on the other hand, has the potential to be a long-term threat to the Slovaks. Its policies on diaspora Hungarians have been perceived by Bratislava as aggressiveness of intentions. If a more nationalistic government came to power in Hungary, it could deliberately attempt to interfere in Slovakia, with the pretext of protecting ethnic Hungarians.

The appropriate response for Slovakia would be to balance against the future threat. This could be accomplished either through admission to NATO or future rapprochement with the Russian Federation. As stated earlier, Slovak overtures and agreements with Russia help confirm our traditional balancing hypothesis. However, although Russia is one possible source of threat to Slovakia, these efforts would not necessarily confirm the defensive bandwagoning hypothesis, unless Russia was directly threatening Slovakia with destruction, and Slovakia felt it had no other choice but to join with the Russians. That is currently not the situation.

## **D. SECOND IMAGE**

### **1. Political Constraints**

Since its creation on 1 January, 1993, the Slovak Republic has been plagued by political instability. This instability severely affects the state's ability to react to both internal and external threats. The political instability manifests itself in a number of ways. Each limits the range of actions which the Slovak leadership can take.

The primary instability is within the government. In the last two years, the Slovak Republic has had three different governments. Prime Minister Meciar is the prime minister for the second time; the first time, parliament forced him out of office with a vote of no-confidence. (USAREUR, 1995) Most of these problems have causes in the behavior of the coalition. Currently, the 150 deputies in Parliament come from 17 different parties. No party has a clear majority. This makes it difficult to both communicate and reach a consensus. (FBIS, 4 July, 1996) The major ramification of the current distribution of seats in Parliament is that no party can pass legislation alone.

In the Slovak system, legislation must be passed with at least 90 votes. Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), which is the leading party in the current coalition, has 61 seats. Based on this count, they could block any



legislation, assuming all their deputies voted in concert. But, they cannot pass their desired legislation without help. According to Jozef Migas, the leader of the major opposition party, "the situation in Slovakia is a peculiar one." (FBIS, 2 July, 1996) This "situation" led to a coalitional crisis in June of this year, when HZDS's coalition partners deserted them, paralyzing the government for ten days. (FBIS, 26 June, 1996)

Another factor of instability within the government is the ongoing feud between the president and the prime minister. Prime Minister Meciar criticizes President Kovac for "exceed[ing] the presidential powers" and for using methods that are "leaning toward monarchism or a certain mafia-like behavior" (FBIS, 4 July, 1996) President Kovac, on the other hand, believes that parliament, under the direction of Meciar's HZDS, has "deprived [him] of . . . power," and that "a president in the constitutional position of the Czech or Slovak type has only the power to openly criticize." Indicative of the seriousness of the feud is the fact that as of June of 1996, the two had not met in person since June of 1995 (FBIS, 3 June, 1996)

The differences between the various parties do not go across every issue in the Slovak Republic. The one area where they seem to be able to reach a consensus is nationalism. Two

particular pieces of Slovak legislation have received resounding criticism from the governments of Europe. The first is the "Protection of the Republic law." Designed as an amendment to the penal code, it makes activities harming the "interests of the republic" a crime and is "considerably reminiscent of the methods used by the states of the former Soviet bloc to silence the opposition at home and abroad." (*Czech News Agency*, 4 April, 1996) The second is a law that "prevents the establishment of autonomy in Slovakia on ethnic principles." According to the chairman of the Slovak National Party (SNS), the bill was needed because, "it is impossible to create room in a young republic giving certain irredentist forces an opportunity to set up any autonomy." (*BBC*, 11 February, 1996)

## **2. Economic Constraints**

The economic scene in the Slovak Republic is improving. Major economic indicators for 1995 were positive: 1) the GDP grew by 7.4 percent; 2) the percentage of the GDP generated by the private sector grew to 64.9 percent; and, 3) inflation was down to 7.2 percent, the lowest in post-communist countries of Central Europe. However, the Slovak economy has not recovered to even the 1989 level, and it still faces challenges. One of the major problems is the growing imbalance of trade with Russia. Slovakia currently has a

trade imbalance of 32 million Slovak korunas (Sk) with Russia. (FBIS, 10 May, 1996) Perhaps as a hedge against future economic problems, the government has decided that it will not privatize all industries. Electricity and gas companies, oil pipeline networks, arms plants, and a small number of strategic enterprises will remain under state ownership. (FBIS, 8 February, 1996)

Improvements in the economy have not been transformed into increased defense spending. The defense budget has been cut 50 percent in real terms from the 1989 level. (USAREUR, 1995) As stated earlier, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) does not have any money for modernization of its equipment. Even if the MOD had sufficient money, the military-industrial complex lacks the technology to effectively modernize Slovak forces, which causes the state-owned complex to go to outside sources in search of technology. The MOD also has a hard time funding the necessary operational and quality of life construction projects that the armed forces need. (FBIS, 29 February, 1996)

### **3. Internal Security Threat**

Of the four Central European countries desiring admittance into NATO, the Slovak Republic is the only one with a significant ethnic minority population. Ethnic Hungarians make up 10.7 percent of the Slovak population.

These Hungarians primarily live in the southern part of Slovakia, along the Hungarian border. The area was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of World War I, when the Treaty of Trianon awarded the territory to Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks do not trust the ethnic Hungarians. In addition, because of statements by Hungarian politicians, Slovaks think that Hungary wants to reclaim the territory.

According to the state secretary at the Slovak Foreign Ministry, this statement sent a "signal aimed at undermining the borders." He said it also meant "moral support for the politicians [in Slovakia] of Hungarian ethnic origin" and a "campaign for undermining stability in our geographic space with the goal of creating conditions for a change of the existing borders." (FBIS, 27 March, 1996)

Slovak fears of ethnic Hungarians are actively exploited by politicians such as Prime Minister Meciar. They are easily exploited, because "in Slovakia, nationalist prejudices and ethnic tensions are never far from the surface." (Wallace, 1994) Measures to control ethnic Hungarians include: 1) the Law on the Protection of the Republic; 2) the law preventing autonomy based on ethnic principles; 3) a constitutional emphasis on "national rather than citizens' rights (Larrabee,

1993, p. 44);" 4) prohibition of Hungarian-language signs and names; and, 5) changes to the organization of administrative districts to "undermine the political representation" of Hungarians. (Cottey, 1995, pp. 88-89) In addition, the internal threat is given equal importance with the country's external threat in the national security strategy. According to the official *Principles for the Slovak Republic's National Security*, "Despite the crucial role played by the external aspect of national security, the Slovak Republic is devoting no less attention to constituting the domestic dimension of its security (FBIS, 18 March, 1994)

#### **4. Summary of Second Image Factors**

While this study has shown that other Central European governments have some measure of instability in them, the case of Slovakia is the first where the ruling coalition does not have a majority in parliament and the state has a significant potential internal security threat. The current government does not have a stable and consistent coalition. This affects the government's ability to balance, either internally or externally, against threats.

With regard to our inferred hypotheses from domestic political theory, the case refutes our hypotheses on political stability and confirms those on economic constraints and the internal security threat. We predicted that an unconfident

leadership would seek to balance externally before internally. This is not the case in Slovakia. They have attempted to streamline their armed forces, build previously nonexistent infrastructure, and improve the domestic military-industrial complex. It is also true that the Slovak government has concurrent orientations toward both the West, in the form of seeking NATO and EU membership and Western technology, and Russia, seeking opened markets to reduce the trade imbalance, military cooperation, and military equipment. However, these efforts are secondary to the internal ones.

The case also refutes our hypothesis that an unconfident leadership may seek to balance externally to receive external validation of the internal legitimacy of the regime. This is not the case in Slovakia. The government has continued its internal, nationalistic policies, as indicated by the "Protection of the Republic Law," in spite of European disapproval.

The actions of the Slovak Republic do confirm the hypotheses on economic constraints and the internal security threat. Since the Slovak Republic lacks the adequate resources to balance internally against both possible internal and external threats, it has to attempt to balance externally, which will allow it to gain resources to improve its domestic economy. Finally, the Slovak Republic considers its internal

threat at least as important as its external threat. External balancing, whether with NATO or Russia, will allow it to extract resources to combat future internal threats.

#### **E. CONCLUSION**

In the Slovak Republic case, both systemic and domestic political theories help explain and predict Slovak responses to today's security situation in Central Europe. The case confirms hypotheses from both levels of analysis. In this case, however, systemic theories do a better job of predicting Slovak actions and responses.

The case of Slovakia confirms six out of seven of our inferred hypotheses from the systemic level of analysis. Of our hypotheses inferred from domestic political theory, the case refuted the applicable hypotheses on political stability. The Slovak leaders, who are not confident in their ability, still have conducted the actions necessary for internal balancing prior to external.

Of the Central European states, Slovakia is the only case that confirms our hypothesis on traditional balancing. While it is seeking admission into NATO, it is also maintaining ties to the Russian Federation. While this is partly due to the fact that Slovakia is heavily dependent on Russia for fuel supplies and Russian imports, it also provides them a hedge against not being admitted to NATO.





## VIII. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES

### A. INTRODUCTION

This study set aside the Russian Federation as an exception, fundamentally different than the countries of Central Europe in its size and power potential. The United States is also an exception. In terms of power, no matter how measured, the United States is currently unmatched in the world. It is a "great power," with advantages in "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence." (Waltz, 1979, p. 131) President Clinton has asserted in the *National Security Strategy* that the United States is "the world's greatest power, and we have global interests as well as responsibilities." (*National Security Strategy* [NSS], 1996, p. iv)

This chapter examines U.S. views on NATO enlargement in the context of the security situation in Europe, particularly Central Europe, today. It analyzes these views using different international relations theories and levels of analysis. Specifically, it explores U.S. actions and perceptions by examining the systemic and domestic factors affecting U.S. security decisions. The end of the chapter summarizes the relative explanatory power of each theory.

## **B. THIRD IMAGE**

Washington is 3,674 miles from London, 3,841 miles from Paris, and 4,172 miles from Berlin. Even though these great distances separate the United States from the capitals of Europe, the United States has been called a "European power." Because of this, Richard Holbrooke, a former key member of the Clinton State Department, has said, "an unstable Europe would ... threaten essential national security interests of the United States." (Holbrooke, 1995, p. 38) In other words, the United States is "inextricably linked" to Europe. (DoD, Office of International Security Affairs [OISA], 1996) Therefore, the United States must look at the balance of power in the region.

### **1. Balance of Power**

According to the Office of International Security Affairs' study on the U.S. security strategy for Europe, the United States has "influenced the balance of power" in Europe. This has been the case for more than fifty years. Today the "single most visible demonstration" of American commitment to European security is U.S. forward deployed forces, both conventional and nuclear. (DoD, OISA, 1996) These forces are the "best-equipped, best-trained and best-prepared" in the world (NSS, 1996, p. iii)

The forces of the United States are not the largest in Europe. In fact, since 1989, they have gone through a

significant drawdown. In 1989, U.S. forces totaled 314,000 personnel. Today, that number is around 100,000. (Joulwan, 1995) Ground forces include an Army corps made up of the majority of two Army divisions. They each have two of three maneuver brigades; the third, or round-out, brigade for each division is based in the continental United States. Air forces consist of approximately 2.33 fighter wings. Naval forces are made up of sufficient ashore personnel to support a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group in the Mediterranean Sea. (*National Military Strategy [NMS]*, 1996, pp. 7-8)

Of course, these forces do not operate unilaterally. They operate multilaterally as part of NATO, which leverages their capabilities. U.S. forces are thoroughly integrated into the NATO military structure, to include serving in multinational units. Both of the two Army divisions in Germany belong to multinational corps with German forces. The U.S. V Corps, commanded by an American, has one German and one American division (1st U.S. Infantry Division, formerly 3rd Infantry Division) in it. The other Army division, the 1st Armored Division, is assigned to a multinational corps led by a German. In addition to operating in tandem with NATO forces, forward deployed U.S. forces receive significant Host Nation Support (HNS) from these allies. For example, Germany

provided \$1.43 billion in HNS to American forces in 1993. (DoD, OISA, 1996) Because of these structural and logistical arrangements, the capabilities of U.S. forces are enhanced. However, should the situation require it, the United States maintains significant capabilities to improve unilaterally the U.S. force structure, capabilities, and balance of power in its favor.

One key to accomplishing this is the U.S. possession of strategic lift assets. These assets include strategic airlift and sealift. The U.S. airlift and sealift capabilities consist of both civilian and military assets. Together, they currently give the United States the capability to fly 47 million ton-miles per day by air and move 15 million square feet of cargo by sea. In addition, the United States currently maintains 34 ships for afloat prepositioning. These ships contain unit equipment and war materiel for combat forces, and they can be rapidly moved to trouble spots. (DoD, *Annual Defense Report*, 1996)

Another critical component of this capability to unilaterally improve the balance of power in its favor is the U.S. nuclear force. Although various arms control accords (START I/INF/START II) have reduced, or will reduce, the total U.S. nuclear force, it still contains a mix of strategic and nonstrategic systems, deployed in a "survivable triad" (air,

land, and sea) to "deter still very powerful strategic arsenals and to convince possible adversaries that any attempt to seek a nuclear advantage would be futile." (NMS, 1996, p. 10)

The United States is continuing to modernize its combat, nuclear, and mobility forces to allow it to keep qualitative advantages over potential adversaries. During the eight year drawdown of the U.S. military, a decision was made to slow down modernization to insure "near-term" readiness (i.e., funding of spare parts, training, and maintenance). Capabilities of the forces were not significantly degraded because the drawdown also eliminated aged equipment, leaving more modern equipment. The end result of the policy, however, was a 1997 modernization budget that is one-third of the 1985 amount. (DoD, *Annual Report to Congress*, 1996) Beginning in 1998, this will change. Because the drawdown will be complete, money can be redirected, and spending on modernization will increase. Over the next five years, the United States will spend almost \$250 billion on new equipment. (White, 1996)

All of these efforts are taking place in a time when "[p]erhaps for the first time in its history, the United States enjoys circumstances in which no other power poses credible military threats to its vital interests." (Sloan,

1995, p. 221) The question becomes, what are the threats driving U.S. actions? The Department of Defense's 1996 annual report to Congress lists a number of threats to the interests of the United States. These include:

- o Attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. interests to gain hegemony in their regions through aggression or intimidation.

- o Internal conflicts among ethnic, national, religious, or tribal groups that threaten innocent lives, or mass migrations, and undermine stability and international order.

- o Threats by potential adversaries to acquire or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

- o Threats to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.

In Europe, Russia is the state that can pose all of these threats to the United States and its allies. Even in its currently decimated form, Russia is a potentially hostile regional threat that is "capable of fielding sizeable military forces which can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States." (NSS, 1996, p. 14) Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, analysts at the RAND Corporation, support this contention by saying that while a "re-armed Russia would not be the military Leviathan the Soviet Union once was, ... [i]t would have an imposing military force, but probably not a great deal more than that of Iran, Iraq, or North Korea - in short, a major

regional contingency-sized force." (Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, 1995, p. 32)

## **2. Balance of Threat**

### **a. Aggregate Power**

In comparison to Russian forces, the U.S. forces in Europe do not have a positive balance of aggregate power. However, since the United States is the leader of NATO, and is deeply embedded in its military structures, it is necessary to consider the U.S. forces in combination with those of the other members of NATO. As discussed earlier in the chapter on Russia, the U.S.-led NATO is the only state or organization in Europe that can match the aggregate power of the Russian Federation. The converse is also true.

Russia is the only state in Europe that can hope to match the combined aggregate power of NATO. However, previously mentioned Russian problems in funding, manning, procurement, morale, deployment of forces, and performance negate the quantitative advantage of the Russian Armed Forces. Based on this fact, and the qualitative advantages (personnel, training, readiness, equipment) possessed by NATO, the balance of aggregate power favors NATO. This is the case with just currently deployed national and allied forces in the NATO area. The U.S. capability for power projection significantly increases the balance of aggregate power in favor of NATO.

Unfortunately, the balance of aggregate power is not totally one-sided in the U.S. and NATO's favor. This is because, unlike the other potential major regional threats today, Russia does possess nuclear weapons. Russia has, and will continue to have, large numbers of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Previous discussion has shown that the Strategic Rocket Forces are the best-maintained units in the Russian Armed Forces today. In addition, as previously mentioned, Russia continues to improve its nuclear forces with such advancements as the Topol M-2 ICBM upgrade, miniaturized nuclear weapons, and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. These nuclear "advantages" will give the Russian Federation greater aggregate power than could be expected based on the state of its conventional forces.

***b. Geographical Proximity***

The utility of using geographical proximity as a tool to study U.S. actions is questionable. Its usage produces a variety of contradictions that challenge the scope and definition of geographical proximity, especially when attempting to analyze the actions of a "superpower" possessing forward-deployed forces, power projection capabilities, and intercontinental nuclear weapons. For example, the United States is located more than three thousand miles away from Europe. Yet, for reasons of history, culture, economics,



etc., its national security interests are seen to be "inextricably" tied to not only those of its NATO partners, but also somehow to those of the newly independent states to the east of NATO. These "tied" national security interests lead the United States to deploy forward more than 100,000 troops in Europe. This seems a small number when compared to overall Russian force levels, even if one accepts the lowest estimates of 1.2 million.

However, the United States is not looking to increase its presence in Europe because it knows it has the power projection capabilities to deploy reinforcements rapidly to the theater. The facilities are already in place to accept these reinforcements, equipment is on the ground and ready for issuing, and the procedures have been practiced for decades during repeated Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises. In this case, these power projection capabilities mitigate the negative effects of the United States not being geographically proximate to its European "neighbors." They also blur the line between long- and short-term forces the United States can bring to bear in extended deterrence crises.

On the other hand, if forward basing and power projection capabilities can mitigate or ameliorate the negative effects of geography in favor of the United States, possession of nuclear weapons by potential adversaries negates

the benefits of geography for the United States. When a country possesses nuclear weapons and ICBMs, everywhere on the planet is geographically proximate. A Russia in its current state, without nuclear weapons, would not be a threat to the United States. However, since the Russian Federation does possess nuclear weapons (and, in fact, has placed more emphasis on their importance), it has the potential to be a threat to the United States and will continue to have this potential. According to the *National Military Strategy*, "For as long as these weapons exist, they will remain a threat to our security." (NMS, 1996, p. 3)

### ***c. Transparency of the Threat***

Based on the preceding discussion, it should be apparent that Russia possesses offensive capabilities that it could use against the United States. Due to the degradation of the Russian Armed Forces, these offensive capabilities really only exist in the nuclear realm. The question is whether the Russians possess aggressiveness of intentions against the United States. The answer is probably no. Official national security documents of the U.S. government, such as the *National Security Strategy* and the corresponding *National Military Strategy*, support the fact that Russia is not viewed by the Clinton administration as aggressive. This is not to say that these documents do not address the dangers

and negative consequences of the possible failure of Russian democracy. They do. However, while states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are directly identified as "potentially hostile regional powers" (NSS, 1996, p. 14), Russia is not.

There are, of course, those outside of the Administration who consider Russia to be aggressive. An example of this group is the Central and East European Coalition. In a prepared testimony before the House International Relations committee, Frank Koszorus, the spokesman for this group, cited a number of possible reasons for future Russian aggression. The first was the unresistable temptation on the part of the Russians to expand their "strategic frontiers." The second was an argument of history, which said that American withdrawal before the "European political order [was] settled" would invite Russia to move into Central and Eastern Europe. The third was that Russian nationalists would incite "expansionist tendencies" in Russia. (Koszorus, 1996)

Even though the national security documents do not adequately detail these possibilities, members of the Administration do acknowledge them. According to Walter Slocombe, Under secretary of Defense for Policy, "we are not naive about Russia, and we are acutely conscious of the dangers ... Should Russia turn away from its new path, we can

re-evaluate our approach and indeed we would have to do so." (Slocombe, 1996) While the truth about Russia perhaps lies somewhere in between the official position of the Clinton Administration and that of groups such as the Central and East European Coalition, it is probably much closer to the Administration's position. As discussed in the chapter on Russia, and recognized by the administration, the political, economic, and moral climate of Russia simply will not support expansionist efforts, even if the sentiment is there.

### **3. Summary of Third Image Factors**

#### **a. Balance of Power**

Balance of power theory and our inferred hypotheses from it do not do a good job of explaining or predicting U.S. actions towards the European security situation today. Only one of the inferred hypotheses holds up. The United States has sought to balance internally first. While pushing off decisions on possible balancing through enlargement of NATO, it has continued to restructure its forces, modernize its equipment, and add critical assets, particularly in strategic lift, to its inventory.

U.S. actions do not support our other three hypotheses. The United States is not trying to push for admission to NATO of the states of Central Europe because it wants to balance in the traditional sense, joining with the

weaker of two states or coalitions to offset the threatening power of a stronger state. Instead, it seeks to establish a favorable situation that will allow the "building of tolerant democratic societies, and the balance of power that allows them to take root and flourish." (DoD, OISA, 1996) The other two hypotheses are also refuted, because the United States is obviously not conducting any type of bandwagoning, either defensive or for profit. Great powers do not bandwagon.

**b. Balance of Threat**

Similarly, balance of threat theory and its associated inferred hypotheses do not adequately explain U.S. actions. As mentioned earlier, our inferred hypothesis on geographic proximity is called into question by the contradictions caused by U.S. possession of forward-deployed forces, significant power projection capabilities, and nuclear weapons, as well as by Russian possession of nuclear capabilities. ICBMs make everywhere geographically proximate. The blurring of the effects of geographic proximity caused by nuclear weapons points to the need for a modification of the hypothesis. In a conventional-to-conventional potential confrontation, states that are nearby pose a greater threat. However, if one, or both, of the potential adversaries possess nuclear weapons and adequate delivery systems to hit the other, geographic proximity matters less.

Of the other two hypotheses, the U.S. case does confirm the hypothesis that the transparency of a threat will affect whether a state perceives a threat. Russia possesses offensive capabilities which the United States must consider. However, Russia is not seen as a threat today, and is not even listed as a specific threat in the national security documents, because it cannot support, economically or politically, aggressive intentions against the United States.

Finally, the U.S. case refutes our last hypothesis, which says that a state will seek to balance against a threatening state that has greater aggregate power and is geographically proximate, if the threat is transparent. Ostensibly, Russian forces are geographically proximate and have greater aggregate power than U.S. forces in Europe. However, U.S. power projection capabilities and nuclear forces erase these advantages and make it unnecessary for the United States to balance against Russia, no matter if Russia is a transparent or potential threat. The U.S. efforts to admit the Central European states into NATO are more in line with a great power trying to shape the system<sup>28</sup> in a way beneficial to itself and its allies.

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<sup>28</sup>In his book, Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz posits that possession of power gives the possessor a greater stake in the system and the ability to act for the system's sake, even if the great power "pay[s] unduly in doing so." (Waltz, 1979, p. 198)

### C. SECOND IMAGE

According to Senator Richard Lugar, "We spend so much time on the 'Russian factor' in the NATO enlargement equation that we tend to neglect the 'American factor'." (Lugar, 1995) When examining U.S. actions and perspectives on NATO enlargement, it is imperative to consider "second image," or domestic, factors. In the United States, domestic and foreign policies are as "inextricably" linked as the United States is with Europe. In fact, most of the time it is difficult to see where one stops and the other starts. According to the Clinton Administration's *National Security Strategy*,

The line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing - that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives, and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people. (NSS, 1996, p. I)

The main foreign policy debate in the United States today is the debate over the future role of the United States in the world. According to Don Snider, Director of Political-Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic and International Studies, "there is no real consensus today as to the appropriate grand strategy for the United States." (Snider, 1995, p. 15) This lack of consensus is a political constraint that can lead to economic constraints. Because of the U.S. system of checks and

balances, the President and the Congress, which has the power of the purse, must generally agree on foreign policy that involves expenditure of funds. If there is no consensus, there will be no allocation of resources to support the policy. (Snider, 1995) The NATO enlargement issue is not immune to these political and economic constraints.

### **1. Political Constraints**

When it comes to NATO enlargement, U.S. political arguments revolve around three issues -- what role the United States should play in the world today, whether the United States should extend security guarantees to the prospective states, and the cost. This debate does not always fall along partisan lines. According to Stanley Sloan, a senior researcher at the Congressional Research Service, "Both the Republican majority and Democratic minority of the 104th Congress include some members who favour a continuing US international leadership role and others who favour global retrenchment." (Sloan, 1995, p. 217) This diversity of opinions points to one of the major potential constraints of the U.S. political system -- lack of consensus.

Today, before the 1996 elections, the U.S. government is "structurally and politically divided, with a Democratic President Clinton controlling the executive and the Republican Party ... in charge of both houses of Congress." (Sloan, 1995,



p. 217) On NATO enlargement, President Clinton's supports eventually admitting new members into the Alliance. Most Republicans also support enlargement. Their Contract with America included legislation to "mandate establishment of a program to assist the transition to full NATO membership of specified countries<sup>29</sup> in Central and Eastern Europe." (Gilman, 1996)

However, there is an increasing number of representatives and senators who are leery and unsupportive of NATO enlargement. Led by Senator Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, they are primarily concerned with: 1) the fact that NATO expansion may have negative impacts on the situation in Russia; 2) the possibility that the United States may not have any vital national security interests in the area that would warrant extending security guarantees; and, 3) the potential costs of enlargement. (Giacomo, 1995)

The security guarantee issue deals with Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which established NATO. Article Five provides, in the event of an attack, a security guarantee to all members of the Alliance, saying:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently

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<sup>29</sup>In the House, the bill named the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In the Senate, the Brown amendment, named after its sponsor, mentioned these three, as well as Slovakia.

they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (GAO, 1996, Appendix I:0.0.5)

Based on this article, the U.S. would have to provide the Czech Republic, or Hungary, or Poland, or any other potential new NATO member, with guarantees, including nuclear guarantees, for its safety. In the event of an attack on these countries, the U.S. would be obligated to respond. This article has led some people to question the importance of these countries to the United States. According to Michael Mandelbaum, a foreign policy analyst at Johns Hopkins University, "We haven't yet answered the question: Are we prepared to defend the Polish-Byelorussian border with the American nuclear arsenal?" (Dobbs, 1995) This issue is especially sensitive, considering that these countries "do not yet have long track-records of political democracy and free market capitalism." (Biden, 1995)

Currently, those opposed to NATO enlargement are in the minority. However, the growing concern about the process could limit the Administration's capabilities to continue the enlargement process. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have the ability to affect NATO enlargement. The

House of Representatives controls the federal budget. If there were sufficient opposition to NATO enlargement, it could refuse to provide funds. The Senate, on the other hand, is responsible for ratifying all treaties. If there were sufficient opposition in the Senate, it could refuse to ratify the accession of new members to NATO. (Kupchan, 1995)

The Administration must also consider the American public's opinion, especially in an election year. One of the major areas of the public that it must consider and deal with is the large number of Americans who have their roots in Central Europe. These Americans "are concentrated in the Midwest and Northeast in sufficient numbers to be a potential swing vote." (Kupchan, 1995) They comprise a potentially powerful lobby that the President cannot ignore. According to Eugene Iwanciw, a founder of the Central and East European Coalition,

There are 23 million Americans who trace their heritage to Eastern Europe, including over 9 million Poles. There are a dozen states -- very important states for any presidential election -- where they constitute more than 5 percent of the electorate.<sup>30</sup> Taking an expansionist position on NATO is a no-lose way of appealing to these voters. (Dobbs, 1995)

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<sup>30</sup>Six of which have more than 15 percent: Connecticut (18), Pennsylvania (18), New Jersey (18), Wisconsin (16), Illinois (15), and Michigan (15). (Dobbs, 1995)

## 2. Economic Constraints

For the United States, according to Joshua Muravchik, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, resources do not significantly constrain its ability to conduct foreign policy. According to him, "America is the richest country the world has ever known, and its resources have been expanding ... There is no resource problem." (Muravchik, 1996, p. 8) He estimates that the percentage of the budget spent on foreign aid is less than one percent. (Muravchik, 1996) Of course, more than foreign aid is required to manage the international system. The problem, as indicated in the previous section, is the lack of consensus and the political will to allocate the funding for NATO enlargement.

Robert Tucker, a contributing editor of *The National Interest*, believes that the great debate in American foreign policy today is not over what role the United States should exercise in the world. Rather, it is the contradiction between the American desire to "remain the premier global power and an ever deepening aversion to bear the costs of this position." (Tucker, 1996, p. 20) This aversion affects the dynamics of the public debate over NATO enlargement. According to Senator Nunn, the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, "As long as there is no price tag attached to them, resolutions about NATO expansion will pass

overwhelmingly. When you have a price tag, ... then a whole different set of players will get involved." (Dobbs, 1995)

The difficulty is that the "price tag" is undefined. There have been a number of studies attempting to estimate the costs of enlargement. It is problematic, since the Alliance has a number of options for integrating new members, ranging from upgrading the new member states' abilities for self-defense to building infrastructure and forward deployment of NATO troops on the territories of new members. (Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, 1995)

According to the RAND Corporation, the cost of admitting new members could be between \$20 and \$50 billion over a ten year period. This amount would be distributed in an undetermined manner between current and new members. (Dobbs, 7 July, 1996) Obviously, the current economic situations in these countries would limit their ability to contribute.

The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on NATO enlargement estimates that NATO funding for new members would "probably be gradual, would vary considerably, and would probably not exceed a total of \$50 million for any individual nation during the first 3 to 5 years of their membership in NATO." (GAO, 1996, Section 5.1) These figures are based on the following improvements to each new members' infrastructure: command and control information systems,

communications systems, air defense radars, air defense control centers, a collocated operating base, and a prepositioned material storage site. (GAO, 1996, Table 4) Since the United States contributes approximately 23 percent of NATO's common civil budget (GAO, 1996, Section 3.2), the RAND studies would indicate potential U.S. costs of \$4.6 to \$11.5 billion over ten years. The GAO report indicates annual costs of \$11.5 million per new member, over a 3 to 5 year period.

This money is available. In fact, the United States is spending more than that on some of the prospective new members right now. In 1995, the United States provided \$54 million in bilateral assistance to Partnership for Peace (PfP) members. (GAO, 1996, Section 2) For 1996, the Czech Republic and Hungary will each receive \$10 million in U.S. bilateral assistance, which is almost equivalent to what the GAO's estimated annual cost is (\$11.5 million). Poland is scheduled to receive \$25 million, more than twice what the GAO predicted. Total U.S. bilateral assistance (\$100 million) to PfP member states for 1996 would pay the U.S. portion for nine new members, using the GAO estimates. (GAO, 1996, Table 3)

As indicated by Senator Nunn earlier, he expects the debate over NATO enlargement to become more complicated when final and more accurate costs estimates are attached to the

issue. One reason for the reluctance of U.S. politicians to support the fiscal expenditure that will be required for NATO enlargement is that threats to U.S. national interests currently ambiguous. Another reason is that the United State has unilateral means available to increase its security. As discussed in the section on "third image" factors, the United States is conducting internal balancing.

It is modernizing its combat, mobility, and nuclear forces, with plans to spend almost \$250 billion dollars on new equipment in the next five years. It is also ensuring the survival of critical components of its military-industrial complex. According to Secretary of Defense Perry's message in the DoD's 1996 Annual Report to Congress,

Another way we hedge against future potential threats is by maintaining selected critical and irreplaceable elements of our defense industrial base, such as shipyards that build nuclear submarines ... the Department will selectively procure certain major systems in limited quantities to keep their production capabilities warm. (DoD, Annual Report to Congress, 1996)

### **3. Internal Security Threat**

Although there has been a number of recent incidences of political violence and terrorism in the United States, such as the bombing of the World Trade Center and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, there is no serious threat to the internal security of the country. Radical groups, regardless of their affiliation, are confronted with large and effective local,

state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Because of this, the United States faces no internal security threat to its survival or sovereignty.

#### **4. Summary of Second Image Factors**

Our inferred hypotheses from domestic political theory do not do a good job of explaining or predicting U.S. positions and actions on NATO enlargement. Only one of our hypotheses is confirmed. We predicted that a state with a confident leadership and strong state power or good state-society relations would balance internally prior to externally. In today's security environment, the U.S. is conducting internal balancing, while in some areas, particularly Central Europe, it has not expeditiously moved towards external alignments. This is because the leadership is confident in the stability of the government, has good relations with society, and is confident they can implement internal balancing efforts. Due to the current societal debate on what role the United States should play in the world, the government is not as confident in its ability to conduct the external balancing.

As for the rest of the hypotheses, they either do not apply or the U.S. case refutes them. Because the U.S. has a stable democratic government, unlikely to be deposed no matter who wins the next election, we do not see the Administration attempting, or needing to attempt, to balance externally



because internal balancing will further weaken its position. For similar reasons, we do not see the Administration seeking to balance to gain external validation of its legitimacy.

Economically, we do not see the United States balancing for external extraction. As one of the richest countries in the world, it has the capabilities and the resources to balance against threats internally, and does not need to balance externally. Paradoxically, by choosing to align with the states of Central Europe through its support of NATO enlargement, the United States will have to contribute significant amounts of money. And, the European countries seeking admission to NATO currently have little ability to provide significant resources to the United States in return.

Our final hypothesis concerned internal security threats. The United States today, although it has rising crime rates and a number of disparate groups who have actually used violence or have the potential to use it, does not have a significant internal security threat to its sovereignty or survival. Since it does not consider this threat more dangerous than external threats, and since it has the internal resources to combat the threat, the U.S. does not need to balance externally to gain resources.

Given the inability of our inferred hypotheses to predict or explain U.S. actions on NATO enlargement, it is interesting

to consider possible alternative explanations for why the United States supports enlargement. One possible explanation is bureaucratic politics. There are NATO lobbies in the Department of Defense, the State Department, and in academia, all of which have an interest in the continuing existence of NATO. Each is a part of the bureaucracy, and bureaucracies seek both influence and their continued survival. These desires can sometimes affect national security decisions.

According to Morton H. Halperin, in his book, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, participants in the national security decision making process "come to determine the national security of the United States in terms of the health and well-being of the organization to which they belong, the political and other interests of the President, or their own personal interests." (Halperin, 1974, p. 20) This problem can be exacerbated during elections. Halperin has said that "no President can ignore the pressures on him from the bureaucracy, especially the senior military and departmental officers, or the pressures from congressional leaders and the public, when a presidential campaign is around the corner." (Halperin, 1974, p. 306) These dynamics could affect whether, and to what extent, the United States supports NATO enlargement.

#### D. CONCLUSION

In the case of the United States, our hypotheses inferred from both the systemic and domestic political theories did a resoundingly poor job of predicting U.S. actions. This performance on the part of our hypotheses does not impugn our theories. The United States is unique of all our cases. It is the only all-around great power considered in the cases. While Russia must still be accorded some measure of "greatness" because of its nuclear capabilities, it no longer can compete with the United States because it does not possesses adequate economic capability, military strength, political stability, or competence.

U.S. internal balancing was the only area that was accurately predicted by our inferred hypotheses. This makes sense. The United States is in a period where the strategic environment is ambiguous. Currently, there are no immediate threats and no peer competitors. At this point, it is not evident where or when, or even if, they will develop in the future. U.S. efforts at internal balancing provide a hedge against the future unknown.

Even though there is not an unambiguous threat to the United States, it is still seeking to balance externally. The United States is one of the leading advocates for the accession of new members into NATO. This is in spite of the

fact that the United States will have to contribute almost a quarter of the total cost to NATO members and will have to provide security guarantees to states which may or may not be of vital national interest to the United States. Potential explanations exist for this behavior at both domestic and systemic levels of analysis.

Proponents of liberal democracy might explain U.S. actions by saying that it is in the best interests of the United States, as the most powerful liberal democracy, to sustain and perpetuate the existence of liberal democracies. According to Robert Kaufman, a professor of political science at the University of Vermont, the "institutional constraints and the norms of liberal democratic regimes significantly ameliorate the security dilemma between such regimes." (Kaufman, 1994, p. 699) These constraints and norms are able to ameliorate the security dilemma by "reducing the expectation of violence, by promoting a broader convergence of interest, by muting what clashes of interest exist, and by imposing formidable constraints on the preemptive use of force." (Kaufman, 1994, p. 699)

Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, might explain U.S. actions from a Realist's point of view by saying that the United States is acting this way because it cannot afford to ignore the system. According to Waltz, "Great powers are

never 'masters with free hands.' They are always 'Gullivers,' more or less tightly tied." (Waltz, 1979, p. 187) The United States is tied to the current system; it could try to withdraw from the system, but history is replete with isolationist states that the rest of the world would not allow to remain isolationist. Possession of power brings benefits -- the means of maintaining one's autonomy, wider ranges of action, and bigger safety margins when dealing with less powerful states. It also gives the possessor a bigger stake in the system and the ability to act for the system's sake. (Waltz, 1979). Acting for the good of the system, however, should not be considered an altruistic task. The United States will definitely receive benefits from a more stable and secure system.



## IX. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

### A. INTRODUCTION

This study had three goals: first, to provide an understanding of the situations of the six countries most involved in the NATO enlargement debate today; second, to survey the relative explanatory power of the competing systemic and state level theories that purport to explain state behavior to determine if one does a better job of predicting and explaining states' actions; and third, to provide policy analysts a heuristic tool for studying the problem and developing relevant policies. This study used comparative case studies as the means to accomplish these tasks. The study considered the cases of Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the United States. The case studies of the perspectives of the six states fulfilled the requirements of the first goal. The rest of this chapter will try to fulfill the requirements of the other two. It will analyze the relative explanatory power of the two levels across the case studies. With a goal similar to that of Barry R. Posen in his book, The Sources of Military Doctrine, this analysis seeks to show the theories' "overall relative value ...of each as an instrument for the study of national strategy." (Posen, 1984, p. 222) Finally, it will attempt to draw out some relevant policy implications for analysts and leaders to consider.

## B. RELATIVE EXPLANATORY POWER

This section seeks to determine which theories, systemic or state level, do a more consistent job predicting and explaining the actions of the states involved in the NATO enlargement debate. In other words, it attempts to assess which of the two levels has the greater relative explanatory power. From the beginning, it is necessary to declare that this is a difficult task to do in a very precise fashion. In addition, the process is made more problematic by two factors.

First, the determination of relative explanatory power is based on a comparison of how well the inferred hypotheses in each level of analysis held up over the six case studies. This is problematic because the determination of whether a case confirms or refutes a hypothesis is a subjective judgment arrived at after examination of a body of evidence. Unfortunately, absolute control of the variables is not possible, and there is no guarantee that the independent, key variables chosen for study are the only ones affecting the behavior of the states.

Second, not every hypothesis is created equal. Some may have a greater weight in affecting the decisions and behavior of a state. This dynamic may occur both within a level of analysis and between the levels of analysis. In addition, the importance, or weight, given to the variable may depend on the observer assessing the situation or behavior of the state. Some Realists, for



example, would attach greater weight and emphasis to balance of power theory, even over balance of threat.

Given these inherent limitations, an attempt at a somewhat rigorous comparison of the two levels of analysis to determine relative explanatory power is possible. To do this, I used a method of comparison similar to that of the U.S. Army's tactical decision making process<sup>31</sup> for comparing alternative courses of action. This process calls for comparing alternative courses of action against each other based on criteria that pertain to, or may affect, the mission.

For the case studies, a value is assigned to each hypothesis based on whether the case confirmed the hypothesis (value = 1), refuted the hypothesis (value = -1), or was able neither to confirm nor refute the hypothesis (value = 0). The basis for this selection of values is simple. A theory gains credibility when it is able to accurately predict or explain, through its inferred hypotheses, a state's behavior. Therefore, confirmation of a hypothesis is a positive "tick" for that theory's scorecard. Conversely, when a theory is not able to predict or explain a state's behavior, then it loses credibility. In this case, refutation of a hypothesis by a case negatively affects a theory's credibility. When a case can neither confirm nor refute a hypothesis, primarily because the case

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<sup>31</sup>The U.S. Army's tactical decision making process is outlined in Student Text 100-9, "Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decisionmaking," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1991.

does not meet all the conditions specified by the hypothesis, the credibility of the theory is not affected one way or the other.

Once one of these three values is assigned to each hypothesis in a case, the values representing all the hypotheses in a level of analysis are summed for each case. Given these totals for all six cases, we can then compare the relative values of the two levels of analysis to determine which has greater relative explanatory power.<sup>32</sup> Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the performances of the systemic and state level hypotheses, respectively. Figure 9.3 compares the totals for the two levels.

Hypotheses	Russia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	United States
<b>Balance of Power</b>						
1. Internal balance before external	-1	1	1	1	1	1
2. Traditional Balancing	1	-1	-1	-1	1	0
3. Defensive Bandwagoning	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Bandwagoing for Profit	-1	1	1	1	1	0
<b>Balance of Threat</b>						
5. Nearby states are greater threats	1	1	1	1	1	-1
6. A state will perceive a threat if it can see or suspects another has aggressive intentions and offensive capabilities	1	1	1	1	1	1
7. Balance against threat?	1	1	1	1	1	-1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>

Figure 9.1 Summary of Systemic Level (Third Image) Hypotheses

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<sup>32</sup>This method stresses positive numbers. The larger the total in each case, the more accurately the theory predicted or explained the actions of a state (i.e., the more confirmed hypotheses there were).

Hypotheses	Russia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	United States
<b>Political Stability</b>						
8. Confident leadership = internal balance	0	1	1	1	0	1
9. Unconfident leadership = ext. balance	-1	0	0	0	-1	0
10. Unconfident leadership = external validation	-1	0	0	0	-1	0
<b>Economic Constraints</b>						
11. External balancing to gain resources for domestic economy	-1	1	1	1	1	-1
12. Lack of internal resources forces external balancing to meet threat	0	1	1	1	1	0
<b>Internal Security Threat</b>						
13. External balancing for extraction of resources to combat internal threat	0	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>

Figure 9.2 Summary of State Level (Second Image) Hypotheses

Level of Analysis	Russia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	United States
<b>Systemic Level</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>State Level</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>

Figure 9.3 Comparison of Systemic and State Level Totals

As Figure 9.3 shows, the systemic level did a marginally better job of predicting or explaining the actions of the six states considered in this work. The figure shows that, in general, the inferred hypotheses from neither level of analysis were able predict or explain U.S. actions. For the four Central European states, the relative explanatory power edge goes to the systemic level. In the case of Russia, the selected theories and inferred hypotheses from the state level were totally unable to predict or explain Russian behavior, while those from the systemic level were

at least able to explain some Russian actions. Therefore, overall, I assess that the relative explanatory power of the systemic level is greater than that of the state level, for the independent, key variables selected.

### C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In the fall of 1993, Kenneth Waltz predicted the demise of NATO, saying that "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are." (Waltz, 1993, p. 76) Three years later, in the fall of 1996, this still is not happening; in fact, it is not even on the far horizon. Instead, we have seen a willingness of the members to increase both the scope of the Alliance's missions, in the form of out-of-area missions, and the size of the Alliance. In addition, France has returned to the military structure of the organization, increasing its size and capabilities. Instead of collapsing, NATO seems to be, in the parlance of the European Union, both deepening and broadening.

There are two main paradoxes of the possible NATO enlargement. The first is, "If Russia is so weak in social, political, economic, and military terms, why does NATO need to expand?" The second is a paradox based on the self-fulfilling prophecy. Its argument is that if NATO enlarges, it will provoke Russia into becoming exactly what we fear; but, if NATO does not enlarge, the Russians will be encouraged to move back into their old area, or sphere, of interests. Neither of these paradoxes is easily solved.

This section attempts to draw out some of the pertinent implications of the policy of NATO enlargement. First, it covers an area that will be critical for any U.S. president to "sell" to the American public, or at least the House and Senate, prior to enlargement -- how the United States will deal with Article Five security guarantees, both nuclear and conventional. Second, it discusses possible Russian reactions to enlargement. Finally, it considers what measures NATO can take to lessen the sting of enlargement for Russia, while still satisfying the expectations of new members.

#### **1. Article V and Deterrence**

As pointed out in the U.S. case study, the NATO enlargement debate in the United States is starting to take shape over two issues. The first issue is how much enlargement will cost. The second, and more germane, issue is whether the United States should provide extended deterrence coverage to the potential new members. In an effort to provide this extended deterrence, the United States could use either nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, or a combination of the two. For reasons enumerated below, the efficacy of using nuclear weapons in the case of an extended deterrence situation involving new members of an enlarged NATO is doubtful. Because of this, the United States and NATO should rely on a policy of conventional extended deterrence.

*.a. Nuclear Extended Deterrence*

The role that nuclear weapons could play in an extended deterrence setting may be decreasing. In 1988, John Mueller, a professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, wrote an article discussing the "essential irrelevance" of nuclear weapons. (Mueller, 1988) Stephen Cimbala, a professor at Pennsylvania State University, called into question the utility of nuclear weapons for extended deterrence. He said the United States lost its ability to conduct nuclear extended deterrence with the development of a Soviet second-strike capability. (Cimbala, 1993) There are two main issues for American planners and leaders thinking about using nuclear weapons in a future extended deterrence situation involving new members of NATO.

The first is that the Russian Federation will maintain this second-strike capability. As pointed out in the Russia case study, even after ratifying and implementing START II, it will have enough land and sea-based warheads to hit U.S. targets in the event of a first-strike on Russia. The second issue is one of political will and national interests. The U.S. case study pointed out that there are those in the government who wonder whether Poland and the Czech Republic and Slovakia are really vital national interests to the United States.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>This discussion, of course, assumes that the challenger is Russia. While this may not necessarily be the case, the United States' "pledge under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to threaten nonnuclear states with nuclear attack (Watman and Wilkening, 1995, p. 80)" would

Certainly, Warsaw and Prague and Bratislava are not London or Paris or Bonn/Berlin. These places do not carry the same historical weight and importance in the minds of the American people that the major capitals of Europe do. Therefore, these two factors -- an assured Russian second-strike capability and possible future debates over the political will of the United States to use nuclear weapons to deter attacks against areas of dubious national interests -- could limit the credibility of a future U.S. attempt at nuclear extended deterrence in Central Europe. The solution is a robust ability to conduct conventional extended deterrence.

***b. Conventional Extended Deterrence***

In 1992, Charles Glaser, a professor at the University of Chicago, wrote that the "United States and its NATO allies could choose to rely entirely on conventional forces to deter Russian conventional attack against Western Europe." (Glaser, 1992, p. 51) Given the previously detailed and pervasive problems in the Russian Armed Forces today, it seems this is more apropos now than then. Based on this, it would be prudent for the United States and NATO to base future extended deterrence strategy on the principle of conventional deterrence.

Of course, extended conventional deterrence can be problematic. A major area of concern is the credibility of the deterrer's capabilities. According to Richard Harknett, a

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negate, or at least severely limit, the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence attempts.

professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati, the credibility of a deterrent threat rests on two things -- the political will to go through with the threatened actions should deterrence fail and the capability to hurt the challenger. With nuclear deterrence, the major problem is the credibility that the deterring state will have the political will to use nuclear weapons. With conventional deterrence, the major problem is not the credibility of the deterrer's political will, but the credibility of the deterrer's capability.<sup>34</sup> (Harknett, 1994)

The problem of conventional deterrence, according to Harknett, is that "[f]rom a challenging country's perspective, conventional deterrent costs are likely to be viewed as highly suspect. Regardless of formidability, conventional deterrence will be perceived as threatening costs that can be contested." (Harknett, 1994, p. 91) Challengers are likely to believe that they can contest these threatened costs "either through exploiting time, new tactics, [or] improved counter-weaponry." (Harknett, 1994, p. 92) Harknett offers several solutions that the United States and NATO could use to lower the contestability of their threatened costs in future extended deterrence situations in Central Europe. The most important is sharing information with potential challengers. According to Harknett, "[i]nformation

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<sup>34</sup>In his article, Harknett really only considers substituting the effects of conventional weapons for those of nuclear weapons. He does not consider the balance of forces.



shared with the challenger concerning the deterrer's objectives and capabilities may be the most critical." (Harknett, 1994, p. 94) NATO is already doing this, to some degree. There is a Russian liaison officer at NATO headquarters in Brussels. More could be done, however, under either the auspices of Russian membership in the Partnership for Peace or a special charter between NATO and Russia, to further the image of NATO's conventional capabilities in the eyes of the Russians. There is, of course, a risk inherent in this strategy. By letting a potential challenger share information on capabilities, the deterrer runs the risk of having the challenger innovate to counter those capabilities, making deterrence less effective in the long run.

## **2. Possible Russian Reactions**

Winston Churchill's 1939 characterization of Russia as a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma is no less true today, especially concerning its possible actions in response to future NATO enlargement. The goal of this section is not to prophesize exhaustively every possible Russian reaction. Instead, it seeks to survey two possible reactions, one at each end of the spectrum.

According to Sherman Garnett, a specialist on Ukraine and a former policy analyst with the Department of Defense, Russian reaction to NATO enlargement would be immediate and negative.<sup>35</sup> Some of the possible "worst-case" reactions of Russia to NATO

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<sup>35</sup>Talk given at the Naval Postgraduate School, 10 September, 1996.

enlargement can be drawn from a recent study by the Russian Institute for Defense Studies (INOBIS). According to Anton Surikov, the head of the institute, "Most representatives of the power structures (defense, security, and police) are in agreement with our ideas." (Starr, 12 June, 1996) These ideas include: 1) countering the enlargement of NATO by establishing a military alliance within the CIS; 2) Redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to the Western, Northern, and Southern Theaters of Military Operations (TVD); and, 3) In the event of a total collapse in NATO-Russian relations, selling nuclear and missile technology to Iran, Iraq, and Algeria. (Starr, *Orbis*, 1996) Other potentially dangerous possibilities would include a rapprochement with China and the rise of ultra nationalists to power in Russia.

Of course, Russian capabilities to do any of these things would be limited by its current social malaise, political instability, and military and economic weakness. Until they can fix these problems, it is unlikely that they could do anything that could stop NATO enlargement. Which brings us to the "best-case" scenario of Russian reactions, at least for NATO -- the Russians essentially do nothing because they cannot do anything.<sup>36</sup> For the

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<sup>36</sup>This option, of course, does not presume inaction on the part of Russia. Certainly, there would be increased economic and military efforts to cement integration of Russia with the CIS. The greatest integration would probably be seen between Russia and Belarus. As previously mentioned, the relations between these two are currently tighter than between Russia and any other former republic. However, these actions could not stop, or even slow, NATO enlargement.

short term, this seems like the more probable Russia reaction, not, obviously, by choice.

Two main areas could constrain Russia reactions to NATO enlargement. The first is the social malaise of the society, which could affect its support of any Russian countermeasures. As mentioned earlier, there has been a wholesale demoralization of the Russia population. Even if NATO enlarges, it is unlikely that the Russian government can generate any support against the enlargement from the populace. According to Igor Kuznetsov, an anthropologist from Krasnodar University in Russia, NATO enlargement is only an issue as part of the political game. Among the Russia populace, there is no echo of the issue. They are too concerned about their own issues and problems.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, it is doubtful that they would support any programs that diverted scarce resources towards a Russian confrontation with NATO.

The second is the fragility of the anti-enlargement consensus. According to Sherman Garnett, "The anti-NATO enlargement consensus is likely to break up once it happens." I believe this consensus also would breakup over the diversion of resources to counter enlargement. As outlined in the case study on Russia, the country is suffering from debilitating economic conditions. Each ministry and organization in the government seems to act like a feudal baron, trying to grab as much power, influence, and resources as

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<sup>37</sup>Talk given at the Naval Postgraduate School, 12 September, 1996.

possible for its barony. It is difficult to imagine that the threat of NATO enlargement would transcend this current situation.

### **3. Easing the Sting**

The question becomes, how can NATO insure that it gets the "best-case" response from Russia over enlargement and not the "worst-case?" Obviously, it cannot guarantee either result. What it can do, however, is attempt to expand in such a way as to assuage Russian perceptions of threat and limit the likelihood of the "worst-case" coming to fruition. According to Sherman Garnett, the greatest leverage NATO has in this area is the manner in which it expands. A rapid enlargement might provoke the self-fulfilling prophecy of Russia becoming what we fear. On the other hand, an open and gradual enlargement, with a declared defensive strategy, could mitigate that likelihood. This section will highlight four possible strategies that may attenuate Russia anti-NATO feelings.

#### ***a. Strategy of Attrition***

In an effort to allay Russian fears, NATO could adopt a formal strategy of attrition. According to the Russian military theorist Major General A.A. Svechin (1878-1938), adoption of a strategy of attrition envisages the creation of a protracted struggle; because of this, "an attrition strategy favored a defender with superior mobilization potential and economic resources." (Cimbala, 1993, p. 171) These are the advantages that NATO has today.

The combination of superior Western economies and industry with American force projection capabilities gives the Alliance a unique capability to stop and counter any conventional attack in Europe. These same capabilities would also be able to reconstitute NATO fighting power faster than any potential adversary. By formally adopting a strategy of attrition based on reconstitution, NATO would be less threatening to Russia. For NATO, though, this would not have to entail any kind of toothless strategy. In other words, it would not preclude the use of offensive measures. As Stephen Cimbala says, "Attrition strategies and other varieties of non-offensive defense are non-offensive only to the degree that they abjure reliance on prompt offensives as decisive moves." (Cimbala, 1993, p. 182) Unfortunately, "the difference between...offensively oriented and rearward looking or defensive conventional force postures is not always obvious." (Cimbala, 1993, p. 168) To preclude problems of perception about this on the part of Russia, NATO could increase its efforts to share information about the Alliance.

***b. Shared Information***

In order to facilitate the enlargement of the Alliance, NATO must share information with the Russians for two reasons. These reasons were discussed earlier, but it is important to state them explicitly here. The first reason is so the Russians can have a better view of the intentions of NATO. Sharing information with

Russia on the intentions of NATO in Central Europe will do two things: first, it will show Russia that Central Europe and newly admitted members are important to the Alliance; and second, it will show the Russians that NATO is not an aggressive organization bent on destroying it.

The second reason is to insure the Russians know that NATO has sufficient, possibly overwhelming, capabilities to inflict damage on Russian interests, should it attempt to stop enlargement or interfere in the area. These reasons are not in opposition to each other. The second provides a better view of NATO's capabilities to the Russians. This should increase the credibility of U.S. and NATO efforts at extended conventional deterrence in the future. However, any program of shared information must be created with the inherent risks of sharing in mind. There are degrees of sharing; too much sharing could allow any potential adversary, including the Russians, to innovate and develop technologies and counter-measures for the advantages NATO has.

### *c. Forward Deployment Options*

The third strategy that the U.S. and NATO can use to enlarge NATO, while at the same time ameliorating Russian fears of the enlargement, is to adopt a gradual forward deployment doctrine that includes: 1) creation of sufficient infrastructure to support force projection; 2) no deployment of nuclear weapons in peace time; and, 3) deployment of foreign troops only in multinational units

built around units of the country in which the deployment takes place. These options will do several things.

First, creation and enlargement of infrastructure would allow for rapid force projection into an area in a time of crisis. This should be the first priority of enlargement. Once the infrastructure is in place, the system should be routinely and vigorously tested. Exercises in the vein of REFORGER to countries such as Poland, especially when observed by Russian military officials, would demonstrate the importance of the country to NATO and the capabilities of the Alliance.<sup>38</sup>

Second, by not deploying nuclear weapons into the territories of the new members, even though some of them have said they would accept them, NATO decreases the level of confrontation between itself and Russia. This is because, as mentioned in the Russia case study, there is a fear that enlargement will bring tactical nuclear weapons into range of the "heartland" of Russia. Besides, realistically, this is not a hard call for NATO to make. Between the British, French, and American nuclear forces, including naval assets that could cover Poland from the Baltic Sea, there are more than enough nuclear assets to hit any target in Russia that a tactical nuclear weapon stationed in a Central European NATO state could hit.

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<sup>38</sup>Of course, these would not be "Return of Forces" exercises. They would be "Deployment of Forces" exercises. Hence, the exercise in Poland could be called DEFORPOL.

Finally, NATO forces could be stationed in these new member states as a part of multinational units only. In fact, I believe they should be stationed in the new members' territories. It would demonstrate NATO's commitment to these new partners. It might be less offensive, or more palatable, to the Russians if these units served under multinational colors. An American or British or German brigade or division, because of its capabilities and equipment, is a provocative force. However, battalions of these countries, integrated into a multinational unit with a more convoluted chain of command, different languages, and mixed equipment<sup>39</sup> have to be less provocative to the Russians. On the NATO side, these multinational units would provide the armed forces of these countries daily examples of professional militaries and familiarity with NATO procedures and equipment.

#### ***d. Multilateral and Bilateral Efforts***

The final strategy that NATO could use to soften the blow the Russia of enlargement could be multilateral and bilateral agreements between the members of the Alliance and Russia. These agreements could create parallel structures designed to increase the role of Russia in Europe, both in the security area and in the political and economic areas. The agreements could provide ties that will seek to substitute for items such as trade lost by the

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<sup>39</sup>Of which, the equipment of the pre-enlargement NATO members would generally be compatible because of Standard NATO Agreements (STANAG), while that of the new members would be a mix of recently obtained, compatible equipment, and older Warsaw Pact equipment.



reorientation of the Central European states from East to West. In addition, incorporating Russia into the structures and institutions of Europe will help to allay Russian fears of isolation from the West.

#### D. CONCLUSION

As stated at the beginning of this study, NATO enlargement is the most contentious question in the European security environment today. The states involved support or oppose enlargement for a variety of reasons. President Clinton has said that it is not a matter of whether NATO will expand, but when. Given that it is likely to happen, it is the responsibility of policy analysts and leaders in every state to consider both the expected benefits and the possible consequences of NATO enlargement on the overall security environment.

In order to do that, policy makers must have the tools to explore all aspects of the issue. The first tool this study attempted to provide was that of knowledge about the subject. The individual case studies were structured to give the reader an overall view of some of the systemic and state level factors affecting the debate over NATO expansion in those countries. The structure of the case studies also sought to provide a second tool for policy makers -- a determination of which level of analysis has greater explanatory power.

The schools of Realism and Liberalism offer competing explanations for the loci of state behavior. Realists believe that the nature of the system influences state behavior. Liberals believe that the nature of the state and its interconnectivity with other states influence state behavior. This study pitted some of the contending theories of the systemic and state levels of analysis against each other to determine if one level or the other does a better job of explaining and predicting state behavior.

It was not possible to do this comparison over the universe of possible causes which influence the outcomes we see in state behavior. However, given our focused comparisons over the six cases and two levels of analysis, it was possible to make a determination of the relative explanatory power of the two levels. In this study, and for the key, independent variables which it considered, theories from the systemic level of analysis exhibited a greater ability to predict and explain state behavior.

The final tool which the study sought to provide the reader and policy maker was an overview of several of what I consider key and pertinent implications of NATO enlargement that have to be considered along with the awareness of the situations in the individual countries. These implications included how security guarantees should, and will, be extended to the new members, possible Russian reactions to NATO enlargement, and some strategies for enlargement that might ameliorate the expected adverse reaction

on the part of the Russians. How NATO expands will directly influence how the Russians react.



## APPENDIX

### The Military Balance<sup>1</sup> For Europe

Country	Personnel	Divisions	Sep. Bde <sup>2</sup>	Tanks	AIFV/ APCs	Arty <sup>3</sup>	SSM	Aircraft		Atk Helo
								Cbt	Trans	
USA - Europe	159,600	2	0 <sup>4</sup>	1968	3160	1373	Varies <sup>5</sup>	228	26	153
Russia	€1,714,000	69	19	19,500	35,000	21,300	Varies	2150	650	1000
Kaliningrad	38,000	3	2	1100	1300	600	40	35	0	48
France	409,600	9	1 <sup>6</sup>	1067	4688	1546	113	477	126	237
Germany	367,300	8	1	2855	6606	2090	0	454	90	45
Britain	254,300	2	2	950	4176	569	64	561	74	126
Czech Rep	92,900	5	3	1433	1659	1418	14	240	14	36
Hungary	74,500	0	12	1191	1645	991	0	171	14	39
Poland	283,600	10	2	2110	2291	1880	40	438	34	70
Slovakia	47,000	2	0	912	1043	808	9	146	16	19
Austria	51,250	0	5	169	447	230	0	54	31	0
Belarus	92,500	2	2	3108	3406	1584	96	354	44	78
Bulgaria	101,900	3	3	1967	894	2053	72	294	14	44
Croatia	105,000	0	5	178	92	900	0	20	9	2
Estonia	2500	0	4 bn	0	44	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	6850	0	2 bn	0	15	0	0	0	4	0
Lithuania	8900	0	1	0	15	0	0	0	30	0
Romania	230,500	7	11	2395	2450	3138	15	382	39	37
Slovenia	8100	0	7 bn	57	45	45	0	0	0	1
Ukraine	517,000	14	3	5430	5216	3638	272	1433	274	307
Serbia	126,500	0	19	639	629	1499	0	284	23	115

<sup>1</sup> John Chipman, director, The Military Balance 1994-1995, London: Brassey's Ltd., for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.

<sup>2</sup> Maneuver brigades only.

<sup>3</sup> Artillery totals are for towed artillery, self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars.

<sup>4</sup> The United States has material prepositioned in Europe for 4 armored and 4 mechanized infantry brigades. The numbers given for U.S. equipment totals reflect this prepositioned material.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. and Russian missile numbers are not listed, given their vast amounts of surface-to-surface missile systems.

<sup>6</sup> Separate brigade numbers for France and Germany reflect the combined French/German brigade.



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